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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to illustrate and explain the variable take-up of microfinance 
from the particular standpoint of the actors who actually produce and deliver 
microfinance. It draws attention to issues of relationships, action, tensions, and 
compromises in the real work of loan officers, which ultimately define how 
microfinance works. Few existing studies have used data outside South Asia to 
examine what loan officers actually do at the interface with clients and their role 
in the diffusion of microfinance. A central concern of this thesis is that 
microfinance relies heavily upon loan officers to be a critical link and facilitators 
of 'bottom-up' development, yet the activities of loan officers in sub-Saharan 
Africa and Zambia in particular, where microfinance is emerging, remain 
relatively under-researched. 
This qualitative ethnographic study was designed to examine the processes of 
microfinance and how it works by interviewing and observing loan officers' 
interactions with clients and everyday practices. Analysis of data was conducted 
in accordance with grounded theory principles and organised with the assistance 
of the software programme, QSR NVIVO. 
The results reported in this thesis indicate that loan officers had multiple, 
ambiguous and fast changing roles, mainly driven by an institution's economic 
survival rather than clients' 'empowerment'. Pressure for institutional 
sustainability and commercialisation were also found to be changing 
relationships and the original character of microfinance. Furthermore, the 
practice of microfinance in Zambia risked transforming loan officers into 'loan 
repayment agents' as opposed to 'development workers' or 'enablers' of growth. 
The thesis concludes that loan officers are so critical that without an appropriate 
~-~~fieldwork~ culture,- microfinance. cannot -effectively -diffuse -whatever~its~ design. 
The central contention of the thesis is that, sustainability and diffusion of 
microfinance could be flawed if it is so dependent on loan officers. 
Furthermore, those studies which have excluded the voice of loan officers may 
not be an accurate predictor of its likely performance. 
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Chapter one 
Introduction 
"Microfinance has proved its value, in many countries, as a weapon against poverty and hunger. 
It really can change peoples' lives for the better -especially the lives of those who need it most" 
(Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, 18 November 2004). 
1.1. Introduction 
This research seeks to illustrate and explain the variable take-up of microfmance 
from the particular standpoint of the actors who actually produce and deliver 
microfinance. It draws attention to issues of action, tensions, and compromises 
in the real work of loan officers at the interface with clients, which ultimately 
define how microfinance works. It does this by examining the role played by 
loan officers 1 in 'empowering' the poor and the development of micro finance in 
Zambia. 
Poverty alleviation topped the official international development agenda in the 
1990's with claims that appropriate credit can end poverty. To boost world 
microfinance initiatives, the UN General Assembly designated the year 2005 as 
the International Year of Microcredit. The importance of micro finance was also 
raised in the 2004 G8 Summit in Sea Island, the Commission for Africa Report, 
2005 and later at the G8 Gleneagles Summit, 2005 in Scotland. The Microcredit 
Summit Campaign of 1997 set an ambitious goal of reaching 100 million of the 
1 Loan officers are employees of MFis actively involved in the lending process by way of 
implementing the policies, mediating the transactions and interacting with clients. They are the 
major link between microfinance institutions and clients and possess the most experience with 
respect to implementation or real work of microfinance. Other titles such as: field staff, credit 
officers or fieldworkers have been used to refer to such MFI employees. This study adopts the 
title..:. Joan offi(£rs-unless.refemng-to~other 'sources. · - · - · · · ~ ·· ·- · = - - - · 
world's poorest by 2005 (Microcredit Summit Secretariat Summit, 2001 ). 
Although the definition of poverty is problematic, in Africa more than 40 
percent of its 750 million people live below the internationally recognized 
poverty line of $1 a day (World Bank, 2005), and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is 
even more disturbing. As table 1.1 shows, SSA has the highest percentage living 
below US$ 1 per day compared to other regions and in particular, South Asia 
and Latin America. In 1996, the World Bank Group and the International 
Monetary Fund launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) to 
provide debt relief to 41 heavily indebted countries, 32 of which are located in 
SSA alone (Swallow, 2005). 
Table 1.1 Headcount indices: Official Percentages of Population living 
below US$1 per day 
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
East Asia 57.7 38.9 28.0 29.6 24.9 16.6 15.7 14.9 
Eastern Europe 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 3.7 4.2 6.3 3.7 
& Central Asia 
Latin America 9.7 11.8 10.9 11.3 11.3 10.7 10.5 9.5 
& Caribbean 
Middle East & 5.1 3.8 3.2 2.3 1.6 2.0 2.6 2.4 
North Africa 
South Asia 51.5 46.8 45.0 41.3 40.1 36.6 32.2 31.3 
Sub-Saharan 41.6 46.3 46.8 44.6 44.0 45.6 45.7 46.9 
Africa 
Total 40.4 32.8 28.4 27.9 26.3 22.8 21.8 21.1 
Source: World Development Indicators 2005. 
Beck, et al, (2005) saw a strong correlation between poverty and lack of 
financial access. Similarly, the Commission for Africa Report, 2005, found 
levels of financial exclusion as high as 90 percent in African countries. Basu et 
al., (2004) found that in Ghana and Tanzania only 5-6 percent of the population 
had bank accounts. Given the scale of poverty in developing countries, and 
arguments that microfinance can be an effective strategy in poverty alleviation 
(Commission for Africa, 2005; Khandker, 1998; World Bank, 2005), there is 
2 
striking international variability in its take-up. Nowhere is the task of alleviating 
poverty more urgently required than in SSA (Table 1.1 ), where micro finance 
needs to move from its initial promising start to sustainable large scale operation 
in order to deliver long tetm inclusive access to financial services to the poor. 
1.2 Introducing the research 
Microfinance2, the provision of small size loans and other financial services to 
low income households, is often seen as a key recent innovation in terms of 
means of outreach to the poor and vulnerable (Montgomery and Weiss, 2006). It 
is an effort to counter the effects of credit market failures that effectively 
exclude many potential borrowers from markets (Aryeetey and Pokuaa Fenny, 
2006). It has become a widely acknowledged approach to alleviating poverty. Its 
central premise is that the lack of access by the poor to credit constitutes one of 
the most critical impediments to poverty reduction and broad-based 
development. However, microfinance activities are more known in Asia and 
Latin America than in SSA3. As Mosley and Rock (2004) have also noted, most 
evaluations to date relate to the same South Asian context while regions like the 
SSA remain underresearched. In addition, there are fewer case studies of 
microfinance failures themselves (Fisher (2002). Currently there is more 
microfinance diffusion, provision and practice in Latin America and Asia, but 
not SSA. Evaluations of microfinance projects throughout Africa otherwise 
suggest that they have been less successful (Aryeetey, 1998). The microcredit 
2 
"Microfinance" is the supply of loans, savings, money transfers and other financial services to 
very low-income people. Microfinance institutions (MFis) refer to a growing number of 
specialized financial institutions that use innovative delivery methods to extend the financial 
services market. Microfinance institutions consist of organizations and agents that engage in 
relatively small financial transactions using specialized, character-based methodologies to serve 
low-income households and others who lack access to the banking system (Jurik, 2005). They 
may be informal, semi-formal (that is legally registered but not under the central bank 
regulation), or formal financial intermediaries. This thesis focuses on semi-formal 
intermediaries. 
3 The focus on sub-Saharan Africa naturally excludes the Arab countries of North Africa that are 
often identified with the Middle East. Africa in this study will m-ainly be used to refer to SSA 
countries. 
3 
Summit Campaign Report (2005) showed that in 2004, Asia had the highest 
number of microfinance institutions (MFis) and cl ients compared to the other 
regions (see figure 1.1 and 1.2t At an institutional level, the numbers of 
bonowers reached by microfinance programmes in Africa are lower than figures 
for successful institutions in Asia and Latin America. In Kenya, for example, 
less than 700,000 out of an estimated 9 to I 0 million poor can access 
microfmance (Hulme, 2000). In Zambia, access to MFI services is estimated at 
less than 100,000, in a country where 68 percent live in poverty (DFID fact 
sheet, 2006). 
Distribution of MRs by Region 
1800 -
1600 
1400 
1200 
El No . of MFis 1000 ~ 628 800 -600 400 ~ 0 
Asia Africa LA&Carib 
Region 
Figure 1. 1 Distribution of MFis by Region 
Source: Compiled from Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2005, p.26 
4 These statistics compiled by the Mi crocredit Summit Report exclude MFl s that did not subm it 
information in 2004. However, these onl y accounted for 10 percent of a ll the cli ent population 
reached. CETZAM and PRIDE Zamb ia-the institutions under study are both listed as having 
submitted data (Summi t Rep01i , Appendi x 3, p. 54). 
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Distribution of Clients by Region 
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Figure 1. 2. Distribution of Clients by Region 
Source: Compiled from Microcredit Summit Campaign Repm1 2005, p.26 
The contrast that figures 1.1 and 1.2 present is equally striking. As figure 1.1 
shows Africa has half the number of MFis in Asia, but reaches out to a 
population of less than 10 million (figure 1.2). Why is this so, given that more 
than 85 percent of African MFis use the Asian group-based methodology? 
In examining why MFis in SSA have not evolved and performed as expected, 
most studies have attributed this in part to the sparse population in rural areas 
(though most MFis are urban based, in particular in Zambia), high operational 
costs and other institutional constraints to expansion (Baumann, 2004; Mukama, 
et al. , 2005 ; Nissanke, 2001; Volschenk and Biekpe, 2003). Others believe it 
arises from inappropriate lending methodologies (Pitamber, 2003; Wright, 2000) 
and inadequate financial and legal frameworks (Maimbo and Mavrotas, 2003; 
Mwiinga and Meagher, 1999). Consequently, research has tended either to focus 
on product diversification, credit technologies and methodologies which allow 
microfinance institutions to expand financial services to the poor while 
achieving financial sustainability, or on the employment and income generation 
impacts of credit (Aghion and Morduch, 2000; Bebbington and Gomez, 2006; 
5 
Deubel, 2006; Morduch, 1999). Likewise evaluations of microfinance programs 
pursue questions of financial sustainability, efficiency, scale of operations and 
changes in household income. Fernando (2006) among others has argued that 
many positive claims about microfinance are based on simple quantitative 
indicators, such as numbers of borrowers, lending institutions and loan 
repayments. This is understandable where the interest of many economic studies 
is less to explain the process than the subsequent outcomes of micro finance, and 
thereby justify continuing financial and policy support for it. In addition, much 
research about microfinance is investment related, and the literature has an 
underlining tone of advocacy. Important as these might be to continued funding 
and development of sustainable MFis, they often fail to address grassroots 
perspectives. So, despite all the effort devoted to impact studies, less attention is 
given to the organizational and social processes through which the outcomes 
they report are first achieved. Microfinance is not just about outcome measures. 
It is also about understanding processes (Jurik, 2005). In other words, these 
studies are not equipped to explain the how, and why, type of questions which 
need to be posed about it. How, then, does microfinance actually work? What 
can explain its variable take-up? This thesis asks such questions of micro finance, 
in particular of micro finance development in Zambia. 
1.3. Motives of the Study 
Interest in how microfinance works, and in Zambia in particular, was motivated, 
firstly, by the proliferating literature during the 1990's and early 2000's, and 
growing global interest among organisations such as the World Bank, IMF and 
United Nations. The past two decades have seen the emergence of powerful new 
methodologies for delivering microfinance services, especially microcredit. 
Much of this has been pioneered by Non-Governmental Organisations (Hulme 
and Mosley, 1996; Nissanke, 2001 ). Zambia itself has very high poverty levels 
(see chapter 3) and yet knowledge of its microfinance sector remains limited 
(Mus-<fna an-d Coetzee, 2001 ). Donor funded- microfihahce ihstitutiomr-havec not 
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been established long, with most microfinance programs starting 1994-2001. 
Furthermore, despite the multiplicity of donor agencies that fund microfinance 
programmes (e.g. SIDA, DFID, USAID and CARE); there is limited knowledge 
except for a few internal evaluations prepared by donor agencies and 
microfinance institutions themselves. Many evaluations were commissioned by 
donor agencies (seeking to make a case for micro finance) and thus their purpose 
needs to be scrutinised. Microfinance in sub-Saharan Africa is an emerging but 
under researched sector. SSA itself is difficult to study because of this lack of 
reliable research (Lafourcade et al., 2005), while certain data do not enter the 
public domain at all. Individual evaluation studies have tended to be 
concentrated in two main regions - East and West Africa. Overall, there is a lack 
of research from sub-Saharan Africa (Copestake, et al. 2001 ), but an increasing 
need for it. 
This research therefore argues that orthodox economic models of cause and 
effect which link project inputs to outputs and impact, although important, are 
not fully adequate for understanding and managing the processes of 
microfinance in action. This is because they neglect the work of microfinance 
itself from grassroots perspectives, in particular, loan officers and their clients. 
As an alternative, this research proposes a framework that incorporates the 
'intervening action' of microfinance as 'a lens' through which other key factors 
also account for its variable take up. 
Relatively few studies have concentrated specifically on fieldworkers in spite of 
their grassroots importance (Ahmad, 2000, 2002; Baumann, 2004; Goetz, 2001; 
O'Reilly, 2004). Less is known about loan officers and their potential to shape 
the outcomes of microfinance. Outside Bangladesh and South Asia, little 
knowledge exists about the role of fieldworkers/loan officers in group-based 
microfinance. This research therefore concentrates upon how microfinance 
actually works from the perspectives of loan officers and clients. In light of 
rising expectations for micro finance as an anti.:.poverty strategy, -it is important to 
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understand the actors who facilitate any such process of 'empowering' the poor. 
This research provides insights into the actual work of loan officers who 
implement policy and directly interact with clients of micro finance institutions. 
1.4. Research Aims and Objectives 
The study is concerned to understand why microfinance in SSA and, in 
particular, Zambia has not yet evolved as expected, let alone realized its full 
potential. It asks why many microfinance institutions struggle with client 
outreach in the midst of acute poverty. In doing this, the study adopts a "bottom-
up" (not just "top-down") perspective to understanding the process of 
microfinance and focuses on the loan officers who mediate the relationship 
between clients and the organization. It aims at developing an interpretive view 
rather than solving any one particular problem. To meet this aim, the thesis has 
four objectives: 
( 1) To explain the variable-take up of micro finance in Zambia by examining 
the process of micro finance in the related broader context. 
(2) To understand the actual role of loan officers at the interface with clients, 
particularly the factors that 'enable' or 'constrain' such interactions. 
(3) To explain why loan officers and MFI clients interact as they do and how 
this affects microfinance performance. 
( 4) Develop an alternative theoretical v1ew of micro finance that better 
explains its variable development. 
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1.5. Specific Research Questions 
To achieve the main research objectives, this research will seek to answer the 
following questions: 
1. Who are the loan officers and what motivates them to seek/do such 
developmental work? 
2. What roles do field workers/loan officers play m the process of 
micro finance? 
3. What is the nature ofloan officer-client relationship? 
4. How might the personal characteristics of a loan officer enable or constrain 
their interactions with clients? 
5. How do loan officer and clients themselves construct the nature of the 
rnicrofinance work? 
6. How do loan officers adapt to competing expectations of their clients and 
management? 
1.6. Methodology 
A key argument of this research is that, rather than just take a top-down and 
managerial perspective, a 'bottom-up' perspective can also offer important 
perspectives upon 'real world' rnicrofinance development. Loan officers need to 
be understood in terms of what they observably do as well as what they and 
others claim, which here meant interviewing them as well as observing their 
interactions with clients and each other. 
The chosen research methodology followed an inductive and qualitative 
approach which recognizes that actors' interactions have the potential to shape 
practice in ways which are not always fully measurable. This research therefore 
draws from constructivist and interpretive paradigms and a relativist ontology 
which ackllowle-dges 'riuiltipfe iealitfes'~'=sudCframeworks focus on- processes . 
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by which meanings are created, negotiated and sustained. The research seeks to 
demonstrate trustworthiness through credibility, transferability, dependability, 
and conformability in data. 
1. 7. Contribution to Knowledge 
As noted above, there is limited understanding about how microfinance works in 
Africa, especially where research has been confined to a discussion of 
institutions themselves and lending methodologies. This study identifies and fills 
a theoretical and empirical gap, by highlighting the actualities of microfinance 
and the importance of loan officers to its diffusion. In contributing to 
knowledge, it argues that loan officers are so critical at the grassroots that, 
without an appropriate field work culture, microfinance does not fully embed 
whatever its original design. The implications for microfinance development are 
that existing knowledge could be misleading if it misses out other interaction 
variables and the voice of the actors who deliver it. Similar arguments have been 
raised concerning 'accountability to the poor'. Goetz and Jenkins (2005) for 
example, argue that, unless the poor are taken more into account, and are able to 
participate in exacting accountability themselves; conventional accounting for 
better development outcomes could be flawed. This research therefore argues 
that what we know about sustainability and diffusion of micro finance could also 
be flawed if it is so dependent on the performance of loan officers who hitherto 
have been peripheral to research findings. The study therefore represents a 
departure from current preoccupation with the outcomes of microfinance. To 
understand how certain promising schemes fail, and tone down actors' varied 
expectations, means incorporating a 'bottom-up' perspective. Seeing 
microfinance from the perspectives of loan officers and clients informs our 
understanding of the difficulties of implementation, and makes its potential more 
difficult to realize than any simple 'win-win' picture can acknowledge. The 
research therefore contributes by illustrating and explaining how, and why, in 
practice rnictofirtance"fak~up· is so' variable 'across different regions. 
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Less is known about group-based microfinance in urban areas. The presumption 
that poverty in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and other developing regions is a rural 
phenomenon (World Bank, 2004, 2005, 2006) explains why so little attention 
has been given to understanding how microfinance works and adapts to urban 
relational dynamics as opposed to those of rural populations. Poverty is an 
increasingly urban concern in SSA (Mukama, et al., 2005; Solomon, 2003), and 
yet perspectives about how microfinance works, and also possibly diffuses, are 
still informed by other studies undertaken in rural South Asia, especially 
Bangladesh and to a lesser extent Latin America. All these have different 
national cultures making complete transferability of practices untenable. This 
thesis turns attention to Sub-Saharan Africa - a key emerging area for future 
microfinance development. 
In contrast to other studies, this research has applied the concept of emotional 
labour (Hochschild, 1979) regarding the nature of loan officers' work and their 
interactions with clients. Microfinance at the grassroots is revealed to be 
emotion laden (Ito, 2003; Rahman, 1999) and loan officers who directly interact 
with the poor face emotional issues that need better understanding if 
performance is to be enhanced. In addition, because of its grassroots focus, this 
research aims to provide useful insights into clients' group dynamics by using an 
accountability framework. This brings a very insightful perspective to 
understanding why certain types of accountability can be counterproductive 
within solidarity based groups (Dixon et al., 2006), making 'local' participation 
and 'bottom-up empowerment' even more difficult to realize. 
Finally, this is the first detailed study to take a grounded micro perspective 
approach to understanding microfinance processes in sub-Saharan Africa. In 
particular, the research addresses a country (Zambia) and a topic (Loan officers) 
that is relatively under-researched, and presents evidence and insights that add to 
the existing literature. 
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1.8. Structure of the Thesis 
The contents of chapters 2-9 are now briefly presented. Chapter 2 is divided into 
two parts. The first (2.1 to 2.5) presents a review of microfinance on selected 
changes and developments since the 1990s. It begins by locating microfinance as 
a global strategy for poverty reduction and a means to providing access to 
financial services for the poor. It later offers a critique of key themes and 
debates in microfinance development. The second part (2.6 to 2.9) reviews the 
literature relevant to field workers and identifies its limitations, and, hence, 
provides a rationale for this research itself. 
Chapter 3 aims to contextualize the research by providing a brief comparative 
overview of inter-regional differences in the development of micro finance, with 
a view to justify the focus on SSA. It also provides a brief socio-economic 
background of Zambia and the environment in which microfinance evolved 
there. It presents an introductory overview of the actual organisations concerned 
and ends with a review of previous research and other literature to establish the 
basis for the current study. 
Chapter 4 describes the field research design and methodology itself. It explains 
the specific methods chosen to generate the data necessary to address the key 
research questions. The chapter reflects on the researcher's experiences of 
conducting the study, particularly how this eventually led to a reassessment of 
its methodological assumptions, and other issues relating to dilemmas 
encountered. It also provides an overview of how the data was analysed with the 
assistance of QSR NVIVO, a computer software programme designed to assist 
in the analysis of qualitative data. This section is provided to aid transparency 
and make it clear how themes were actually developed. 
Chapter 5 presents a profile of microfinance loan officers at CETZAM and 
PRIDE Zambia. In particular, it emphasizes their educational qualifications, age 
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structure and gender and also argues that their personal characteristics can both 
enable and constrain their interactions with clients. It outlines their motivations 
for doing this work and their perspectives about microfinance fieldwork. It then 
illustrates how the social positioning of loan officers, their limited prior 
experience in NGO developmental work, and the orientation received upon their 
entry shaped and explained the ways in which they understood and related to 
their clients. This chapter illustrates how working among the poor clearly 
challenges many NGOs/MFI loan officers. 
Chapter 6 discusses the issue of social relationships and practice of group-based 
microfinance. It examines interactions between loan officers and their clients 
and also between loan officers and their superiors, to understand the factors 
shaping their emerging relationships. The chapter then situates expectations 
about relationships in the specific cultural context, especially relationships of 
patronage. The chapter illustrates important issues about trust and reciprocity 
amongst actors and later shows how mistrust variously undermines 'enabling' 
relationships, the facilitative work of loan officers, and thus inevitably how 
microfinance ultimately diffuses. The chapter argues that microfmance is social, 
and that sustaining relationships is as consequential to loan officers (and to 
micro finance institutions) as the repayment of loans. 
Chapter 7 explores the central role of loan officers', clients' and own judgments 
of their work, their field experiences and the challenges faced in adapting to 
competing demands upon them. The chapter starts by contrasting the 
institutional, and loan officers, and clients' own perspectives. It then examines 
how understandings of loan officers' role were created and interpreted by 
managers in CETZAM and PRIDE Zambia. It illustrates the dissonance that 
occurs when loan officers pressured to meet repayment targets start to act more 
as 'debt collectors' than facilitators or 'enablers'. It highlights mismatches 
between the conceptualisation of groups and the actualities of those groups, 
which- did -nor ne-c-essarily worlcaccording to group methodology casslfffiptions, 
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and had other unintended outcomes. The chapter explains the strategic position 
of loan officers in the processes of microfinance and argues that how loan 
officers perform is not necessarily driven primarily by clients' interests, but also 
by the exigencies of the organisations, and their need to secure their own jobs. 
Chapter 8 presents the microfinance action approach as a possible theoretical 
framework that could incorporate more 'bottom-up' perspectives hereafter. It 
then identifies key emergent themes based on the evidence which recognizes the 
complexities of how microfinance works. These themes are set against existing 
knowledge of micro finance and the role loan officers play in facilitating the (dis) 
'empowering' of the poor within its framework. In addition it illustrates how this 
research relates to other work undertaken in different regions-in particular, 
South Asia. 
Chapter 9 provides the main conclusions to be drawn from the study, showing 
how the thesis aims to contribute to knowledge about the variable international 
take-up of microfinance. It also considers the implications for microfinance 
development and practice based on its own empirical findings. The chapter 
concludes by outlining possible future research directions. 
1.9. Scope of the study 
The study does not directly address issues of the dynamics of how groups are 
originally formed (see Marr, 2002 on group dynamics). Equally, the focus is not 
on lending methodologies, which have already received much attention (Snow, 
1999; Bhatt and Tang, 1998; Painter and MK Nelly, 1999). Other detailed 
debates on women empowerment (Goetz, 1996; Johnson, 2004; Mayoux, 1999, 
2001, 2002; Rahman, 1999) and outreach to the poor (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; 
Rhyne, 1998; Woller et al., 1999; Conning, 1999) are also outside its immediate 
scope. 
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Secondly, the research was not an evaluation study. It did not aim to make a 
judgment about loan officers' successes and failures nor does it prescribe 
solutions to problems. In short, this research departs from the orthodox 
managerialist evaluation view (Masse, 2005) which has dominated previous 
rnicrofinance studies, and looks towards relationships and interactions to explain 
rnicrofinance at work. 
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Chapter Two 
Overview of Micro finance 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines selected changes and developments in microcredit since 
the 1990s and the questions that these raise. It serves two main purposes. It 
begins by defining microfinance in relation to poverty alleviation, then situates it 
within a broader view of finance and development, and offers a critique of key 
themes and debates about microfinance development. It then reviews the theory 
and research relevant to field workers themselves on the basis that the current 
understanding of microfinance cannot adequately explain its variable 
international take-up without incorporating these other perspectives. 
Microfinance5 is defined as the provision of financial services such as deposits, 
loans, payment services, money transfers and insurance to low-income, poor and 
households otherwise excluded by conventional financial institutions 
(Montgomery and Weiss, 2005; Rhyne, 2001; Weber, 2004). It consists of short 
term lending and recycling what would otherwise be counted as very small 
amounts of money. It is also associated with helping empower the very poor to 
account properly and independently for their small businesses and thus manage 
their livelihoods better. It is also strongly associated with lending to women 
who, as well as being over-represented among the world's poor, have arguably 
proved more reliable borrowers than men (Ahmad, 2002; Elyachar, 2002; Hulme 
5 
"Microcredit" involves the provision of collateral-free small loans to jointly liable people for 
purposes of income generation and self-employment. "Microfinance" is a more recent concept 
than "microcredit". It is the provision of a range of financial services in addition to credit, such 
as options for insurance schemes or opportunities to save. Microcredit programmes are 
increasingly complemented with microfinancial services. 'Microfinance' has now become 
established as the popular terminology to reflect this complementarity (Weber, 2004). For the 
purpose oftnis-thesis, -the term 'micro-finimce', is used unless citing from other-sources. -
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and Mosley, 1996; Johnson, 2004; Mayoux, 2002; Prahalad, 2005). On the other 
hand, poverty alleviation is a long term goal of governments and key 
international institutions such as the World Bank and United Nations that seek 
more effective ways of reaching the poor. The importance of rnicrofinance as a 
targeted strategy for poverty alleviation lies in its ability to reach the grassroots 
with financial services based more on a 'bottom-up' than 'top-down' approach 
for which Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 6 have been a 'favoured' 
institutional form. 
As an innovative form of financial intermediation with the poor (ADB, 2000; 
Honohan, 2004; Nissanke, 2002), rnicrofinance is in effect 'double tasked' to 
achieve specified developmental ends and goals through well regarded means 
such as group lending methodologies (Donaghue, 2004; Zeller, 2001), through 
which the poor can borrow money and mutually assure their own progressive 
empowerment towards independent survival and self-management (CGAP, 
2000). With Bangladesh and South East Asia as its early proving grounds it was 
hoped that rnicrofinance would overcome the limitations inherent in more 
orthodox development programmes by being a more joined up' initiative which 
was also accountable to the poor themselves. As it has diffused outside its 
original territorial proving grounds, and had been officially confirmed in 
the 2005 United Nations 'International Year of Microfinance', questions are still 
raised about how well it can transfer and translate elsewhere. 
2.2 Situating Microfinance 
Development specialists maintain that lack of access to external finance explains 
continuing poverty (Hermes et al. 2005; Kirkpatrick and Maimbo, 2002; 
6 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) encompasses a very heterogeneous group of 
organisations and is used synonymously with Community Based Organisation (CBO), Grass 
Roots Organisation (GRO) and Private Voluntary Organisation (PVO) to name a few (see Vikil, 
1997). In addition, microfinance provision is highly diverse, using a range of different 
organisational structures from informal groups to mainstream banks, and from individual loans 
to group-based (Lafourcade, lsem, Mwangi and Brown, 2005). 
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Nissanke, 2002). Usually, the very poor have little or no access to loans from the 
formal banking system, especially when they cannot provide acceptable 
collateral. Women, in particular, have had less access to credit than men in many 
developing countries. Often, it is argued, investing in women will bring about a 
higher return in both the enhancement of human and physical capital than 
investing in men alone (Diagne, et al. 2000; Fernando, 2003; Goetz, 2001; 
Prahalad, 2005; Rutherfold, 2004). Women form the majority ofMFI borrowers, 
and are disproportionately represented among the poorest of the world's 
population (World Bank, 2003) making them priority targets for poverty 
alleviation programs, while they are more likely to be credit-constrained than 
men, and have less power in household decision making (Hietalahti and Linden, 
2006; Johnson, 2004; Kabeer, 2001; Mayoux, 2001, 2002). It has also been 
argued that women show more attachment to group-based schemes and are 
lower risk clients than men7 (Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002; Coleman, 2005; 
International Labour Organisation, 1996; Isaia, 2005). 
According to Montgomery and Weiss (2005), the poor's lack of access to credit 
is readily understandable in terms of lack of collateral, in addition to the various 
complexities and high administrative costs involved in dealing with large 
numbers of often semi-illiterate and innumerate individual borrowers. For 
instance, Tsai (2002) and Park, et al. (2003) report that women in rural China 
relied more on rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) than men 
because their higher rates of illiteracy precluded them from applying for loans, 
and women also had less acceptable forms of collateral, while male credit 
officers almost habitually discriminated against them. Tsai found that 70 percent 
of those with borrowing experience of state banks were men (2002, p.1 08). 
Similar findings are reported in Hermes, Lensink and Menrteab' s (2005) study 
in Eritrea which found that many rural poor originally lacked access to formal 
7 Critics ofmicrofinance (especially from the feminist perspective) describe the concentration of 
organisations on women not as a positive move towards empowerment, but rather an institutional 
measure tO nhiX:imise repayn,-ent brutilising the-vuliieraoilityc of w<.Hnen: SeeTioi<e (2002)for 
detailed discussion. 
18 
finance, and turned to informal credit markets as an alternative. Several other 
studies (Ardener and Burman, 1995; Bastelaer, 1999; Mosley and Rock, 2004; 
Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; Schreiner, 2001) have documented similar trends 
in Africa where the use of informal finance such as that by ROSCAs and money 
lenders is still widespread. 
To manage their livelihoods, the poor rely on loans from either moneylenders at 
high interest rates or friends and family, whose supply of funds is often limited. 
Microfinance programs are therefore praised for their ability to overcome 
traditional barriers to lending to the poor through innovative measures such as 
group lending and regular savings schemes, as well as the establishment of close 
links between clients and the field staff of the institutions concerned. 
Historically, banks and other formal financial institutions left the poor to manage 
their own money, and were unwilling to lend because of the risks involved. 
Microfinance arose as a response to the problems of the official delivery of 
subsidised credit8 to the poor (especially farmers). It primarily developed as a 
response to the inability or indifference of commercial banks and the formal 
financial system to serve these needs (El-din Nasr, 2002). It therefore served as 
an alternative to both banks, which in most developing countries serve only 5-20 
% of the population (Basu et al. 2004; Gallardo et al. 2003 ), and also informal 
sources of finance such as money lenders. In principle it may be assumed that 
the key principle for microfinance development is the simultaneous closing of 
the gap between formal/nonformal finance (credit/money) provision and the 
passive/active economic citizenship (see table 2.1). 
8 Adams and Von-Pischke, 1992; Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Johnson and Rogaly 1997), review 
an extensive literature on targeted credit programs of the early 1970s, and report on their poor 
performance, especially in developing countries. Many suffered from poor loan repayments and 
outreach to the poor was limited. The evidence points to serious flaws and failure_ to enhans:c::_!h!'!_ 
-- " economic ·aCtivity ofttie 1ow:income --poor as result of -direct-top:ao\¥11- intervention by 
governments and donor agencies. 
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THE CLASSICAL THE NEO-CLASSICAL THE NEW MODEL 3 
MODEL 1 MODEL2 
Official/formal finance Formal/semi formal Multi model (formal, semi-
dominated dominated formal/informal) 
Top-down/centralised Top-down/responsive Top-down/bottom-up 
(combination) 
Control centred Expansionist 'Joined-up' 
Excludes nonformal finance Absorbs non formal finance Integrates formal/informal 
finance 
Restricted forbearance Additional forbearance Mutual forbearance 
Minimal outreach Further outreach Full outreach 
Exclusionary Partial Inclusive 
Passive economic citizenship Mixed economic citizenship Active economic citizenship 
Table 2. 1 Typical models of formal and nonformal finance 
The table presents 3 ideal-typical models. The (orthodox) classical model 
proceeds top-down and can be centrally governed. The formal finance9 
perspective postulates a large 'forbearance gap' between it and informal finance 
at large. The gap arises because, from a formal finance standpoint, informal 
9 For purposes of this discussion, formal sector institutions are regulated and licensed as 
financial intermediaries, usually comprising the central bank, commercial and merchant banks, 
development or other specialised banks, and non-bank financial institutions. The informal sector 
on the other hand, display great diversity but will represent those units that operate without 
regulation- such as money lenders, traders, ROSCAs and non -bank pawn brokers (Matin et al. 
2002). Micn:>credit~programmes,_managed'~l5y~Naos-- are often -referrea to as, semi~formal, 
implying that they are legally registered and may be partially or cursorily regulated. 
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finance cannot be 'properly' controlled and trusted. Formal fmance may 
privilege certain groups, but still actively exclude others. 
Consequently, the classical model has been judged as deeply 'gendered' (Blake, 
2006; De Goede, 2005) where women were not fully considered (in patriarchal 
society, women are required to have a husband or some other male relative 
cosign for a loan), because they were assigned to the informal finance sector. 
According to Prahalad (2005), the poor at the 'bottom of the pyramid' lack 
affordable "legal identity". Without it, "they cannot access services such as 
credit" (2005: 107). DeSoto (2000) specifically documented how the problem of 
a lack of "legal identity" at the 'bottom of the pyramid' excludes many from 
being active economic citizens. 
This exclusion is particularly evident in Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, 
where the formal financial systems remain bank-dominated (Izugbara, 2004; 
Nissanke and Aryeety, 1998). For example, Beck et al (2005) found that access 
to fmancial services worldwide (i.e. formal finance for these purposes) differed 
widely across 99 countries sampled. For example, in Ethiopia there was less than 
one bank branch per 100,000 people while Spain had 96. In Albania there were 
four loans per 1,000 people, while Poland had 774 loans. Basu et al., (2004) 
found that most of the poor population in sub-Saharan Africa had very limited 
access to formal financial services. For example they found that in Ghana and 
Tanzania, only about 5-6 percent of the population had access to the banking 
sector. In Uganda, only 8 percent of rural households had a bank account 
(Spencer and Wood, 2005). If 'access', and also actual use of 'formal finance', 
are conditions for active economic citizenship, then the poor often find 
themselves excluded from it. As a result they become passive economic citizens, 
and in effect socially marginalized. For many (especially women) there has been 
little prospect of anything other than passive economic citizenship. They have 
few rights, very limited access, and where access was available they could 
hardly afford credit, and were thus -not taken seriously by fomtal financial 
21 
institutions (Hanahan, 2004; Mayoux, 2002; Read, 1997). Unless they are active 
economic citizens much formal finance effectively lies beyond them. 
This is where microfinance and the 'new model' fit (see table 2.1). It works 
against financial exclusion and is seen as a link between formal and informal 
financial intermediaries (Claessens, 2006; Ghate, 1992; Matin et al., 2002; Zeller 
et al. 1997). The World Bank stated that, " .. .in financial markets women lack 
access to collateral largely because of gender norms surrounding women's 
access to property, and that microcredit programs through the use of alternative 
collateral, have overcome these constraints" (WDR, 2001, p. 173). 
Consequently, microfinance has emerged to fill the gap and has been promoted 
as a 'grassroots' or 'bottom-up' participatory approach 10 to alleviating poverty, 
which implies more participation of the poor themselves where they seek to 
control their own 'development' (Economist, November, 2005; Spencer and 
Wood, 2005). According to Fischer, 'the participation of the poor' and their 
'taking control', marks it out from other anti-poverty policies, such as 
international aid and debt forgiveness, which are essentially top-down rather 
than bottom-up, and also have decidedly mixed outcomes (Economist, Nov, 
2005). From the perspectives of the classical model, microfinance is constantly 
seeking to help those on the margins of the economy gain access to mainstream 
markets (Fisher, 2002, p.341) and consequently MFis are moving from the 
margins of the financial system towards the mainstream. 
Equally, from a bottom-up perspective, microfinance should encourage more 
active economic citizenship among selected groups such as women, by being 
more encompassmg and trusting of the poor. This implies joint action and 
mutual forbearance. Accordingly, Godquin, (2004) argued that the primary 
objective of micro finance institutions was to provide financial services (credit 
10 Modem microfinance was founded in Bangladesh in the 1970s and targeted the rural poor. It 
was initially promoted as a bottom up strategy to poverty alleviation. However, in many other 
countries, il has evolVed top~down with"thY tinancial-~supporC of donors, andc-struggles to 
incorporate the participation of the poor. In practice microfinance is both top-down !bottom-up. 
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and saving) to the poor in order to reduce financial constraints and help alleviate 
poverty. Mayer and Rankin (2002), however, argued that the microfinance 
models advocated by mainstream donors like the World Bank 'respond more to 
lenders' concerns with financial sustainability than the borrower's, and may not 
be fully inclusive because the very poor cannot access microfinance services. 
While it could be argued that microfinance originated from South Asia 
(Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is a cited pioneer), donors and NGOs in the 
developed countries have lately promoted it on such a vast scale that many 
NGOs in other developing countries have moved into this sector, following the 
availability of funding rather than their own competencies or mission (Townsend 
et al. 1999). Research into microfinance has consequently been 'donor driven'. 
2.3. The group-lending model 
MFis typically employ a range of methods of providing basic financial services. 
The best-known approach is "group lending" pioneered by the Grameen Bank of 
Bangladesh and BancoSol in Bolivia (Cull et al., 2006; Ghatak, 2000). Other 
approaches use village banking and individual-based lending. The following 
discussion focuses on group lending and credit, since most MFis in both Zambia 
and the sub-Saharan Africa are mainly group-based, and the prior literature has 
concentrated on credit. It should however be evident that non-credit financial 
services including savings and money transfers are also important. 
The practice of group lending11 as a lending mechanism has been emphasized by 
those seeking to understand how modem microfinance deals with information, 
enforcement and administrative costs (Hermes, et al. 2005). It highlights the 
techniques used to deal with 'information problems' such as moral hazard and 
11 Other microfinance programs, such as BRI and BKK in Indonesia and others in Bolivia are 
based -on individual~lial:lilify loans. Recenfstuoies (Diagne, et aT 2002; Hermes, et af 2o<f5) 
show that most clients prefer individual loans to group loans. 
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transaction costs in credit delivery (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2004; 
Besley and Coate, 1995; Bhatt and Tang, 2001; Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; 
Navajas, et al., 2003). Lenders in formal banking require collateral from 
borrowers to minimise their losses should the borrower default. Collateral also 
serves as a device for screening prospective borrowers to make sure they are 
going to repay. Unlike formal banking, this method uses self-formed groups that 
use social capital 12 as collateral to access credit and later assume joint liability 
for repayment of loans to group members. Matin (1997) describes joint liability 
as a cost-effective incentive for the borrowers to use the knowledge about each 
other in screening the "right" people, engaging in mutual observation, and 
exerting peer pressure for loan repayment. In other words, each member is 
responsible for payment of all members' loans and additional loans are not 
disbursed until payments are made. The approach also assumes that the poor are 
a much lower credit risk and that, under specific circumstances, they will repay 
small unsecured loans, using a lending methodology that relies on traditional and 
personal interactions among borrowers (Bastelaer and Leathers, 2006; Bastelaer, 
1999). 
The risk-minimisation methods adopted reflect those used by informal finance to 
solve information and enforcement problems. Their features include: (i) the use 
of groups in creating 'joint-liability', so that social pressure, collateral 
substitutes and other group dynamics motivate repayment; (ii) the adoption of 
progressive lending, frequent repayment schedules and compulsory savings to 
create incentives for repayment; and (iii) the levy of relatively higher interest 
12 Robert Putnam (1993), who popularised the concept of social capital, defines it as "networks, 
norms, and trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared 
objectives". The World Bank (200 I) also suggests that "social capital refers to the institutions, 
relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions. 
Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society; it is the glue that 
holds them together." According to Rankin (2006), the potential of social capital theory lies in its 
recognition of social networks and associational life as resources for fuelling development from 
the bottom-up. Microfinance and the group-lending model are based on this understanding that 
the poor can access credit on the basis of their membership in self-managing "solidarity" groups. 
Otl1er stuaies however;- h-ave aocurrfented the'doWI'rside' of social capital '(see Potfes aifd 
Landolt, 1996). 
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rates to cover operational costs (Cull, et al., 2006; Nissanke, 2001). As with 
informal lending circles, also known as ROSCAs (Ardener and Bouman, 1995), 
it is here assumed that borrowing group members have strong, embedded ties, 
and are likely to know one another prior to group membership (Anthony, 2005; 
Hermes et al. 2005; Johnson, 2004; Morduch, 1999; Woolcock, 1998). 
Moreover, it is argued that while providing access to needed capital, group 
lending also helps build social capital (Light and Pham, 1998) through existing 
social networks amongst borrowers, but shifts the cost of screening, monitoring, 
and contract enforcement from the lender to the group itself (Bastelaer and 
Leathers, 2006). In principle, group lending may reduce the costs of screening, 
monitoring and enforcement (Bastelaer, 1999; Bhatt and Tang, 2001; Ghatak, 
2000; Nissanke, 2001) and also the moral hazard behaviour of borrowers 
(Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990), while also improving repayment rates. Success of 
the borrowing group is argued to depend upon what Woolcock (1998) labels as 
the "bonding" social capital between members. This might imply that, as they 
better trust and network with each other, they engage in more mutual risk-taking. 
Certain studies (Diagne et al. 2002; Jain and Moore, 2003; MkNelly and 
Kevane, 2002), however, have found joint liability and group dynamics have 
less impact on repayment, and hence its role does not hold universally. Other 
studies contend that group lending can inhibit MFis from reaching the poorest of 
the poor (Portes and Landolt, 1996; Wright, 2000). However, social networking 
connections among self-selected borrowers in group-lending schemes may well 
allow significant savings in the screening, mutual monitoring and enforcement. 
The importance of these horizontal relations in ensuring repayment via peer 
pressure is much debated (Bastelaer, 1999; Jain and Moore, 2003). Despite 
limited input from the grassroots (especially in under researched areas such as 
sub-Saharan Africa), the actual role played by loan officers (who act as 
intermediaries between clients and MFis) in accounting for high repayment 
rates, where joint-liability is not mutually enforced by the group, is not clearly 
stated. 
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2.4. Major/Recent Developments 
The 'microfinance industry' is now argued to be changing in concept, vision, 
practice and delivery. For instance, it is argued to have moved from charity to 
business, with the concept switching from microcredit to microfinance, while the 
vision has shifted from "provision of credit" to "access to financial services" 
(Economist, 2005; Harper, 2003; Littlefield, 2004; Rhyne, 2005). Observed 
practice on the other hand has changed from program microcredit to institutional 
microfinance (Fernando, 2003) with more opportunities for active private sector 
participation (Ahmed, 2005). 
From its humble roots, microfinance has expanded considerably (Coleman, 
2005). Although it started as small, non-collateralized loans, the term now 
covers a whole range of services, including savings, money transfers, payment 
services, and insurance. There is a trend towards a wider range of financial 
services, a move away from traditional group lending to individual loans and, in 
summary, a greater shift towards more 'commercialisation' of the sector 
(Bateman, 2003; Rhyne, 2005), especially in the Latin American case 
(Montgomery and Weiss, 2005). 
Recently, other trends indicate a direction reverting to the classical model in 
table 1 - the private sector and orthodox banks such as Citigroup, HSBC, and 
ICICI of India are now becoming involved in microfinance (Economist, 
November, 2005; Montgomery and Weiss, 2006; Prahalad, 2005). As the 
International Year of Microcredit 2005 was commemorated, it was officially 
asserted that: "as we seek to expand access to financial services to the poor, the 
private sector will play a critical role" (Microfinance Matters, November 2005: 
11). This argues that the 'commercially viable' MFis which achieve both 
sustainability and greater outreach will ensure that the largest number of people 
have access to finance. These trends would ultimately reposition microfinance 
- within the conventional fonnal financial sector because othey share similar 
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philosophies and practices (Koveos and Randhawa, 2004; Montgomery and 
Weiss, 2006). This raises important issues of governance and asks whether the 
initial poverty reduction objectives will be subordinated to commercial criteria 
i.e.('mission drift') (Morduch, 1998; Woller, 2002a). The (re)incorporation of 
micro finance is seen as paradoxical given that the initial motive of micro finance 
was to serve poor borrowers without access to formal finance. Will the features 
of mutual forbearance and full outreach to the poor still characterise 
microfinance if it becomes more private? Microfinance has also recently 
diffused into Europe, where more official and private funded initiatives seek to 
fill the void created by others' reluctance to lend money to the poor or 
unemployed (Arnold, 2004). To serve the 'unbankable' segments of the 
population, MFis have adopted a set of delivery mechanisms with 'innovative' 
contracts and incentives to minimize the risks concerned. 
2.5. Key Themes in Microfinance Development 
This section identifies key debates about microfinance development. Micro-
credit is a 'buzzword' in some contemporary development debates. Key global 
institutions and actors, such as the World Bank, the IMF, bilateral development 
agencies and a broad range of NGOs have adopted microcredit as a targeted 
strategy for unresolved grassroots poverty reduction. 13 However, microfinance is 
characterized both by apparent widespread agreement on broad objectives, but 
multiple rifts about other key issues. The movement is linked by a common 
discourse for claiming concern for the poor (Woller, et al. 1999), but this may 
sometimes mask a bewildering variety of philosophical approaches, types of 
institutions and borrowers, and delivery systems that shelter uneasily together 
under the 'big tent' called "microfinance" at large (ibid, p.30). 
13 There have been earlier attempts to assist the poor through the Small farms credit programs. 
Donors and governments heavily subsidized these microenterprise credit programs. This strategy 
was flawed and yielded disappointing results. Adams and Von Pischke (I 992) provide an 
excellent analysis of the subsidized credit programs of the early 1970s. 
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The past two decades have seen the emergence of powerful new methodologies 
for delivering microfinance services, especially microcredit. Advocates have 
promised both to combat poverty and develop the institutional capacity of 
financial systems through finding ways to lend money cost-effectively to poor 
households, especially women (Adams, et al. 1984; Hulme and Mosley, 1996; 
Morduch, 2000; Woller, 2002; Kabeer, 2001; Morduch, 2000). However, there 
is limited consensus about certain issues concerning, for example: its impact, 
outreach to the poor, and empowerment of women and sustainability of 
microfinance institutions. These issues and debates are now considered. 
2.5.1 Evaluation of Microfinance Programmes 
Microfinance has provided substantial flows of credit to very low-income 
groups, or households, normally excluded by conventional financial institutions 
(Montgomery and Weiss, 2005). Two schools of thought have dominated 
leading debates about its impacts. The welfarists, who would ideally champion 
their value-added commitment to serve the very poor, frequently emphasise the 
depth of outreach (meaning the levels of poverty reached), and improvements in 
the material well-being of the poor. They are less concerned with the ends of 
banking per se than in using particular financial services as a means to alleviate 
poverty and hence support the use of subsidies. Their overall goal for 
micro finance is poverty reduction and empowerment of the poor. Grameen Bank 
in Bangladesh is considered to be an example of a widely replicated welfarist 
institution (Pal 1999; Woller et al. 1999). On the other hand, the institutionist 
approach focuses on creating financial institutions to reach clients who either are 
not served or underserved by the formal financial system14• Their emphasis is on 
achieving financial self-sufficiency, institutional scale and breadth of outreach 
(meaning numbers of clients) and not depth of outreach per se. They believe that 
14 The two camps also differ in the designs of service delivery to poor populations. For example, 
institutionists tend to look on group-lending as a purely financial mechanism whereas welfarists 
tend to look on it as something more comprehensive- embracing aspects of "social 
. infen-iiediation": The pradical-inYplications. of tllese views are exertin'g pressure- on emerging 
MFis in sub -Saharan Africa where group lending is more prevalent. 
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credit plays a facilitating and not a leading role in the process of economic 
development; therefore credit does not necessarily help most poor people 
enhance their economic condition (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Morduch, 1998). 
This "financial systems" approach to microfinance, considers that the future of 
microfinance lies in profit-seeking institutions providing financial services to 
large numbers of poor clients. The institutionist position eschews subsidies of 
any kind and is supported by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest 
(CGAP) in the World Bank and USAID. 
The microfinance 'industry' has lately been under increasing pressure to 
demonstrate results and impact. As a result, evaluation of microfinance 
programs is increasingly important as agencies, and particularly aid donors, have 
been formally required to ensure that funds are suitably spent and properly 
accounted for (Demirag 2004; Ebrahim, 2005; Goetz and Jenkins, 2005, 
Hillhorst, 2003; Hulme, 2000) and to prove the poverty reducing effects of 
microcredit activities (Gulli and Berger, 1999; Honohan, 2004; Montgomery and 
Weiss, 2005). That is, accountability and justification is a distinctive emerging 
feature of microfinance at the present time. This kind of impact evaluation, 
however, has itself drawn varied reactions, and also bears particular limitations. 
For instance, researchers differ over the extent to which access to microcredit 
affects borrower welfare (Hubka and Zaidi, 2004), and it is argued that many 
evaluation studies are only conducted by advocacy groups with a partisan 
interest in program longevity, while available resources do not pemtit 
comprehensive long term evaluations in any case (Buss, 1999). Still others note 
that evaluations are often drawn from the same South Asian context15 and also 
Latin America, while regions such as sub-Saharan Africa remain less researched 
(Mosley and Rock, 2004). 
15 More studies have been published particularly of the large programmes in Bangladesh (Amin 
et al. 2003; Khandker, 2003; Morduch, 1999; Pitt and Khandker, 1998). But with some 
exception1f [e.g. Diagne et al.,~ 1996;-Hulriie ana Mosley, 1996; Cope-stake eTal.~ 2001] whose 
studies included MFis from Africa. Overall, there is a lack of studies from sub-Saharan Africa. 
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2.5.2 Impact Assessment Studies 
Traditional or mainstream impact assessment of microcredit programmes have 
usually focused on either the outreach and financial sustainability (Nissanke and 
Aryeetey, 1998) and the tangible socio-economic benefits of such programmes 
(Rahman, 2000). Financial sustainability and cost effectiveness have become 
"hot" evaluation issues and much of the success of microcredit has been linked 
to "credit performance", primarily in terms of high repayment rates and cost 
recovery (Gjerding, 2002). Studies of the socio-economic impact of microcredit 
often address issues such as microcredit impact on contraceptive use (Schuler 
and Hashemi, 1994), access to health care, children's education (Rahman, 2000), 
employment and not least women's empowerment (Mayoux, 1999, 2001). 
2.5.3 Sustainability 
Micro credit started, not as a 'business', but as a means of alleviating poverty and 
helping the poor create sustainable livelihoods for themselves. Its pioneers 
sought to help the poor rather than profit themselves. With the entry of for-
profit organisations into the market, the public focus has shifted towards 
'sustainable' MFis and away from 'sustainable' livelihoods for the poor. With 
subsidies unfashionable, the goal is argued to be establishing financial 
institutions which are accessible to the poor, and which also ensure their own 
survival over the long term (Eversole, 2003; Rhyne, 2005), often implying that 
those microfinance institutions which follow the principles of 'good banking' 
will also be those that most alleviate poverty as well (Bateman, 2003; Morduch, 
2000). Consequently, microfinance institutions, under pressure from donors, 
now focus on the most 'profitable' client segments in order to ensure high levels 
of repayment, and thereby assure their own sustainability. Empirical data is 
inconclusive about whether it is possible to have a sustainable microfinance 
programme which also reaches and assists very poor people. This is a challenge 
to emerging MFis in sub-Saharan Africa in particular, with high poverty levels 
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(chapter one, table 1.1) and where the financial sustainability for MFis is still 
donor dependent. 
Sustainability is a term with multiple meanings ranging from the continuing 
ability to find and retain donors to the ability to cover all costs (Harper, 2003). 
Just how to define 'sustainability' and how to achieve it is problematic. 
Sustainability has been defined as the ability of an organisation to "sustain the 
flow of valued benefits and services to its members or clients over time" 
(Edgcomb and Cawley, in Woller, 1999: p. 42). This means MFis should cover 
all its operating expenses (including loan losses and the cost of capital) entirely 
with internally-generated sources of income (Dunford, 2000). Put differently, 
sustainability means that the poor pay all the costs of the service (which may not 
necessarily correspond to the quality of services received). The expectation of 
donors such as the World Bank is that all MFis should operate by global 'Best 
Practices' if they are to attract further funding itself indicates the extent of donor 
pressure and control 16• 
There is little consensus on whether financial sustainability and/or poverty 
reduction should be the single overriding objective for MFis. Some contend that, 
where rnicrocredit programs disavow social intermediation, they also become 
more like other formal lenders, neglecting the very poor they were originally 
chartered to serve (i.e. goal displacement) (Ahmad, 2000; Buss, 1999; 
Montgomery and Weiss, 2005; Painter and Mk Nelly, 1999; Wright, 2000). For 
instance, Bateman (2003) found that for South East European MFis to become 
self-sustainable or profitable, they had to move away from their original poor 
clients towards larger and more collateralized projects. In response to these 
reservations, Christen et al (2004); Rhyne, (2005) and Rutherfold, (2003) have 
argued that good rnicrofinance practice combines both outreach and 
16 Webster and Fiddler (1996) question the current assumption of global 'best practice' that full 
financial sustainability can be achieved in all circumstances and that donors, in pursuing the 
sustainabilit"fgoal~~m:ay actuallY push MFiif irito making unacc-eptable trade~offs by scaling~ 
down their operations in remoter locations and working with better-off clients. 
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sustainability, and is best embodied in the micro-finance bank model. They see 
sustainability not as an end in itself but rather a means to the end of improved 
social welfare. Evidence suggests that few microcredit programs have yet 
achieved sustainability (Harper, 2003; Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Snow, 1999; 
Buss, 1999) as measured by the widely used subsidy dependence index. 17 Also 
few operate at a level where they do not need donor capital or services, with 
some programs coming close to achieving sustainability, such as the Grameen 
Bank and BRI Unit Desa System of Indonesia and Banco Sol in Bolivia. 
However, others have cautioned (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998) that the 
programmes selected for the study were not typical of those which remain 
heavily donor funded and subsidy-dependent. Sub-Saharan Africa programmes 
have themselves incurred high costs (Bagachwa, 1995; Isern et al. 2005). 
Notwithstanding its merits, the problem with the financial sustainability 
argument lies in its success criteria often based on the number of loans disbursed 
and high repayment rates, and not necessarily whether sustainable self-managing 
client groups and enterprises have been established. The continuing debate on 
sustainability has excluded the perspectives of the key income generating 
players (the loan officers or fieldworkers) responsible for the outreach 
'possibility frontiers'. How, for instance, can MFis become sustainable if these 
grassroots groups are not so themselves? This suggests a tension between a 
focus on poverty and a commitment to sustainability (Hollis and Sweetman, 
2004; Fisher and Sriram, 2002; Paxton, 2002; Richardson and Langdon, 1998), 
while others (Fowler, 1997; Nissanke, 2002) however caution that the tension 
between the two targets directly translates into serious pressures and stresses on 
both microfinance institutions and their clients. 
17 The subsidy dependence index was developed by Varon (1992) as a measure of the financial 
sustainability of financial service institutions. The index quantifies the extent to which the 
lending interest rate would have -to be rais-ea to Cover all =operating costs- if -puolic subsidies 
received by the program were stripped away. 
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2.5.4 Client Outreach 
Microfinance may thus fail to reach the 'poorest of the poor' (Donaghue, 2004; 
Honohan, 2004) and has been found to have real difficulty in reaching the very 
poorest, compared with those ranked just above the poverty line (Green et al., 
2006; Hulme, 2000; Kirkpatrick and Maimbo, 2002; Mosley and Rock, 2004). 
For instance, several studies in South Asia (Ahmad, 2003, 2000; Daru and 
Churchill, 2003; Goetz, 2001, 1997; Fernando, 2003; Hashemi, 1992; 
Montgomery, 1996; Rahman, 1999) show that large NGOs in Bangladesh did 
not reach the poorest 18 in their efforts to expand geographical coverage. In short, 
they drive more for "breadth" than "depth". It is estimated that in Bangladesh 
only 18.4% of the poor are reached while microfinance services in Brazil have 
been limited to 0.4% of the poor (World Bank, 2003). Navajas et al. (2000) 
found that five Bolivian MFis reached not 'the poorest of the poor, but only the 
richest of the poor'. Hulme (2000) reported that many MFis in East Africa had a 
high proportion of clients who were non-poor and that the poorest women were 
not reached, even when this was their stated aim. In Zambia, those with access 
to MFI services have been estimated at a mere 80, 000, while 70% of the 1 0 
million population still lives in poverty, 54% on less than US$1 per day (AMIZ, 
2004; Musona, 2004). 
Critics therefore claim that many MFis worldwide do not reach very far 'down 
the poverty spectrum' (Cohen and Sebstad, 2000; Economist, 2004; Fernando, 
2003; Hulme, 1999; Navajas et al. 2000; Wright, 2000; Zeller and Sharma, 
2000). The findings are therefore mixed. As Hulme (2000, p. 7) observed: 
"At one end of the spectrum are studies arguing that microfinance has very beneficial 
economic and social impacts (Khandker, 1998; Otero and Rhyne, 1994; Hashemi et al, 1997). 
At the other are writers who caution against such optimism and point to the negative impacts 
18 Daru and Churchill (2003) show that most MFis in South Asia do not work with the poorest 
segments, but rather focus on those better off -sometimes referred to as the "middle poor". In 
Zambia, MFii;-are now ctargefing whadhe Joan officers referre-(rto as the ''working poor'' (Field 
notes, 2004). This shift was partly explained by sustainability arguments. 
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that microfinance can have (Adams and Von"Pischke, 1992; Buckley, 1997; Montgomery, 
1996). In the middle is the work that identifies beneficial impacts but argues that 
microfinance does not assist the poorest, as is so often claimed (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; 
Mosley and Hulme, 1998)". 
Harper (2000) and Honohan (2004) therefore question the common assumption 
that rnicrofinance is necessarily about working with the poor and the poorest, at 
least until MFis provide clear evidence that they really do so. 
2.5.5 Empowerment ofWomen 19 
Women are thought central to poverty alleviation as the vanguard of social 
transformation itself (Prahalad, 2005). They comprise a majority of 
microfinance borrowers (Sherraden, et al., 2004). Consequently, a long term 
debate exists about whether, and to what extent, rnicrofinance overcomes the 
constraints of formal finance and specifically enables female empowerment 
(Holvoet, 2005; Johnson, 2004). Research into female empowerment is often 
contentious because observers differ about what is meant by it, how to achieve 
it, and how to measure it (Kabeer, 1999, 2001; Mayoux, 2001, 2002; Malhotra, 
2003). Kabeer (2001) defined empowerment as 'the expansion in people's 
ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was 
previously denied to them'. The World Bank's Empowerment source book 
however officially defined empowerment as "the expansion of freedom of 
choice and action to shape one's life". 
In the rnicrocredit literature, women's empowerment is generally expressed by 
indicators such as: control over loan use, participation in decision making, 
increased mobility, increased voice over family planning, less violence against 
19 This is a simplistic presentation of the large impact assessment field. A detailed presentation is 
beyond the scope of the thesis. See Fernando (2006) and Kabeer (2001) for a comprehensive 
review of evaluation studies on empowerment. For a discussion of microfinance and 
empowerment in Africa, see Mayoux (1999). 
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women, and enhanced contribution to family income (Coleman, 2005; Hashemi 
et al. 1996; Pitt and Khander, 1995; Townsend et al. 1999). 
Many diverse and contradictory findings have been presented concerning the 
empowerment potential of loans to women (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996; Kabeer, 
2001; Khandker, 1998; Rahman, 1999; Schuler and Hashemi, 1994; Schuler et 
al. 1996, 1996a; Woolcock, 2001; Mayoux, 2001). One set of studies conclude 
that microcredit does empower women in terms of their ability to make 
purchases, involvement in major family decision making, participation in public 
action, mobility and political awareness (Coleman, 2005). Another extensive 
literature, however, finds that claims of empowerment should be cautiously 
interpreted (Hunt and Kasynathan, 2001; Izugbara, 2004; Mahmud, 2003; 
Schuler, et al., 1998). Yet another (Fernando, 2006; Deubel, 2006) argues that 
microfinance has failed to fulfil its promise for women's empowerment. These 
differences basically reflect variance in the judgement of what exactly the 
concept of women's empowerment covers, and what kinds of changes would 
constitute evidence of genuine empowerment (Brett, 2006; Gjerding, 2002). 
Kabeer regards these diverging conclusions as both apparent and real, while also 
reflecting differences in methodology, particularly whether findings are either 
qualitative or quantitative. Another factor concerns the difference in the 
particular questions posed. While some question the processes of loan use, 
others examine the outcomes of access to loans (Kabeer, 2001: 66-67). In 
addition, some suffer from selection bias. Existing evidence is considered to be 
regionally biased, patchy, and also limited in the depth of questions asked and/or 
based on relatively small scale samples. So, outside Bangladesh, there are few 
detailed studies (Deubel, 2006; Holvoet, 2005; Johnson and Kidder, 1999; 
Mayoux, 2001), and many lack testimonies from women themselves about the 
impact of credit on their lives (Kabeer, 2001). 
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2.5.6 The Limits of Impact Studies 
Studies of the impact of credit for poverty elimination point to the difficulties in 
impact assessment (Honohan, 2004; Meyer, 2002; Premchander, 1999). Program 
managers and their funders may display simple linear thinking about the 
consequences of their actions. Inputs, in terms of people, resources and 
activities, are assumed to lead to outputs which are expected to have tangible 
impact on targeted groups (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). Emphasis is placed on 
measuring changes in income levels following credit programmes. This 
approach raises a number of methodological questions especially where the 
impact of credit on poverty is being assessed (Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2004; Honohan, 2004; Nissanke, 2001; Woolcock, 1999). Actual loan 
use, given the fungibility of cash (Hulme, 2000; Johnson and Rogaly, 1997) and 
its controls, and also baselines for measuring change, are all problematic. With 
all this, causality is difficult to establish because of the influence of other factors 
on lives and livelihoods and the problem of sample selection bias.20 In addition, 
there has not yet been any consistent regional pattern in reported findings. For 
instance, MkNelly and Dunford (1998) found a much more positive program 
impact in Ghana, while another thorough study by Barnes et al. (200 1) for 
Zimbabwe reported disappointing impacts. 
The lack of consistency could be attributed to the very multiplicity of indicators 
(and differing methodologies), which makes it difficult to draw systematic 
compansons across the various impact studies. Impact assessment 
methodologies have in some cases moved from being quantitative and positivist 
to qualitative and exploratory (Copestake, 1996; Hulme, 1999; Baker, 2000). 
This further methodology claims to recognize subjectivity in evaluation, 
2
° Few studies have made satisfactory attempt to correct for this major problem. Thus Coleman 
( 1999) notes that most existing impact studies are donor driven, nonacademic and are of a 
descriptive nature or suffer from the selection bias problem. Littlefield, et al., (2003) have also 
observed that, while the general pattern of results sheds valid light on the question of impact, few 
studies include fully rigorous controls for selection biases. Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 
(20o,.r- share similar views and add that, 'anecdotes are culled to- show1ne -p-ofenWil-- of 
microfinance. 
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recognize different interpretations, and thus understand that respondents' own 
accounts add value and meaning to any numbers about them (Woolcock, 1999; 
Copestake, 2002). On the whole, Montgomery and Weiss (2005) conclude, 
'studies have either been inconclusive or provide less convincing results' (p. 16). 
Yet despite such uncertainties and the tendency to highlight significant (and 
therefore positive) findings (Honohan (2004), rnicrofinance continues to be 
promoted as an effective poverty reducing development tool. 
In summary, much focus has been on the range of institutional arrangements 
pursued in different organizations and countries, and in tum numerous studies 
have attempted to assess the outreach and poverty impact of such programs. 
Consequently, research has in many cases (especially where donor funded) 
proceeded as though the actual process of rnicrofinance at work did not itself 
particularly matter for the outcomes subsequently achieved. For instance, 
feedback from the grassroots through the fieldworkers' perspectives is not 
disclosed within the input-output 'development' approach. As such, less is 
known about how rnicrofinance occurs, and how it transfers to situations such as 
SSA for example. This highlights the following issues. Microfinance institutions 
provide at best marginal support for the very poor and any link between 
rnicrofinance and women's empowerment is still tenuous. Evaluations of group-
based microfinance programs have been dominated by concerns about impact 
assessment, program replications, and financial sustainability. Evaluation studies 
aim to enable donors and managers to appreciate the extent to which programme 
inputs produce the predicted results. The approach has often been deductive 
without necessarily explaining either why or how certain particular outcomes 
were achieved. Moreover, this research can be ambiguous and contradictory due 
to methodological problems, and also the emerging diversity of rnicrofinance 
practices themselves. 
Despite the effort devoted to generating impact and evaluation studies, research 
can therefore neglect the ongoing work of microfinan-ce itself, ana place more 
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emphasis upon its founding strategy than its subsequent implementation. 
Research may neglect field workers or loan officers (Ahmad, 2000; Goetz, 2001, 
1997; O'Reilly, 2004) and how they interface with poor people (Holcombe, 
1995; Jackson, 1997). A well-appreciated but poorly articulated feature of group 
lending concerns the role of loan officers. A number of issues concerning what 
loan officers themselves do at this most critical interface have arguably not been 
sufficiently addressed before, but are still potentially critical for performance in 
frontier territories such as Africa, where microfinance still needs to progress 
from what are now simply promising beginnings. A loan officer is often the 
actor enabling 'development on the ground' and the critical link between 
micro finance institutions (MFis) and the poor clients, making them central for 
actual service delivery (Ahmad, 2002; Goetz, 2001; Isaia, 2005; 0' Reilly, 
2004). Because they mediate transactions between MFis and borrowers, loan 
officers are thought to implement policies in ways that imply in-depth 
understanding of clients and informed empathy for successful lending (Ahmad, 
2002; Chua, 1998; Goetz, 2001; Holcombe, 1995; Jain and Moore, 2003; 
Pawlak, 2002). In short, while it is asserted that "the heart of MFI lies with its 
fieldworkers" (Chua, 1998), that argument has not yet really been fully 
examined and substantiated. 
2.6 Frontline Workers' Role 
While there is considerable research on impacts of micro finance, there is limited 
research which addresses loan officers specifically. In seeking to examine field 
workers in microfinance, an interdisciplinary literature search has been 
necessary. This section therefore draws on studies which have explored the role 
of frontline workers or professionals in such diverse areas as: family planning 
programmes (Simmons and Elias, 1994; Andaleeb, 1996), social work (Ellis, 
Davis and Rummery, 1999; Gibbs, 2001 ), extension agents in agricultural work 
(Dutta Das, 1995), and bank lending officers and the lendee (Coulson, 1997; 
Berger and Udell, 2001; Javier, 2003; Jurik, 2005; Lehmann and Neuberger, 
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2001; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). The banking literature which uses agency 
theory in addressing bank lending relationships with small business enterprises 
has also been considered. 
Small business researchers have explored the relationships between Personal 
Business Advisors (PBAs) and clients (small firms), and found the PBAs to 
perform the role of account managers, counsellors and coordinators (Lean et al. 
1998; Sear and Agar, 1996; Sear and Moran, 1998; Mole, 2000, 2002). In their 
role, PBAs were found to be the key to Business Link's success, but were 
required to fulfil quantitative targets (Mole, 2002). Findings from family 
planning programmes suggest that field workers have been central, yet much 
depended on their actual relationships with clients. However, relationships with 
clients could be problematic, making certain interactions difficult. Still others 
have extensively researched 'street-level bureaucrats' and their role in 
processing clients and policy implementation (Lipsky, 1980; Meyers et al., 
1998; Brodkin, 2000). 
In 'Street Level Bureaucracy' Lipsky (1980) contended that, under certain 
circumstances, it was useful to regard those bureaucrats at the "bottom" of the 
ladder as ex officio "policy makers". Lower-level bureaucrats thus "made" 
policy when aspects of formal statutes are either ambiguous or internally 
contradictory and where the routine activities of front-line workers cannot be 
fully monitored or controlled. This suggests that "although they are normally 
regarded as low level employees, the actions of public service workers actually 
constitute the services delivered by government" (1980: p.3). The 'street-level 
bureaucracy' model directed attention to how 'policy deliverers' actually 
worked and also adapted to tensions between management objectives and client 
demands (Brodkin 2000). Several researchers (Hasenfeld, 1992; Fineman, 1998; 
Keiser, 1999; Riccucci, 2002) have since employed this 'street-level bureaucrat' 
model to explain frontline workers discretion in policy implementation. For 
example, Riccucci' s · (2002) found that the actions of front..: line Workers -had 
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substantial and sometimes unexpected consequences for the outcome of benefit 
programs. Elsewhere, Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002) found that fieldworkers 
(volunteers) made their own interpretations of principles and priorities in 
response to demands placed on them. 
'Street-level bureaucracy' thinking implies that fieldworkers are an important 
link in the micro credit lending process because they meet with clients on a 
regular basis and establish the close relationships that facilitate loan repayments. 
Put another way, they are the "foot soldiers" of the MFis (Holcombe, (1995) 
with most direct contact with the poor. Hence, the "heart" of microfinance lies 
with its fieldworkers (Chau, 1998). Borrowers gain their particular experience of 
MFis by interacting with them as if they 'personify' MFI policies themselves. 
Ito (2003) found that fieldworkers often fulfilled the roles of village counsellors, 
money managers, and conflict mediators at the same time. So, in fulfilling these 
roles, field workers (like "street level bureaucrats") may face rival demands of 
MFis to increase loan disbursement and repayment compared with the demands 
of borrowers to be more personally sensitive to their peculiar circumstances. 
Thus a potential conflict could exist in the reconciliation of field workers' 
pressure to meet borrowers' demands and those of the organisation that employs 
them. Lipsky (1980: xii) argued that: "The decisions of street-level bureaucrats, 
the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties 
and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out". 
2.7 Microfinance Field Workers 
Field workers are those front-line staff of microcredit institutions or Non-
governmental Organisations (NGOs) who are most engaged in direct contact 
with the clients in service delivery (Ahmad, 2000; Isaia, 2005; O'Reilly, 2006). 
Field workers by implication should interact constantly with clients (Lipsky, 
1980), since they are the key implementers of the policies of NGOs and 
overseers of clients. In principle~ clients haveafelationsliip witlf MFis, buT often 
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there is no direct link to the management of MFis, as that relat ionship is 
mediated through field workers/ loan officers. As such microfinance programmes 
usually rely on practices such as ' regular' visits by loan officers and frequent 
contact with borrowers and group/centre meetings. The cl ient- loan officer 
interface (see fig 2.1) is thus criti cal to realizing the deve lopmental goals of 
microfinance. To the extent that they provide this link, field workers/loan 
officers can have considerable impact on an institution 's outreach, clients ' group 
dynamics and perceptions of microcredit. 
Microfinance 
Institutions 
\ 
Clients' groups 
(Borrowers/savers) 
.-----------., 
Field workers 
or Loan officers 
Figure 2. 1 Field workers' functional position in a group-based MFI 
Berger and Udell (200 I) argued that the most important link in relationship 
lending involves the loan officer because he/she is the person in the bank with 
the greatest access to the 'soft ' information about the firm , owner and 
community which is difficult to quantify and communicate through the formal 
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organizational structure. The loan officer has most personal contact and their 
position in microfinance mirrors that described by Berger and Udell, but it still 
needs further exploration because the crux of developmental practice lies at their 
interface with clients (see fig 2.1). Loan officers are crucial makers and 
providers of information to upper (managerial) as well as lower levels (clients). 
It is therefore at the interface between the MFI's field worker and the client, 
whether she/he is saving, borrowing, purchasing insurance, that certain 
developmental processes actually occur. While frontline workers derive vital 
information, their particular importance among NGOs and, more particularly, in 
microfinance has been less well recognised (Sriram, 2002, p. 230). Based on fig 
2.1, Jackson (1997) observed contradictory demands on the field worker/loan 
officer role, in addition to the different pressures of clients and their own 
institutions. But what is empirically less evident is how (in practice) they adapt 
to these competing expectations or demands. What strategies do they use and 
how does that then shape the further development of microfinance programmes 
themselves? 
A comparative review of literature would thus indicate that the role of field 
workers within the context of microcredit has been relatively neglected. There 
has been limited research in NGOs in either developed or developing countries 
and even less in Africa and virtually nothing in Zambia21 (see table 2.2). 
Commenting on the conference "NGOs in Global future", Ahmad (2000) 
reported that most discussions centred on NGOs, with much less attention to 
their clients, and even less to field workers themselves. Accordingly, Ahmad 
(2000) notes, 'there is more research with volunteers, particularly in the 
developed countries, than with field workers' (p. 65). 
· 
21 Most of the studies ori fieldo workers are based con Souttio Asia and in particular:Bangladesh.- -
Only two come from Africa (Table 2.2) and a handful conducted elsewhere. 
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Table 2. 2 Research on Field Workers of NGOs in Developing Countries 
Authors Topic of interest Study Area 
Musaka, undated Key problems of expatriate staff in Uganda 
an international NGO 
Christoplos, 1998 Humanitarian field work and local service Angola 
institutions 
Rao and Kelleher, Gender and organizational change in a Bangladesh 
1995, 1998 rural 
development NGO 
Goetz and Gupta, Women development workers and gender Bangladesh 
1994,1995, 1996, equality 
1997 
Jackson, 1997 Role of field workers m a participatory India 
project 
Odwyer & Motivation of Irish development workers South 
Woodhouse, 1996 in the South 
Edwards, 1996 NGO performance and driving factors Bangladesh 
Hashemi &Hossain, Skills of field workers-Family planning Bangladesh 
1995 programme 
Rahman &Islam, 1994 Role of service providers-Family planning Bangladesh 
Garain, 1993 Training of grassroots workers India 
Begum, 1993 Women relief workers and Environmental Bangladesh 
Disasters 
Cape, 1987 Role and experiences of expatriate Papua New Guinea 
'developers' 
Griffith, 1987 Expatriate field staff experiences and their India 
role in decision making 
Pastner, 1982 Women field workers and the challenges Pakistan 
Janowitz, et al., 1999 Role of field workers in promoting family Bangladesh 
planning methods 
Ahmad, 2000 Field workers of NGOs and their Bangladesh 
perspectives on microcredit services 
Goetz, 2001 Women development workers and their Bangladesh 
role in rural credit programmes 
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2.7.1 Microfinance Development: The Field Workers' Role 
Fieldwork within developmental NGOs and MFis needs to address capacity 
building in groups and individuals, and the environment in which the poor can 
take risks to grow their businesses and thereby develop themselves. According 
to Sriram (2002), field workers provide three functional roles in extending micro 
financial services. First, they are crucial to helping clients overcome their 
reluctance to participate arising from their previous experience or losses. 
Second, in the absence of peer-information in urban settings, the actions of loan 
officers contribute to diminishing the probability of delinquency and default. 
Third, they can ensure a constant quality in the provision of the service. In 
principle, the primary role of a field worker can be argued to be that of facilitator 
or catalyst (O'Reilly, 2004; Rao and Keller, 1995; Tembo, 2003), and at times 
personal advisor as well. This requires that field workers interact and empathize 
with the poor and develop an in-depth of understanding of their situation. They 
also need to be "well trained, responsible and motivated, but also able to 
understand and manage groups and sometimes the shrewdness of the human 
soul" (Isaia, 2005, p. 462). However, field workers may also require 
organisations that offer genuine support, provide career opportunities, and a 
management style which facilitates open communication and appropriate team 
work (Ahmad, 2000; Heyns, 1996; Jackson, 1997), because their work is 
socially isolating with low levels of direct supervision affording field workers 
considerable autonomy. While fieldwork is generally the 'core process' of 
developmental NGOs, it is often the least researched and understood process 
within them (Ahmad, 2003; Goetz, 2001, 1996). This relative neglect is ironical 
and may reflect a tendency of managers and researchers alike to assume that 
provision of credit is a straightforward process of ensuring loans are disbursed to 
the poor with high repayments as expected outcomes. 
Two particular studies into the importance of fieldworkers in developmental 
NGOs are --Ahmad (QOOO)- and Goetz (2001 ). -Both were based on ~wen--
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established NGOs in Bangladesh, but they differ on their research focus. Goetz 
found field-level workers were crucial participants with close contact with the 
poor borrowers. They were also critical to communicating policy changes, and 
their perspectives about these changes likewise influenced how clients 
experienced and benefited from participation. They were responsible for 
effecting the 'fit' between top-level policy initiatives and local realities and 
interpreted policy goals to fit local conditions. However, fieldworkers' 
experiences in challenging gender inequalities and building trusting relationships 
depended upon their own gender, family and educational background. Although 
all field workers were required to secure high rates of repayment as institutions 
responded to pressures for financial sustainability, fieldwork posed an even 
greater challenge for women given their socio-cultural constraints. Findings 
elsewhere in the same geographic area have been similar (Rahman, 1999b; 
Schreiner, 1999). Goetz therefore concluded that: 'practices and perspectives of 
field workers have been neglected and yet they were a key component in any 
strategy to promote poverty eradication' (Goetz, 2 001, p. 31 7). 
Ahmad (2002) explored Bangladeshi NGOs 'from below'. Based on a sample of 
four types of NGOs (international, national, regional and local (small)), the 
focus was on: field workers' careers, personal and professional lives, interaction 
with clients and superiors, and their opinions on NGO policies and practices. 
Using a multiple methodology, field workers judgments about service delivery 
were found to differ from those of their superiors and also NGO policy itself. 
Field workers were found to be implementers of NGO policies who were 
nevertheless organizationally dis-empowered: 'their problems and opinions 
remained unheard and unaccounted and that very little research (even in 
Bangladesh) has been conducted on them in spite of their importance in the 
credit process and service sustainability' (Ahmad, 2002: p.3). 
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2.8 Emerging Issues about Loan Officers 
The foregoing discussion on fieldworkers/loan officers argues that their 
facilitative role is critical to the development of microfinance. However, as 
intermediaries, loan officers are expected to have certain qualities that enhance 
their empathy with clients, as well as meet organizational targets. But to link the 
two disparate groups (clients and MFis), loan officers require (relevant) prior 
and on going socialization. Nevertheless, their situation creates particular 
expectations and tensions which could have a further bearing on their practices 
and judgment of micro finance at work. Also important is the issue of gender in 
recruiting fieldworkers/loan officers. Does gender of a loan officer matter? 
These issues are briefly explored here in order to further our knowledge of the 
dynamics of their work and expectations surrounding them. 
2.8.1 Loan Officers' 'Expected' Qualities 
To facilitate development or change in individuals, groups or communities is a 
challenge which may require a commitment to not only an institution's mission 
and values, but also to self development as well. Key personality factors which 
constitute the desired attitude are variously claimed to include: patience, 
listening skills, interpersonal sensitivity, team work, and integrity, self-
confidence without arrogance, empathy, commitment, respectfulness, diplomacy 
and perseverance (Churhill, 2002; Heyns, 1996; Tembo, 2003), although further 
empirical substantiation is required. Gender, age and socio-economic standing 
are additional criteria to be considered, all directed at gaining community trust 
and fulfilling the two key roles of facilitators and advisors. However loan 
officers in Zambia have increasingly acted as debt collectors, as chapter Seven 
will suggest. 
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2.8.2 Job status 
Field workers have elsewhere been considered to be underpaid, under-valued, 
overworked, and under-appreciated (Ahmad, 2000; Baumann, 2004; Suzuki, 
1998), making their retention problematic. They occupy the lowest positions on 
their organisation's hierarchy yet are potentially critical for implementation 
(O'Reilly, 2006). Suzuki (1998) highlighted the tensions between the 
headquarters and field offices of NGOs and noted that field workers of NGOs 
could be marginalised by NGO managers, policy makers as well as donors. In a 
number of microfinance NGOs, fieldworkers have complained about lack of 
respect, heavy work load, job insecurity and stress, while claiming that they 
would leave if a better job was found (Ahmad, 2000; Woolcock, 1998; Rahman, 
1999). Ahmad (2002) found that graduates in Bangladesh also preferred 
government jobs to those in NGOs because they gave more job security, rewards 
and also higher social status (section 5.5). Many had joined developmental 
NGOs just to provide for their own continued subsistence rather than any deep 
personal interest in and commitment to, developmental work with the poor 
(Goetz, 2001; Goetz and Gupta, 1997). 
2.8.3 Training 
Field workers may not necessarily receive suitable orientation, induction or 
training, on the grounds that they are urgently needed in the community itself 
(Ackerly, 1995; Ahmad, 2003; Goetz, 2001, 1996; Montgomery, 1996; 
Mukama, et al., 2005). In other cases, MFis claim to have limited budgets and 
cannot afford required training (Baumann, 2004; Paxton, 1999). Training may in 
some cases not really equip the field workers with the capacity to handle the 
group and organisational dynamics. For instance, Griffith (1987) found that 
many field workers were not fully trained to identify the poorest and to deal with 
different social relationships. In other cases, training may be inadequate, 
uncoordinated or not sufficiently locally relevant. Field worker training rarely 
emphasises relationship building techniques-(Andaleeb, 1996). Baumann (2004) 
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and Volschenk and Biekpe (2003) therefore found that South African MFis were 
constrained by inadequate skills, and limited resources for capacity 
development. Consequently, training occurs 'on-the-job'. In addition, Basu, et 
al., (2004) and Mukama, et al., (2005) noted that many MFis in Africa 
experienced a shortage of skilled and trained staff (even at management level). 
In Zambia, Musona and Coetzee (2001) found that loan officers were ill-
prepared to provide 'quality customer service'. Consequently, loan officers 
lacked a thorough understanding of their expected role (Churchill, 1999). Any 
training offered usually favoured gaining technical and accounting skills over 
other aspects of 'development' work or how to facilitate it. Certain established 
NGOs of Bangladesh are no exception to this problem of inappropriate training 
(Ahmad, 2000). 
2.8.4 Promotion and restricted progression 
While Goetz (1995) found in BRAC a very clear system for internal 
advancement (even for field staff), most NGO organisations are reported to lack 
a clear system for personal advancement, especially for field staff, while the 
problem of limited promotion opportunities also makes it difficult to retain some 
young and well educated field workers (Ahmad, 2002; Uphoff, 1994). In 
particular, Ahmad found that higher qualified field workers were likely to be 
promoted, suggesting that work performance was not always adequately 
considered. However the 'egalitarian' ethics of some NGOs may espouse 
relatively 'flat' staff structure rather than 'tall' organizational hierarchies, which 
may further limit the scale/rate of internal advancement in any case. 
2.8.5 Pressures to disburse loans and achieve high repayment rates 
Studies in Africa, Latin America and South Asia have all noted the pressure on 
field workers to sideline other deserving tasks in order to increase reported 
repayment rates. As MFis are required to be self-sustaining, and high repayment 
rates are an important in-dicator of 'good' performance, social intermediation is 
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likely to be marginalised. Consequently, field workers eventually act more like 
'policemen' and 'debt' collectors (Montgomery (1996). But how might loan 
officers then manage their 'new' role as 'debt collectors' as well as facilitators? 
What impact does this have on how field workers interact with their clients and 
promote the institution's image? What accountability issues does this 'new' role 
raise? 
2.8.6 Perspectives on Recruitment and Gender 
While it is argued that female loan officers should be more suited to interacting 
with NGO's clients, research has not been conclusive. In his study of 
fieldworkers in Bangladesh NGOs, Ahmad (2000, 2002) found a great increase 
in the numbers of female field workers in rural 'development' programmes 
together with a significant increase in women clients. However, this increase 
was partly because of donor influence, and also because women had claimed 
certain advantages over men in working with rural poor women in a gender-
segregated society. Isaia (2005) also reported that female loan officers were well 
suited to Jordan, due to its particular cultural character. Would such gender bias 
still hold in places where microfinance NGOs are concentrated in urban areas 
and in a society that was less observably gender-segregated? 
As regards work performance women may feel they have to further 'prove' 
themselves by being 'twice as good' as men (Goetz, 2001, 1996; Fowler, 1997; 
O'Reilly, 2006). Others observe that certain cultural norms tend to reflect and 
favour men more than women (O'Reilly, 2004; Rahman, 1999). Similarly, 
Ahmad (2002) found that women field workers' authority was publicly 
questioned and they faced more logistical problems. Others regard mobility as a 
major problem. As a result a relatively high early 'drop-out' rate of female field 
workers has been observed (Goetz, 1997). Isaia (2005) and O'Reilly (2006) also 
noted the difficulty in employing and retaining female fieldworkers/loan officers 
who often-leave citing family obligations.- Interestingly, client preferences vary 
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greatly, and may also be 'context dependent'. For example, female clients in 
South Asia have been reported to prefer fellow women field workers to men, 
especially in credit programmes that incorporate education on gender equality 
and reproductive health (Ahmad, 2002; Goetz, 2001; Montgomery et al. 1996). 
But, most clients in sub-Saharan Africa prefer male to female field workers. 
Does the gender of a field worker matter? If so how does that affect the way loan 
officers interact with clients and their perceptions of microfmance work? 
Thus, although they are often facilitating and producing development on the 
ground, the agency of loan officers has not been the focus of researchers' 
attention so far. As a result, much microfinance literature simply serves to affirm 
belief in the power of both lending methodologies and policy design to solve 
problems and result in positive affirmation of micro finance as a tool for reducing 
poverty. Existing studies have also focused on excellent, exceptional or else the 
largest of organisations rather than smaller emerging institutions (in emerging 
areas) which are still grappling with implementation issues. This extensive 
literature does not sufficiently deal with the work organization of microfinance, 
but may be critical for its further development. 
2.9 Explaining Variability in Microfinance Diffusion: Emerging 
Organizational Factors 
There is clear evidence that literature is not yet adequate when it comes to such 
processes as the work of microfinance itself. The agency of fieldworkers/loan 
officers and clients is not therefore sufficiently articulated. It is also clear that 
microfinance is not diffusing equally and that there is a gap in the understanding 
of its take up and applicability. Standard input-output models may not raise 
these particular issues - i.e. process variables. Microfinance and working with 
the poor is more organic than mechanistic and organizational and labour 
processes are not necessarily predictable from economic models (Frost, et al., 
2006). As Masse (2005) argues, "economistic models may conceal rather than 
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explain development practices". More recently, researchers in organizational 
studies have taken interest in examining organizational processes by which 
people co-ordinate goal-directed activities - emphasizing proactive human 
actors and emergent social processes (Heath and Sitkin, 2001). Organizing 
microfinance at grassroots ideally involves commitment, passion and managing 
own and clients' feelings in order to sustain client loyalty and relationships. 
This is because loan officers undertake relational work and have some 
responsibility for managing their own as well as others' emotions. As part of 
their job loan officers like other service employees are required to express 
certain emotions, such as positive affect toward their clients. But these 
employees may not really feel all the emotions that they are expressmg, 
resulting in what has been called "emotional labour" (Grayson, 1998). Yet these 
displays of emotions are not without potential for creating dissonance - tension 
between what is displayed and what is felt (chapter 6). 
Emotional labour refers to the regulation of one's feelings and is defined as "the 
induction or suppression of feeling in order to sustain an outward appearance 
that produces a sense of being cared for" (Hochschild, 1983: 13 7) or not cared 
for (own italics). It requires the worker to produce an emotional state in another, 
e.g. of gratitude or fear22 . Emotion itself is strongly shaped by social learning, 
cultural protocols and social structures (Sturdy and Fineman, 2001). More 
specifically, research has established that emotional labour is an integral (yet 
often unrecognized) part of employment that involves contact with other people 
(Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993; Fineman 2006; Harris, 2002). As noted by 
James (1993), 'emotional labour involves working with feelings rather than 
denying them'. Fineman (1993, 2006) has argued that emotion as a management 
subject should be central to organizational conduct and behaviour. Emotion is 
seen as the 'life blood' of organizing, entwined with, rather than separate from, 
vanous meaning-making and cognitive processes. By emotionalizing 
22 For hl<We-i:letailed-discussion of emotional laoour imd how it applies to- many other frontline 
jobs, see Fineman, 2000 and Taylor, 1998. 
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organizations researchers have given fresh insight into many key issues and 
processes, such as decision making, leadership, conflict, organizational change, 
social/gender differences (Fineman, 2003). All these issues confront loan 
officers/fieldworkers in their roles as facilitators, mediators and organizers of 
client groups. Working with the poor has an emotional character to it, especially 
where field workers are expected to identify and empathise in order to solicit 
their co-operation and trust. However, much loan officer labour - in particular 
the emotional aspects - are "invisible" to organizations and management, 
despite being essential to fulfilling organizational goals. For instance, emotions 
like trust do have a key role in inspiring confidence in both loan officers and the 
poor in the context of information asymmetry, while negative emotions such as 
fear, guilt, anger or embarrassment could limit social interaction and 
participation. Consequently, the thesis uses emotional labour because this 
provides us with an explanation in the areas of interpersonal relations, trust and 
context which are found relevant to understanding how rnicrofinance works and 
translates at the grassroots. 
Organizational studies and other literature on related field processes such as 
nurses (Aldridge, 1994; Henderson, 2001 ), the police (Martin, 1999), barristers 
and magistrates (Anleu and Mack, 2005; Harris, 2002), flight attendants 
(Hochschild, 1979; William, 2003) social workers (Gibbs, 2001 ), teachers 
(Mayers and Zepeda, 2002), bill collectors (Hochschild, 1979) affords some 
insights into the real-life experiences of developmental work. A study of loan 
officers in a large commercial bank in Israel for example found that credit 
granting was construed as both a financial transaction and an interpersonal 
interaction between a loan officer and a client that was rooted in their history 
and embedded in their perceptions and feelings. Emotions played a significant 
role in loan officers' decision making (Lipshitz and Shulimovitz, 2005) 
regarding the credibility of the loan applicant. Along similar lines, Pixley (2002) 
argues that fmance organizations are rational and emotional, because 
impersonal trust, confidence and their contrary emotions are unavoidable in the 
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context of uncertainty (p. 41 ). However, loan officers in group-based 
rnicrofinance institutions (though dealing with a financial transaction) face a 
different context, in the sense that they primarily interact with marginalized 
poor people who expect reciprocal acts of care, concern and compassion (Frost, 
et al., 2006) from them (regardless of their gender) - i.e. an emotion directed at 
another's misfortune or suffering. The success or failure of these interpersonal 
interactions depend on the joint qualities and behaviours of the actors involved, 
but more so on the loan officers being able to manage their own as well as 
others' emotions, while still under pressure to meet organizational demands. 
In another related field, Gambetta and Hamill (2005) investigate how taxi 
drivers employ unconventional strategies to assess and establish the 
trustworthiness of their prospective passengers. Their study of streetwise with 
taxi drivers in Belfast and New York, found that establishing trustworthiness 
and risk assessment were daily challenges facing taxi drivers. Similarly 
trustworthiness underlies the financial transactions and social interactions 
within microfinance. However, as chapter 6 shows, mutual trust can be 
problematic. 
This justifies the argument that, although input-output efficiency analysis of the 
performance of microfinance has some value, genuine insights can emerge on 
process rather than from standardized input-outputs approach (Mosse, 2005; 
O'Reilly, 2004, 2006). An ·examination of process largely deals with actors 
because they form and re-create a significant part of it. Loan officers 'translate' 
and implement MFI's policy at the point of interface with the poor and assume 
organizational roles critical to realizing rnicrofinance goals. 
Therefore the performance of rnicrofinance rests on more than just having the 
right institutional design and lending techniques at the start. It is also about 
engaging with the poor, interacting with them in their own surroundings, and 
reaching out to them with appropriate service products (Isaia, 2005). It calls for 
- - - - ~ ::-:;-- -"--.- -
a particular kind of work, patience, humility and empathy on the part of loan 
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officers as the pnmary service deliverers (chapter 6). In particular, how 
microfinance translates at the grassroots largely depends on how the field 
workers/loan officers practically implement MFI policies and interact with 
clients, and the choices they make about what to foreground or silence during 
those interactions. 
Additionally, in organizing microfinance, loan officers may fulfil multiple roles 
(Ito, 2003) because of their positionality (fig 2.1) within MFis. As such, clients 
and management can place different expectations on them, and they are 
therefore likely to experience role conflict. Katz and Kahn (1978) originally 
reported that role conflict is the "simultaneous occurrence of two or more role 
expectations such that compliance with one would make compliance with the 
other more difficult" (p. 204). Similarly, Koustelious, et al., (2004) indicate that 
role conflict occurs when different groups or persons with whom an individual 
must interact (for example, family, members of that person's group) hold 
conflicting expectations about that individual's behaviour. In education, teachers 
have reported experiencing role conflict as a result of being expected to perform 
diverse roles (Conley and Woolsey, 2000). The work of loan officers also 
requires them to be both facilitators of 'bottom-up' development as well as 'debt 
collectors' at the same time. The tension between these two roles, however, can 
result in loan officers' dissatisfaction with their job and also not being able to 
satisfy either clients or their management. Therefore, for role conflict to exist, 
the loan officer must be aware of divergent expectations. The nature of their 
work, as presented in chapter 7, reveals that loan officers are not just 
'fieldworkers' but can also be regarded as 'everything' to the microfinance 
process itself. Thus a divergence between the formally espoused nature of the 
job (the job description) and the everyday job (what they actually do) is likely to 
emerge with loan officers experiencing both role conflict and ambiguity. 
Role ambiguity, on the other hand, occurs when the actor has insufficient 
knowledge of expectations of an assigned job, or is unsure about other's 
expe-ctations (Kahn, et -al.; 1964; Koustelious, et al., 2004): [oan officers, as 
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previous studies have found (section 2.8.3) receive limited training and 
professional development on how to be facilitators, and little guidance about 
how their work would change given greater emphasis on institutional 
sustainability. As a result, loan officers, just like high school departmental chairs 
(Mayers and Zepeda, 2002), can experience tension, emotional exhaustion, and 
job dissatisfaction, frustration and reduced productivity. Likewise, for role 
ambiguity to exist, the loan officer must actually question their role (chapter 7). 
But how does the experience of role conflict and ambiguity shade light on how 
loan officers interact with clients and account for their activities and delivery of 
micro finance services (chapter 8)? 
Accountability has been an increasing issue for donors where microfinance 
institutions are particularly donor dependent (Ebrahim, 2003; Edwards and 
Hulme, 1995). Research has lately found that donors are increasingly looking for 
repayment performance that calls for one-dimensional accounting and 
accountability (Goddard and Assad, 2006). As such 'upward' accountability to 
donors accounts for portfolio at risk and use of resources dominates, with much 
less 'downward' accountability to MFI's clients (Ebrahim, 2005; Dixon, et al, 
2006; Hillhorst, 2003; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2006; Porter, 2003). However, 
microfinance and MFI performance also depends upon how loan officers resolve 
the accountability issues of their functional position between MFI and clients. 
Where formal and 'upward' accountability is prioritized, and repayment 
performance is a key measure of institutional success, emerging accountability 
relationships and interactions between loan officers and clients might not 
necessarily fit with the original goal of bottom-up participation by the poor. The 
key question then is: does the type of accountability provide opportunity for 
client participation or for group self-management? This research will seek to 
demonstrate (chapter 8) that the effects on MFis, development workers (loan 
officers) and clients (as a result of inappropriate accountability) are not 
sufficiently recognized but could be critical to the further development of 
micro finance. 
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Moreover, microfinance process and its development is ideally a partnership 
between MFis and clients. Clients are central to microfinance work and their 
'voices' can add credibility to knowledge of how it actually works. Clients come 
to microfinance from different backgrounds and with varied expectations of 
MFis. Again orthodox models are weak on interaction variables. Focusing on 
interaction variables such as culture, could yield insights into how and why 
clients relate to each other [and to loan officers] as they do. In particular, the 
cultural expectations of family relationships in different places may need 
highlighting further (see chapter 9) if we are to appreciate the work of group-
lending from the clients' perspective. For instance, is microfinance culturally 
neutral or cultural contingent? Are there any other factors besides cultural 
factors that could account for the observed variability in its practice and 
performance? Is there any necessary mutual trust in the interactions between 
clients and loan officers, and also amongst MFI staff, as well amongst clients 
themselves (see chapter 6)? Furthermore, the very substantial difference in 
nature of trust across societies is likely to impact on how the poor will work with 
loan officers. Without trust, microfinance and group lending methodology may 
not achieve the expected bottom-up development (Bastelaer and Leathers, 2006) 
and thereby cast doubts on the original intention of microfinance as an inclusive 
development strategy for the poor (table 2.1 ). How then does micro finance 
diffuse in less trusting cultures? What this research does is to explore these 
issues (chapter 8) through grounded theory based on an exploratory study to help 
us understand the data generated and shed light on how microfinance works. 
2.10 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter argues that emerging issues within microfmance are wide ranging, 
although much research has been driven by the desire to produce evidence in 
support of micro finance as a sustainable poverty reducing strategy. It has shown 
that much research has itself been top-down, economic in nature, and is often 
concentrated on lending technologies and demonstrating the material outcomes 
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of rnicrofinance programmes. Whether microfinance can reach the poor, or 
'empower' women and significantly alleviate poverty, are both important 
empirical questions. Additionally, the chapter has highlighted that programme 
evaluations and research on sustainability and commercialisation of 
rnicrofinance has not yet been sufficiently informed by the loan officers who 
most interact with clients. 
The literature on programme design, evaluation and impacts often presents loan 
officers as if they were neutral actors in the process of rnicrofinance. Schemes 
have proceeded without necessarily recognizing the scale of loan officers' 
influence on service delivery, client 'empowerment', outreach, and lately on 
institutional sustainability as well. However, this research will argue that loan 
officers are central actors. They shape both policy and practice of MFis and are 
critical to rnicrofinance performance. Consequently, other studies which 
exclude the 'voice' of loan officers from their interpretation of rnicrofinance are 
not necessarily an accurate predictor of its likely performance. Economic input-
output models may not give sufficient attention to the agency of the 
fieldworkers who play a key role in the shaping of relationships and 
development practice. Furthermore, the work of loan officers cannot be fully 
understood without using the concepts of emotional labour, trust, conflict and 
ambiguity to explain it. There is therefore a significant gap in our understanding 
about how rnicrofinance works, which this study argues can be overcome by 
making loan officers' 'voice' much more central. The key question therefore is: 
if rnicrofinance performance is particularly dependent on the work of loan 
officers, especially at the early stages, what is it that they actually do at the 
interface with clients that affects it? What is their role in its diffusion and can 
that role change? 
This discussion has also shown that studies of the role of loan officers are often 
based on South Asian and Latin American experiences, yet their findings may 
·.not be equally applicable-to sub-Saharan Africa. -Second,-there-is-a bias towards 
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cases from successful MFis, agam from South Asia, and in particular from 
Bangladesh (Pitamber, 2003). In sub-Saharan Africa, however, many MFis face 
serious implementation problems, and are much less mature (see chapter 3). 
Certain studies have been practitioner and donor driven and therefore may lack 
further academic purpose and rigour, and also tend to be of a short term, 
pragmatic nature. Although Ahmad's (2000) and Goetz's (2001) studies come 
closest to this study here, neither were concerned with the present obs.erved 
international variable take-up of microfinance, especially in emerging areas like 
SSA. Secondly, both these studies did not directly raise the issues of 
accountability at the grassroots, or other role conflict and ambiguity and tensions 
in the new drive for commercialisation. In particular, they have not directly 
considered emotional labour in interactions between loan officers and clients, 
which is particularly relevant to the understanding ofmicrofinance in action. 
This study therefore builds on the existing knowledge but still differs in certain 
key respects. It examines the work and actual role of loan officers in their 
interactions with clients, and how they adapt to the different demands of 
borrowers and institutions' (i.e. microfinance in action). It does not address 
personal problems of loan officers. Gender and women 'empowennent' are not 
the central issue despite their importance to the wider debate. Secondly, this 
study is conducted in a different cultural context, and also within emerging MFis 
faced with serious implementation problems and future sustainability pressures. 
Thirdly, it seeks to shift attention from well performing NGOs in South Asia, in 
particular Bangladesh, to under-researched emerging MFis and their field 
workers in Africa. In so doing, it poses the following research questions: 
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1. Who are the loan officers and what motivates them to do developmental 
work? 
2. What roles do field workers/loan officers play in the process of micro finance? 
3. What is the nature of loan officer-client relationship? 
4. How might the personal characteristics of a loan officer enable or constrain 
their interactions with clients? 
5. How do loan officers and clients construct the nature of the microfinance 
work they perform? 
6. How do loan officers adapt to the different expectations of their clients and 
management? 
The research methodology and design used to generate data to address these 
research questions and objectives will now be discussed. Before this, however, 
chapter three puts the research into context by providing a brief comparative 
overview of interregional differences in the development of micro finance with a 
view to justify the focus on SSA and Zambia in particular. The socio-economic 
context of Zambia and the microfinance institutions under investigation are also 
considered. 
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Chapter Three 
Comparative Analysis of Zambian Microfinance 
3.1 Introduction 
The last chapter presented microfinance as a 'bottom -up' strategy for reducing 
global poverty, especially in developing countries. It also highlighted that, to 
achieve its intended goal of 'empowering' the poor to take control of own 
livelihoods, microfinance needs to diffuse widely and achieve greater scale. 
However, so far the development of microfinance has been variable, with 
particular regions such as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lagging behind those of South 
Asia and Latin America, both in terms of client outreach and performance. This 
chapter presents a brief characterization of microfinance in three regions: South 
Asia, Latin America and SSA, with a view to establishing the case for researching 
SSA, and in particular Zambia. How has microfinance evolved here and how does 
this compare with other world regions? 
The comparative approach to assessing performance is not straightforward, partly 
because organizational forms and other institutional arrangements differ from 
country to country, and measurement standards vary. It is also important to realize 
the diversity of practice within microfinance itself. It is diverse in terms of 
organizational types, with MFis organized as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs ), banks, credit cooperatives or non-bank financial institutions. An added 
dimension concerns the type of target group chosen. Some target women, others 
poor clients, and still others small business lending for example. 
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There is also some ambiguity and uncertainty about how the boundaries of 
microfinance should be defined. 23 Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to give a 
broad overview of some of the distinguishing characteristics of microfinance in 
sub-Saharan Africa relative to South Asia and Latin America and then present the 
Zambian socio-economic context. 
3.2 Inter-regional Differences 
Although there are thousands of MFis worldwide, the development of 
microfinance over the past two decades has not been globally uniform, but is 
concentrated in selected regions such as South Asia and Latin America (Honohan, 
2004), making Africa a relative latecomer (Mosley and Rock, 2004). Microfinance 
institutions in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) encompass a wide range of providers that 
vary in legal structure, mission, and methodology - offering these financial 
services to clients who do not have access to mainstream banks or other formal 
financial service providers (Lafourcade, Isem, Mwangi and Brown, 2005). Most 
MFis in Africa are expanding in number and still in their experimental stage and 
are small scale by comparison with MFis in South Asia and Latin America24 . For 
example, data suggests that Asian MFis lead the world in terms of both breadth 
(number of clients) and depth (relative poverty of clients) of outreach 
(Montgomery and Weiss, 2005) (see figure 3.1). 
23 Honoham (2004) points to literature that is not unanimous on whether semi-formal 
cooperative savings and credit associations, postal savings banks and agricultural development 
banks should be included as microfinance. There is also a question of whether mainstream banks 
that provide financial services (mainly deposits) at a micro level need to be classified as 
microfinance. The thesis focuses on institutions providing access to credit and a limited range of 
financial services, such as savings and insurance. 
24 The average age is estimated at about I 0 years for African MFis- this is still lower than that of 
Soliih A:siarlMFis (Montgomery and~Weiss; 2oos). - · ~ 
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Figure 3. 1 Regional Breakdown of Access to Microfinance 
Adapted from the State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2005: p.26 
In their analysis of over 1,500 MFis from 85 developing countries, Lapenu and 
Zeller (200 1) also found that Asia accounted for the majority of MFis, retained the 
highest volume of savings and credit, served more members than any other 
continent and exhibited the highest repayment rates. However, Latin American 
MFis exceed Asia in terms of financial viability (Microbanking Bulletin, 2003) 
and commercialization (Hubka and Zaidi, 2004). African MFis have the lowest 
repayment rates . Even within Africa, East and West Africa receive most 
international support and account for most clients and organizations involved in 
microfinance (Lapenu and Zeller, 2001). However, SSA microfinance institutions 
are reported to be among the most productive globall y, as measured by the number 
of borrowers and savers per staff member but, in efficiency terms (cost per 
borrower), they are among the lowest (Lafourcade et al. 2005). 
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Another notable feature of microfinance in Africa is that it has borrowed quite 
heavily from South Asian solidarity models, in particular from the Grameen Bank 
of Bangladesh (Cull, et al., 2006; Mosley and Rock, 2004) and also from its own 
traditional structures such as the rotating savings and credit associations (Lyons, 
2000; Nissanke, 2001; Pal, 1999). According to the Micro Banking Bulletin 
(2005), over 85 percent of MFis in Africa offer group loans through solidarity 
groups or village banks25 . Microfinance has also emerged with the support of 
governments, civil institutions, and donor organisations (Congo, 2002), and a 
number still operate as unregulated MFis. In terms of numbers, Africa is 
underdeveloped, with observers (MicroBanking Bulletin, 2005) suggesting that its 
share in total microfmance client numbers varies between 3 and 6 percent, a figure 
far smaller in proportion to its population than either Asia or Latin America. Yet, 
unlike Grameen Bank,26 in its founding stage, most MFis in Africa (in particular 
Zambia) face the challenge of a 'culture of default' and declining repayment rates, 
in addition to the pressure from donors to expand rapidly (Churchill, 1999; Paxton, 
1999). However, what seems common to all regions is the higher proportion of 
women borrowers27 and that the sector world wide remains heavily grant and 
subsidy dependent with most MFis still not self-sufficient (Coleman, 2005; 
Honohan, 2004; Holvoet, 2005; Spencer and Wood, 2005). 
In addition, most MFis in sub-Saharan Africa experience relatively high rates of 
client loss within the range of 25% to 65% per annum (Hulme, 1999; Copestake, 
2000; Musona and Coetzee, 2002; Stark and Nyirumuringa, 2002), due to 
dissatisfaction with MFI loan products, poor customer service and repayment 
25 Solidarity group lenders employ contracts based on JOint liability. Loans are made to 
individuals, but the group which may have 5 and 20 members depending on the institution and 
location, takes the responsibility for a loan should a member default (Isaia, 2005). Village 
banking is based on larger groups with a degree of self -governance but draws on a similar 
notion of joint liability (Cull, et al., 2006). 
26 Several writers have increasingly criticised the Grameen Bank model as unduly rigid, and 
Grameen Bank itself has made amendments to its original model. In particular, recent literature 
suggests that this model does not adapt well to the urban settings of most of the African 
countries where it has been adopted. 
27 Some studies (Isaia, (2005) in Jordan and Volschenk and Biekpe, (2003) in South Africa) have 
notel more inclusion-of male clienk - - . - . - . . .. .. - . . ... . -
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schedule rigidities, amongst other reasons. This is significantly in excess of the 
dropout rates reported in Asia of 10% to 15% (Murray, 2001), and nearly 25% in 
Latin America (MkNelly and Painter, 2000). This is problematic as it increases the 
costs of service provision, and possibly one reason why most MFis in Africa 
remain small (and potentially unsustainable). Programmes operating in SSA in 
particular are judged particularly costly (Baumann, 2004; Nissanke, 2001; 
Volschenk and Biekpe, 2003). 
Creating strong and viable MFis in Africa is particularly challenging given this 
particular social and macroeconomic context (Baumann, 2004; Paxton and Fruman 
(1999). The environment is challenging for microfinance due to the combination 
of previous failures, weak infrastructure, low average population density, acute 
poverty, illiteracy and high prevalence ofHN AIDS. The World Bank 2005 report 
showed that sub-Sahara Africa has the lowest GNP per capita of any region of the 
developing world. Poverty is also widespread and in addition, MFis in sub-
Saharan Africa are faced with high illiteracy rates (Aryeetey, 1998; Mukama, et 
al., 2005) and a much lower population density than that of Asia (see table 3.1 ). 
Therefore despite the rapid increase in number of MFis, their outreach remains 
small compared with the potential demand (Congo, 2002). African MFis are 
nevertheless important actors in the financial sector, and can be positioned to 
reach the millions of potential clients living in poverty with little access to 
mainstream financial services. 
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Table 3. 1 Regional characteristics 
GNI per capita Growth ofGDP Population Rural Adult illiteracy 
2002 (US$) per capita(%) density Population (%) (%) 
Region 2001-2002 (no./km2) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 306.5 0.9 29 67 35 
East Asia & Pacific 1740.5 5.8 116 66 10 
South Asia 640.5 2.6 293 72 41 
Latin/ America 1726.5 -1.9 26 25 11 
&Carib. 
Source: World Bank, 2004, 2005 
3.3 The Environment for Microfinance in Zambia 
3.3.1 Socio-economic situation 
Zambia, which until two decades ago was one of the most prosperous countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, now ranks as one of the least developed countries in the 
world. Its per capita GDP has been declining over the past thirty years and is 
significantly lower than the SSA levels28 (Me Cullouch et al. 2000; Saasa, 2005). 
It has a population of 10.5 million (World Bank, 2005). Its formal sector 
employment has declined following two decades of recession. Retrenchments both 
in the public and private sector have left many more depending upon the informal 
sector (Ferguson, 2006; Hansen, 1999). Employment data for 2002 shows the total 
number in formal employment was 476, 000, out of a labour force of five million 
(Musona, 2004). Mining, once the driving force in the Zambian economy, 
declined as did those sectors which depended on it. Consequently, poverty in 
Zambia is officially widespread (ZHDR, 2003). Zambia is also reported to be one 
of the most urbanised countries in SSA and deindustrialization has contributed to 
28 At independence, 1964, Zambia's GOP per capita was US$ I ,200, declined to US$750 in 1986 
artd'ftirther'to-US$380 i1n002 before- iilcreasingl)' sligntly to US$450 in 2004 (Mail111:io ano 
Mavrotas, 2003; World Development Indicators, 2001, 2005). 
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making poverty an increasingly urban phenomenon (CSO, 1990; Me Cullouch et 
al. 2000). The HIV/AIDS pandemic and other diseases (amongst other factors) 
have worsened poverty (Zambia's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2002). 
The informal sector in Zambia, as in many other developing countries, remains 
dynamic in terms of new employment generation, and currently accounts for more 
than 70 per cent of the Zambian labour force (MOF, 2003, p.43). A majority of the 
poor subsist as micro entrepreneurs - as farmers, street vendors, market traders 
and home workers, - many of them women. They are likely to continue to depend 
on the informal sector for their livelihood. However, data about the informal sector 
is typically inadequate (Me Cullouch et al. 2000). It has therefore been recognised 
that microfinance can play a significant role, particularly in creating greater access 
to financial resources for those who earn their living in the informal sector29 . The 
new development of MFis is an attempt both to raise the standard of living, given 
a capita income of about $450, and to create access for the poor to small capital 
pools, since approximately 73 percent of the population are below the national 
poverty line (World Bank, 2005). The Zambian government has made poverty 
reduction a main goal for development. In 2004, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Volunteers, the Grameen System of 
Bangladesh and two Zambian microfinance NGOs launched the 'Microfinance for 
Poverty Reduction project' in Chongwe and Lusaka, aimed at improving the 
socio-economic situation of poor women (UNDP Zambia, 2004). This is in line 
with the rest of the world in attempting to 'eradicate' poverty as recently 
demonstrated through the latest campaign for 'making poverty history' 2005. 
29 Providing credit to those in low income or targeted groups such as small-scale farmers is not 
new in Zambia. The country has a history of failed government funded credit programs and 
institutions, -up till the 1990s: Maiml5o and Mavrotas (2003)ana Mbanacele -(2000) provide 
detailed accounts. 
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3.4 Microfinance in Zambia 
Zambia's financial sector is relatively small and characterised by low financial 
intermediation (with limited access to financial services for the rural population 
and the low-to-middle income earners). Further, the majority of Zambians cannot 
meet the collateral requirements for the credit facilities offered by commercial 
banks (MOF, 2004; Musona and Coetzee, 2001). In addition, access to financial 
services has been constrained by closures of rural bank networks, bank failures, 
and high bank charges, raising of minimum account balances - which the poor 
cannot afford (Chiumya, 2004). MFis funded by donors have stepped in to fill the 
gap in the provision of financial services. 
Formal microfinance services in Zambia prior to the 1990s were dominated by 
cooperative societies30 (Meagher and Mwiinga, 1999). However the liberalization 
of the economy from 1991 facilitated a resurgence of MFis. Consequently, 
microfinance in Zambia was introduced in the early 1990s, as part of a worldwide 
proliferation of NGO-led microfinance programs. Its rapid introduction reflected 
the belief that such programs could not only empower the poor to help themselves 
but also do so in a way that was financially sustainable. However, the notion of 
commercial profitability was not embraced early in Zambian MFis because 
institutional microfinance started not as a distinct business, but as a means of 
alleviating poverty and helping poor people to create sustainable livelihoods for 
themselves (Harper, 2003). In the Zambian case microfinance intervention was 
also typically urban rather than rural (Chiumya, 2004; Maimbo, 1999; Mwenda 
and Muuka, 2004; Musona, 2004). It targeted the 'economically active poor' -
people with established businesses that needed capital to grow. However, it was 
not itself seen as a branch of commercial banking. Microfinance in Zambia has 
been influenced by the strong role of non-governmental social development 
organisations (NGOs). Most major Zambian microfinance providers began as 
30 Meagher and Mwiinga (1999) give a detailed account on the performance of cooperative 
societies. 
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NGOs, formed as part of donor-supported projects and, are heavily subsidized by 
them31 • As a result, many have an ambiguous ownership status. 
As social development organizations, they frequently referred to 'helping' the 
poor, and were regarded as organizations with essentially charitable goals. 
Consequently, borrowers have sometimes treated rnicrofinance NGO loans as if 
they were grants that need not be repaid (AMIZ, 2002; Dixon et al., 2006). Like 
the rest of the financial sector, rnicrofinance NGOs in Zambia suffer from a poor 
'credit culture' 32 . The general understanding is that NGOs need not emphasize 
paying back loans if they are also meant to 'help' the poor. But rnicrofinance 
activities are now being recast as needing to be more commercial and MFis have 
to adhere to strict cost-recovery operations - a change to which many clients could 
find difficulty. 
High levels of donor funding have also meant that 'upward' accountability to 
donors has skewed rnicrofinance NGO activities towards donor-driven agendas for 
development rather than to clients' priorities. They are to a great extent seen as 
new patrons bringing with them new access to external resources (White, 1999). 
31 Gina Porter (2003) in her research in Ghana finds a similar pattern and argues that 
development NGOs (of which microfinance NGOs are a part) is largely a donor-created and 
donor-led system. Citing Tvedt (1998), she argues that these NGOs have become 'a transmission 
belt of a powerful language and of Western concepts of development, imposing similar policies 
(and microcredit models) on different poverties (and countries) (p.141 ). 
32 MFis claimed that they were also affected by a culture of nonpayment within the country. 
There seems to be some historical pattern to this and is to a large extent endemic. The 
understanding is that Zambians are poor at repaying debts. But this should not be regarded as an 
inborn attribute-it has been conditioned by political factors, an inadequate legal framework, and 
donor-dependent approach to micro-lending and failed government subsidized credit schemes 
which did not penalize wilful loan defaulters. See Churchill (1999) for similar experiences in 
South Africa. The study adds that this 'bad culture' has been perpetuated by a sheer lack of 
commitment to accountability. This culture does not favour the type ofmicrofinance lending that 
thrives on trust and peer pressure for collateral. See Musona and Coetzee (200 1) for similar 
--views. - --
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It is estimated that there are thirty established MFis (AMIZ membership list, 
2004)33 , most of which are either inactive or quite localised and small compared to 
other MFis in South Asia and even East Africa. Despite these numbers a majority 
operate in the urban areas34 (M and N Associates, 2003; Wilkinson, 2003), 
outreach remains low in relation to the potential 'market', and the scope of 
services is likewise limited, mostly to microcredit with little savings mobilisation 
(Chiumya, 2004; Maimbo and Mavrotas, 2003). In a country where three quarters 
of the population live in poverty, with 54 per cent classified as 'core poor' -living 
with income of less than US$ 1 per day - current MFI usage is judged 
disappointingly low (Maimbo, 2003: 11), but the assumed potential for 
microfinance and MFI's growth remains high. Microfinance can make a 
difference, given that the availability of, and access to formal financial services by 
the majority of Zambians is so limited. The Association of Microfinance 
Institutions of Zambia (AMIZ) has estimated that the industry's outreach is 
approximately 80,000 against estimated demand for microfinance services by two 
million people. 
However, like MFis in Kenya (Johnson et al., 2003) and other SSA countries, 
Zambian MFis face relatively high loan delinquency and default, and high 
operating costs, slow intake and high client exits (Musona and Coetzee, 2001; 
Siame, 2004) which all constrain their efforts to achieve the sustainability now 
considered so important. Indeed, most are faced with challenges of 'good 
governance' (given their NGO status), commercialisation and still struggle to 
maintain high repayment rates. Although microfinance has continued to mature in 
some ways, overall it has not maintained the momentum of its early rapid growth. 
33 AMIZ stands for the Association of Microfinance Institutions of Zambia and its main roles are 
to lobby Government for favourable policy, support MFI activities and dissemination of 'local 
best practices'. Most of the active MF!s are affiliated to AMIZ, including CETZAM and PRIDE. 
By 2003 there were 98 MFis out of which 45 were affiliated to AMIZ. By 2004, only 21 posted 
information with AMIZ. In Zambia a number of institutions providing microfinance services are 
not MFis. Some provide the services as projects (Musona, 2004). This might explain the 
inconsistency in reported numbers and clients served. 
· 
34 Interestingly, Baumanno(2004: "6Ynotes .that most Sotith .. African MFis operate ii1 rural areas. 
This is in contrast to the Zambian scenario. 
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Comparatively, microfinance remains relatively undeveloped in Zambia and the 
reported performance of most MFis is below that of similar institutions in East 
Africa (Siame, 2004), many are found to be poorly managed, heavily reliant on 
subsidy, and vulnerable to waves of loan delinquency and even fraud35 . In 
addition, they have reportedly suffered from a loss of trust. Yet it is still expected 
that microfinance can overcome the constraints that excluded the poorest and 
enhance economic participation of the poor especially women. In the section that 
follows, sample MFis are briefly described to provide a backdrop to the findings 
later. 
3.5 CETZAM Opportunity Microfinance Limited 
CETZAM Opportunity Microfinance Limited, originally under the name Christian 
Enterprise Trust of Zambia (CETZAM) was funded by the British Department for 
International Development (DFID), and is one of Zambia's best known 
microfinance institutions. Headquartered in Kitwe,36 CETZAM has branches in 
three (3) provinces namely, Copperbelt, Lusaka and Southern. It was founded in 
1995 as an NGO with an expressly 'strong vision' to meet a social agenda driven 
by Christian principles to 'transform the lives of the poor' by 'providing 
opportunities to create employment and generate income through credit and 
training services'. This approach originally reflected the specific concerns of its 
founder members, which did not only see service provision as an end in itself, but 
rather as a way of responding to their public values. It therefore began by taking a 
'missionary perspective' and sought to use the Christian biblical framework to 
shape a threefold (economic, social and spiritual) transformational development. 
Christian faith framed CETZAM's work and was such an important part of their 
work that it formalised prayer meetings called "devotions" held every morning in 
35 Personal communication with the Director of AMIZ, May 2004 Lusaka 
36 At the time of the field study (2004), plans were under way to move its headquarters to 
- Lus-af<a'frorr!Kitwe. Kitwe has remained as one ofits five branches on the Copperbelt. 
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all its seven branches (for similar arrangements m faith-based NGOs see 
Bomstein, 2003)37 . 
In 1996 CETZAM initiated a partnership with Opportunity International (OI), a 
global NGO to provide technical assistance to develop CETZAM as an 
independent partner micro enterprise organization. In 1997, CETZAM and OI 
entered into an agreement with the Department for International Development 
(DFID) to implement the Northern Zambia Enterprise Development Project 
(NOZAMED Project). The primary aim of the NOZAMED project was to address 
the lack of access to credit faced by the economically active poor on the 
Copperbelt (Musona, 2004). In 2002, CETZAM changed its name to CETZAM 
Opportunity Microfinance Limited. 
Its first loans were disbursed in July 1998 and, through its group-based lending 
methodology, it originally targeted the poorest of the economically active 
population, especially women (CETZAM brochure, 2003). DFID agreed to 
provide £2.29 million in financial support for a five-year period starting February 
1998 (Copestake, 2002). Initially, loans were disbursed on 'mercy' to help the 
poor through what Dichter (1999) calls the 'culture of compassion'. Within this 
religious framework, loan officers (field workers) were considered 'servants' of 
clients they were 'called' to serve, as part of 'God's work', and not career 
practitioners (Dixon et al., 2006). This religious orientation further shaped 
relationships within and outside CETZAM (see chapter 6). 
37 Devotion appeared as a unifying force and faith was supposedly expected to pervade the 
personal and institutional conduct of life. Similarly, client meetings also opened with prayer and 
it was not unusual for loan officers to 'preach' to clients on selected bible verses -especially on 
those to do with good steward, discipline, love and loyalty (Field notes, 2003, 2004). As 
Bomstein (2003) also noted in faith-based NGOs in Zimbabwe, Christianity provided a dynamic 
-ru15ncformicrofinance worlCafCETZA'M. - - -- - --
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3.5.1 CETZAM's lending methodology 
CETZAM offers its clients three types of loan products, two of which are 
delivered through the group lending methodology, namely Trust Bank and 
Solidarity Group38. The third type is individual lending. Its clientele comprises 
mainly women entrepreneurs although lately the percentage of male clients 
relative to that of women has increased. CETZAM expressly uses a group-based 
poverty lending methodology specially intended to target the poorest of the 
economically active population (CETZAM brochure, 2001). To qualify for a loan, 
a borrower needs no physical collateral, but must belong to a joint-liability credit 
group, as is the practice with most group lending methodologies. A loan officer 
then assesses the eligibility of potential clients, visits each group member's 
business to evaluate their financial situation, and trains them in CETZAM's 
lending methodology -including some basic book keeping skills- for ten weeks 
before disbursing loans to them. Trust Banks are thus supposed to become tightly 
knit self-support groups with the ability to transform their lives and communities. 
Self-selection of group members is a major element of the methodology together 
with joint mutual guarantees (Bastelaer, 1999; Matin, 2000). The individual 
lending loan product was initially restricted to the Lusaka branch only, but has 
now been gradually introduced to other branches on the Copperbelt. 
3.5.2 Performance 
CETZAM expanded quickly after it was founded. The first six years reveal an 
impressive start before problems arose. CETZAM originally claimed great success 
(in terms of client outreach), recording repayment rates of 98 per cent and over 
(Copestake, 2002; Copestake et al., 2001), with low percentages of Portfolio at 
38 Membership in Trust Banks is between twenty and forty, comprising people with similar 
economic needs. Solidarity groups have five to seven members. Trust Bank members meet 
weekly, Solidarity fortnightly (CETZAM brochure). Loan officers go out to hold meetings with 
clients in their own environment. The data in this thesis is mainly based on Trust Bank and 
Soliaality'loans-ana-not on the-individual lending loan product: 
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Risk39 (PAR) and Portfolio in Arrears. This initial 'success story' led to a massive 
client outreach drive (see Figure 3.1) partly driven by outside donors as well as 
itself, for together they envisaged the conversion of CETZAM into a registered 
bank with a network of at least 20 branches servmg 50,000 clients by 2005 
(Cheston, et al., 2000). By 2001 CETZAM opened twelve branches (most 
eventually unsustainable), employed eighty-five (85) loan officers. The average 
number of clients per loan officer stood at 375 clients against an expected standard 
load of 350. 
As Figure 3.1 shows, at first the number of borrowers was small, but soon rose 
quickly; approaching 16,135 by 2002, but then fell dramatically to 5,382 by the 
end of2003 and then 4,050 by June 200440 . 
39 PAR (Portfolio at Risk =the outstanding balance of loans with overdue payments divided by 
the total outstanding balance) is a ratio for measuring loan delinquency. It is therefore a measure 
of loan quality that considers not just missed repayments of delinquent clients, but the remaining 
outstanding balance of loans. Thus, PAR captures the risk of not recovering the part of the 
credits disbursed which are still in the borrowers' hands and not regularly repaid. The 
detennination of when a loan is at risk is based on the age of the arrears and can vary among 
MFis. A 'cut-off of 30 days is usually the norm. 
40 l~Y December,~ :2005,- CETZAtvCnad 5;f6(r-a-ctive Clients and percenfage of women clients 
stood at 74 percent (AMIZ, Microfinance statistics report, Dec, 2005). 
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Figure 3. 2 CETZAM-Ciient Population July 1998- Dec. 200541 
Source: Compiled from original CETZAM documentation and AMIZ 
Microfinance annual statistics report-Dec. 2005. 
CETZAM, under pressure from its donors, underwent a major restructuring in 
2003 that included policy, institutional and staff changes. CETZAM then reduced 
its number of branches from twelve to seven, and loan officers from 85 to 28, 
while the client load per loan officer fell to 192 from 233 in December 2002 (see 
table 3.2). 
41 Client figures for year 2003 and 2004 in Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2 differ. The numbers in 
figure 3'.twere p-roviaed-by~AMIZ wliile=th-o-se' in -table-3~2 b-y CETZAM. There is neea-to treat 
internal figures by CETZAM cautiously as they had not been verified independently. 
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Table 3. 2 CETZAM's Trend Data (2000-2004) 
Dec2000 Dec 2001 Dec 2002 Dec 2003 April2004 Dec 2004 
No. ofbranches 7 12 12 07 07 07 
No. ofloan 
- 60 85 28 26 35 
officers 
Active clients 9,390 13, 327 16,135 5,402 4,901 6,214 
Average client load 
per loan officer 
- 222 233 192 188 180 
Source: Compiled from CETZAM documents 
By the end of 2003, PAR at thirty days and over stood at 30 per cent, while the 
percentage of portfolio in arrears was 22 per cent, signifying substantial 
'delinquent' loans. The impacts of a major restructuring and policy changes were 
just beginning to have effects by mid 2004. 
3.6 PRIDE Zambia 
Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development Enterprises (PRIDE) Zambia 
started, as Pride Africa in February 2000, following a project funding agreement 
between PRIDE Africa and the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA). The initial Project agreement covered a one-year pilot period with options 
for extension to a longer term depending on how the outcome of the pilot phase 
was evaluated. The project's stated goal was the provision of financial services to 
micro and small entrepreneurs. After successful completion of the project phase, 
PRIDE Zambia was incorporated as a company limited by guarantee. 
PRIDE Zambia has its Head Office in Lusaka and a 10 branch network in four (4) 
provinces namely Lusaka, Copperbelt, Eastern and Southern. There were 25 loan 
officers as at Jt.me 2004, of which 6 \Vere_ female. By P~se_l11b~r 30, 20Q4! Pg.IDE 
Zambia outreach was 5,080 active clients, (60 percent women) and a loan portfolio 
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of K5.6 billion. Portfolio at risk was estimated at 7.38 percent as at June 30, 
200442 . PRIDE Zambia's performance, just like other MFis in Zambia has not 
been particularly impressive (see Fig.3.2). It has encountered high client drop out 
rates of 40 percent on average between 2002 and 2004 (Musona, 2004). 
Client Population-PRIDE Zambia 2000-2005 
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Figure 3. 3 PRIDE Zambia's client population: 2000-2005 
Source: Compiled from original PRIDE Zambia documentation and AMIZ 
Microfinance Annual statistics report, 2005. 
3.6.1 PRIDE Zambia's lending methodology 
PRIDE Zambia advances loans to individual entrepreneurs through a group-based 
system. Prospective borrowers organise themselves in groups of five members 
42 Reported figures on borrowing clients, PAR and loan portfolio could not be reconciled from 
three different sources. Figures reported in Musona's report (2004), AMIZ Annual Microfinance 
statistics (2003, 2004); the MIX Market website and what was made available for this study had 
many inconsistencies. The figures here need to be taken with caution. MFI sector in Zambia 
itself lacks one single credible database. 
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(called an Enterprise Group (EG)), which are federated at a Market Enterprise 
Committee (MEC). Ten (10) EGs are combined to form a MEC comprising fifty 
members who then elect MEC leaders. The self-selected persons in an EG are 
jointly liable for any loans made to peers in the group. According to PRIDE's 
methodology the MEC management committee chairperson is formally 
responsible for: organising registration, acts as spokesperson for the group, 
enforces PRIDE rules and regulations, conducts meetings and intervenes and 
assists to resolve conflicts between MEC members. The treasurer manages all 
matters dealing with MEC accounts, collects the loan insurance fund, loan 
repayment and any other fees from members. He/She is formally responsible and 
accountable for all money receipts and paper work for MEC. The treasurer is 
expected to assist the credit officers in verification and reconciliation of MEC 
member records. The secretary maintains minutes of meetings and handles all 
group correspondence. MEC meetings are usually held at PRIDE Zambia's office 
premises. Credit officers work directly with the MEC leadership to ensure loans 
are repaid on time. In theory, these are self-governing groups and the credit officer 
need not be active in running MEC activities. 
PRIDE has four main loan products: 
1. Group Loan Scheme: this is the longest established targeted at low-income 
entrepreneurs willing to work in primary groups of five members and confederated 
groups of fifty members. Initial loan size is K350, 000. 
2. Micro-loan: this is targeted at micro entrepreneurs with very low incomes 
willing to work in groups of not more than twenty-five members. It has an initial 
loan size of K50, 000 (inflation has made this amount relatively meaningless and 
therefore the loan product hardly exists). 
3. Premium Loan: this is targeted at medium income entrepreneurs who work in 
groups of five members. It has an initial loan size of K3 million. 
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4. Salary Guaranteed Loan: an individual loan targeted at salaried employees43 
with a maximum loan size ofK15 million. 
Both CETZAM and PRIDE Zambia use a group-based lending methodology but 
differ significantly in their target and espoused philosophy. As earlier discussed, 
CETZAM started as a Christian faith based NGO with a mission to 'assist the 
poor' -especially women44 . Current brochures, however, state that: "CETZAM is 
committed to aggressively transform itself to become the best provider of financial 
services to meet the needs of the economically disadvantaged" (CETZAM 
brochure, 2004). PRIDE Zambia is not faith-based. It provides financial services 
to micro and small entrepreneurs. Its mission statement makes no reference to the 
'poor' and has no explicitly stated client preferences, although 75 percent of 
borrowers are women (field notes, 2004). Common to both MFis is the change of 
its senior managers. CETZAM for example has had three chief executive officers 
in eight years, while PRIDE Zambia has made two changes. 
3. 7 Microfinance Research in Zambia 
The widespread interest in microfinance programmes elsewhere has generated an 
extensive literature reflecting the public attention that microfmance has attracted. 
In Zambia, however, there is little literature on the subject, while performance data 
are considered proprietary, and also difficult to access45 . Although a majority of 
MFis are publicly funded through international donors, they rarely disclose much 
information. Interestingly, studies have mainly been carried out by, or on behalf 
of, donors on the assumption that microfinance plays a vital role in alleviating 
poverty and creating employment. Consequently, the focus has been on impact 
43 Salary guaranteed loans (SGLs) were just being introduced at the time of study and therefore 
not covered in the discussions. Secondly, the thesis is particularly interested in group loans, not 
individual lending. Observations and group meeting attended relate to the Group loan scheme. 
44 CETZAM places emphasis on its social mission -where it seeks to improve access to financial 
services, reduce poverty, empower women, build community solidarity or promote economic 
development. Social performance wastlierefore'"more central to CETZA:l\1 than PRJ DE Zartioia.-
45 Personal communication with the AMIZ Director- Lusaka, April 2004. 
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assessment, especially on programmes supported by DFID. For example, the few 
impact studies have concentrated on CETZAM (Cheston, et al., 2000; Copestake 
et al. 2001; Copestake, 2002), with an exception of one by Copestake, Bhalotra 
and Johnson (1998) of the Peri-Urban Lusaka Small Enterprise (PULSE). There 
are to date no impact studies conducted on PRIDE Zambia. Other researchers 
(Musona and Coetzee, 2001a, 2001b) funded by MicroSave-Africa, have 
documented data about client dropouts and the potential impact on product design 
with a view to improve client retention and also the use and impact of savings 
services. 
AMIZ has conducted a few in-house studies about loan delinquency and related 
challenges. It holds a limited but dated library on microfinance in Zambia. In 
addition, there has been limited academic research. The literature is therefore 
limited and weak compared with other work elsewhere (such as Kenya, Uganda 
and Ghana), and also relative to the funds concerned. While research has 
addressed the impact of microcredit on poverty, less attention has again been paid 
to the loan officers- the real 'implementers' ofmicrofinance. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a brief comparative analysis of microfinance to 
demonstrate how microfinance has evolved and developed in SSA compared to 
that in South Asia and Latin America. Africa in general has lagged behind in terms 
of numbers of MFis and client population as well as accompanying research 
exposure. It has also shown that microfinance in Zambia and the rest of SSA is 
still emerging, but largely donor driven and is also largely urban based. However, 
the performance of most Zambian MFis (as shown in the cases studied) is less that 
of similar institutions in East Africa. Like other MFis in SSA, Zambian MFis 
primarily use a group based methodology and a majority of their clients are 
women. They also face challenges of 'good governance', low repayment rates, 
-- - - -
-sfo\\' ~lient intake, high operating costs a~d sust~inability. The local microfinance 
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context like in other countries in the region, offers potential to extend financial 
services to the poor, but still remains an under-researched sector. Therefore given 
these similarities, Zambia provides a case study for understanding how 
microfinance works and knowledge gained here could form a basis for researching 
other emerging areas. The chapter has therefore clearly demonstrated that SSA is a 
frontier territory for microfinance, yet knowledge of how microfinance diffuses 
remains limited. Having contextualised the study, the next chapter explains in 
detail the methodology and how the process of gaining access and generating 
relevant data and analysis was negotiated and managed. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Design, Methodology, and Procedural Validation 
4.1 Introduction 
As noted in chapter one and three, this research stemmed from growing interest 
in, and optimism about, microfinance as a strategy for poverty reduction on one 
hand, and the unexplained variable take take-up in SSA on the other. Chapter 
two found that discussions of the potential of micro finance are implicitly linear-
i.e. they assume that implementation ofmicrofinance 'best practices' necessarily 
lead to positive development. However, such a top-down view overlooks the 
intervening work of the loan officers whose interaction with clients also shapes 
and reconstitutes MFI policies and processes in diverse ways. 
This chapter therefore states the epistemological assumptions, theoretical 
perspectives, and methodology of the field research itself. The implications of 
different epistemologies are contrasted to justify the constructivist methodology 
chosen. One important element in contrasting a research design is the 
consistency of the method through which the research question is asked. The 
goal therefore, is to develop a research strategy that will help achieve the aim 
and objectives developed in chapter one. The key question concerns what data 
collection and analysis methods afford the most chance of studying microfinance 
in action in dealing with these research questions. It also gives emphasis to the 
pilot study that was conducted at the beginning of the fieldwork. This is because, 
it marked a transition from much of theoretical thinking about the research 
process, to what was practically achievable in the field. 
The chapter first makes a note on the role and place of literature in this study, 
and then describes the research design, covering access procedures, choice of 
sites and institutions, methods of data collection, and how the design was 
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adapted to the emerging nature of the problem in context, including procedures 
and methods intended to give added validity and rigour through triangulation. 
4.2 Role of literature and Grounded theory: A brief note 
As there was an absence of substantive theory that explains how microfinance 
works, earlier literature review served to increase an awareness of the gaps in 
the knowledge (Cutcliffe, 2000), and current thinking in the area (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998) but did not provide the researcher with an implicit theory which 
could be tested. Traditional grounded theory in principle ignores reviewing any 
of the literature in the substantive area under study (Glaser, 1992; Mills, Bonner 
and Francis, 2006). However, later approaches to grounded theory take different 
opinions on the role that previous literature plays in the research process. For 
example, Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) argue for a flexible approach to the 
use of literature in the identification of the research problem and support for 
emerging theory. Glaser on the other hand, argues that this can bias the 
researcher (Glaser, 1992). Others argue that, timing does not matter, as long as 
the analyst is critically analytical of literature at all times and does not allow 
existing knowledge to pre-empt identification of the research problem or 
formation of emergent theory (Me Callin, 2006). In practice, no potential 
researcher is an empty vessel (Cutcliffe, 2000) or goes in the field concept free 
Schwandt, 2000). In this case, what was known from earlier literature shaped, 
but did not necessary determine, what was "found" (Charmaz, 2005). What this 
difference of opinion indicates is that there are fundamental differences between 
Glaser's and Strauss's version of grounded theory. 
The thesis used principles of grounded theory flexibly because research on the 
role of loan officers is generally under-developed or relatively ignored and thus 
microfinance literature offered little direct theoretical or empirical guidance. 
The researcher maintained sensitivity to data (Heath and Cowley, 2004) 
throughout-the research-process;· 'Fhough presentedcex-ante;the secondc'body-of 
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literature specific to emerging categories such as emotional labour, role conflict 
and ambiguity and accountability was accessed and introduced ex-post. 
Therefore the literature in the substantive area is positioned in chapter two and 
subsequently discussed in the data analysis chapters because the researcher 
aimed at 'sign posting' the reader and for purposes of maintaining the flow of 
the 'unfolding story' of the loan officers. Ultimately, how literature is 
positioned remains a matter of debate. 
4.3 Establishing a Research Paradigm 
Research is often categorised into two distinct types: qualitative and quantitative 
based on the nature, objectives and questions of the research and the type of 
empirical data sought. Quantitative or qualitative, researchers approach their 
studies with a particular paradigm (Creswell, 1998). The tenn paradigm refers 
to: "basic set of beliefs or assumptions that guide action" (Guba, 1990, p.17) or 
"the progress of scientific practice based on people's philosophies and 
assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge" (Hussey and Hussey 
(1997, p. 47). Denzin and Lincoln (2003) on the other hand refer to paradigm as 
the basic principles and values encompassed in the researcher's epistemological, 
ontological, and methodological assumptions. These basic beliefs will be 
reflected in how the researcher designs the research, how they collect and 
analyse data (Bryman, 2001; Crotty, 1998; Gummeson, 1988; Maykut and 
Morehouse, 1994; Morgan, 1979). 
Detailed consideration of epistemology, ontology, theoretical perspective, and 
methodology can be neglected m journals and papers about 
microcredit/microfinance, particularly where, as Booysen and Arntz, (2003) 
observe, 'most of the studies are practitioner led, donor driven with little interest 
in methodological rigours'. Quantitative researchers are often guided by the 
positivist paradigm that assumes an epistemological stance where research is 
ideally ciaimed- to be objecti~~. detacb~d- ~~d unbi~sed. The q~~ntitati~~ 
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researcher seeks causal determination, prediction, and equivalent generalization 
of findings (Amaratunga et al. 2002) which are assumed to be independently 
derived (Bryman, 2001; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; Laws, 2003), where the 
researcher can disengage from what is being researched (Evans, 2000; Hussey 
and Hussey, 1997). In addition, 'reality' is inferred to be singular, and so devoid 
of social influence that, if this had been the approach here, it could have 
bypassed the prior social and cultural construction of the 'variables' then studied 
(Silverman, 1998) and could also have inhibited valuable data by imposing 
preconceived constructs and views on the actors themselves (Creswell, 1998) in 
a situation where rnicrofinance is itself an emergent phenomenon. 
Alternative epistemological perspectives (such as contructionism and 
subjectivism) view the world as socially constructed and also espouse multiple 
realities (Bryman, 2001; Scapens, 2004; Silverman, 2005), in which the 
researcher cannot step outside, and must seek to interpret in different evolving 
contexts. This study draws from constructivist and interpretive paradigms, 
because of their relativist ontology, which assumes the existence not of one 
truth, but of multiple possible realities. Such a position focuses on processes by 
which meanings are created, negotiated, sustained and changed within a 
specified context. 
Based on the constructivist paradigm, all meaningful reality [and knowledge] is 
socially constructed (Crotty, 1998; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; Gephart, 1999; 
Patton, 1990) by actors in different ways. Researcher and the researched, in this 
view, emerge as co-makers of meaning through their interaction (Lincoln and 
Guba, 2000; Tembo, 2001). Given the focus on how rnicrofinance actually 
works, the field based work of loan officers, and especially the 'oral' character 
of much rnicrofinance work, cannot be entirely encompassed by a positivist 
approach. The constructivist approach is therefore most interesting and 
appropriate for answering questions about how loan officers construct the nature 
. of ~heir wor.k and their exp_eriencc;:s and w.h!!t follows from th~se. 
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4.4 The choice of a qualitative approach 
Microfinance (as originally intended) is an oral phenomenon intended to be 
participatory by nature. It has long targeted the poor, a majority of whom lack 
high literacy levels (especially written communication) (Paxton, 1999; Porter, 
2003) and also promoted as a 'bottom-up' development strategy. This implies 
that researching microfinance from the 'grassroots' may require an adaptation of 
standard textbook research methods to its unique-and emerging-nature. For 
instance, can one research an intendedly 'participatory' process like 
microfinance in a non-participatory way as often implied by a positivistic 
approach? How can research be adapted to highly 'oral' and low 
literacy/transparency cultures? These questions have important methodological 
implications because most microfinance clients are women, with low literacy 
levels and easily 'intimidated' by formal procedures and also tend to have an 
aversion for numbers. Therefore, since this study did not ask whether, but rather 
how rnicrofinance works, actual interactions between loan officers and clients 
had to be closely observed. The intention was to capture the 'ambiguities', 
tensions and contradictions in the real-time 'messiness' of loan officers' work 
and also bring out the social character of rnicrofinance work. In addition, loan 
officers had to be understood in terms of what they observably do as well as 
what else they claimed, which also meant interviewing them as well. 
This approach departs from the usual evaluation and impact driven concerns 
(Mosse, 2005) which have focused on 'proof of impact, and appropriate 
definitions of success or measures of progress (like loan repayment rates) and 
achievement as required by programme sponsors. Rather like audits, impact 
assessment studies in rnicrofinance tend to look for depth of outreach and direct 
impacts on clients and are conducted by donor appointed specialist short-term 
contractors, often mid-way through donor programming cycles (Copestake, et 
al., 2001). Impact and evaluation studies thus seek to answer the 'How Much' 
and 'How Many' type questions and give limited space for loan 
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officers/fieldworkers to share their experiences about how microfinance actually 
operates. 
A fundamental argument of this study is that, in order to understand the 
processes of microfinance, it is necessary to understand the actual role loan 
officers perform. Such an understanding can best be grasped by talking to loan 
officers and observing their interactions with clients. The field study therefore 
took an interpretative approach to what was going on. Its aim was not to make a 
judgement about loan officers' successes and failures or to prescribe solutions to 
actors' and organisational problems. In short it departs from previous evaluation 
and impact driven research. The research problem therefore, necessitated the use 
of a multiple or combined methodology (Ahmad, 2000; Lapsley, 2004; Sayer, 
1992), originally derived from sociology and anthropology, rather than standard 
economic evaluation (Cloke, 2002). The actuality of investigating microfinance 
meant using a design that was flexible, less structured, more interactive and also 
adaptive to an emerging field. Its design and methods needed to fit its 
unstructuredness while allowing perspectives of different actors to emerge. 
As a study of an ongomg financial innovation (microfinance), which is 
expressly, socially purposed and organized among a largely disenfranchised, 
socially marginal population, it was important to use a methodology that gave 
'voice' to the main actors concerned (Brett, 2006). The researcher sought to 
explain the actual role and experiences of loan officers unobtrusively, without 
assuming objective detachment (Stoner and Holland, 2004). From a 
methodological point of view, a case study method was therefore adopted, 
emphasizing more in-depth, exploratory study (Denscombe, 2003) to help gain 
richer insights (Scapens, 1990). Case study research is considered to have a 
distinct advantage when a "how" or "why" (or exploratory "what") question is 
being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has 
little or no control (Weerd-Nederhof, 2001; Yin, 2003). The key feature of the 
case study approach is less method or data than the emphasis on understanding 
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observed processes as they actually occur in their context (Amaratunga et al., 
2002; Yin, 2003), putting more emphasis on meaning than frequency (Patton, 
1990; Simmons and Elias, 1994). Within the case study approach, a variety of 
types of data and research methods can be used (Denscombe, 2003; Llewellyn, 
1999). It can also provide an opportunity for identifying intervening variables, 
which might be influential on the main relationship. However, the decision to 
use a case study approach, has faced criticisms about lack of rigour, excessive 
length and generation of massive data; and not being able to generalise the 
results as if evidence is just idiosyncratic (Scapens, 1990). These concerns have 
been addressed here by adopting a flexible research design that allowed the 
researcher to include a new case - PRIDE Zambia (following initial findings 
from a pilot study), as a comparator to help minimize the uniqueness effect of 
CETZAM, and also enhance generalizability. The strength of a case study 
methodology, however, is its ability to focus on the processes as they are 
embedded in a particular place or institution (Blake, 2006). 
Microfinance thrives on social relationships and involves close personal 
interaction among groups of clients and loan officers central to it. It is a process 
that can involve actors' emotions when they act, think, and feel, with one 
another. This research involved investigating relations between and among 
social groups, and into how loan officers adapted to differing expectations of 
both clients and management. The 'soft' nature of the study differs from a 
quantitative approach which relies on 'hard' measures and numeric forms. To 
therefore access and observe it is necessary to actively interact with the actors 
being researched, and 'see' actions as if from their point of view in which they 
happen (Jean Hee, 2004; Taylor and Bogdan, 1984 in Shaffrr and Stebbins, 
1991, p.5). Qualitative approaches were considered more appropriate to 
investigate these socially inter-related issues (Hall and Hall, 1996; Singleton and 
Straits, 1999). This meant looking at the type of data required before choosing 
appropriate methods for generating data (Amaratunga, et al., 2002; Marshall and 
_ Ro~s_ma11, )~99) and being flexible in the choice _of the ___ most __ apprgptja1e 
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methodologies (Hentschel, 1999). For Patton (1990) the issue is "whether one 
has made sensible methods decisions given the purpose of the inquiry, the 
questions being investigated, and the resources available". In addition, the 
methods had to be situationally responsive to enable an understanding of loan 
officers' actions and the meanings they attributed to those actions. As Miles and 
Huberman have argued: 
"Qualitative data with their emphasis on people's "lived experience", are fundamentally well 
suited for locating the meanings people place on the events, processes and structures of their 
lives: their perceptions ... and for connecting these meanings to the social world around them" 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). 
Therefore, the task of the study was to discover 'what was going on' in the 
processes through which MFI clients interact with loan officers, and positivistic 
methodologies that operate in a 'disengaged mode' were inappropriate for this 
purpose. In addition, the research questions are exploratory in nature. The 
intention is to understand the actual processes of microfinance from the 
perspectives of loan officers. So far there is limited understanding of how 
microfinance works in different continents and countries. With regard to 
microfinance in Zambia and its loan officers, limited research has been 
conducted thus far. This is where conducting the pilot study played a critical 
role. The exploratory nature of these research questions called for qualitative 
approaches by which a set of rich data could be gained (Silverman, 2001 ). In this 
study, the appropriateness of the research methodology was tested in a pilot 
study. 
4.5 Gaining Access 
"It is foolish for the researcher to put too much work into a study that must be conducted in 
one particular setting unless he or she can be assured that access will not be denied" 
(Morse, 1998, p. 60). 
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The research site concerned is in a province of Zambia where the researcher had 
lived and worked for over ten years. 'Familiarity' as noted by Cotterill and 
Letherby (1994), can reduce initial problems of access, but can create other 
problems as well, and social class barriers can make one a 'stranger' in any 
known locality. In this case the researcher was both 'insider' as well as 
'outsider' (Tadria, 1991). The 'insider' perspective came from being a Zambian 
with local cultural awareness and the ability to orally communicate in a local 
dialect (Bemba), especially with clients without the services of an interpreter. 
On the other hand, the researcher was an 'outsider' or 'stranger' (Argyris, 1970) 
to the institutions and its key participants - the poor and the loan officers -
making social accessibility problematic. It was assumed that loan officers would 
be free to talk to someone 'native,' especially since non-nationals had conducted 
most research within microfinance before. This proved incorrect when fieldwork 
revealed that loan officers did not easily engage the 'politics' of MFis and, even 
where they did, it took some negotiation before they 'opened up'. Therefore 
having both insider/outsider identities was potentially more enriching 
(Christensen, 1993) for improving access. 
Access could not be negotiated on one single occasion but involved continuing 
negotiation and renegotiation (Ahrens, 2004; Bryman, 2001; Burgess, 1991; Hall 
and Hall, 1996). The first phase began two months before going fully to the 
field. As Mosse notes, 'for outsiders access to the workings of development 
agencies (or institutions) is difficult. For one thing, such agencies operate within 
a nexus of evaluation and external funding which means that effective 
mechanisms for filtering and regulating the flow of information and stabilising 
representations are necessary for survival' (2005: 12). Information is seen as a 
private good rather than public and, that being the case, access to quantitative 
data was restricted. Gummesson (2000) refers to access as 'the ability to get 
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close to the object of study, to really be able to find out what is happening'. 
Entry to CETZAM was not as problematic as that ofPRIDE Zambia46 . 
In both cases negotiations began with the chief executive officers, without whom 
the research would not have proceeded. As Peil (1993), cited in Mandel (2003, 
p.203) noted "even experienced researchers often assume that once top 
authorities have given their permission to, everyone lower in hierarchy will fall 
into line". It was still necessary to negotiate with operational managers in both 
organisations who were invited to write 'letters of introduction' to the branch 
managers, who then 'gave' access to loan officers with whom further 
negotiations in effect continued on a daily basis. Operational managers 
concerned about 'protecting' their own work time, expressed concern that the 
researcher would 'get in the way' of loan officers (under pressure to meet 
targets) and wanted to know 'how much time' the research required. Gaining 
access was therefore situationally specific, facing what Lee (1993) described as 
'seemingly unlimited contingencies ... ' The process was ongoing, in which the 
researcher's identity was continually renegotiated across various branches. 
As Tembo (2003) puts it, 'there is a negotiation process that has to be unpacked 
in the process of generating data' (p.233) which here meant dealing with 
contesting meanings, interests and power dynamics, of which the research was a 
part. Gaining access to the two MFis was conditional - "Provided your research 
does not disrupt the work of loan officers". Lee (1993: 124) considers 
conditional access to be that where gatekeepers often 'allow' researchers into a 
setting but then use formal agreements and procedures to control their activities. 
In this case the injunction was; "do your research but do not disturb us". 
'Physical access' gained did not guarantee 'social access' until loan officers 
appreciated it (Shaffir and Stebbins, 1991 in Harrington, 2003: 599). 
46 The pennission to study the two institutions began two months before the Pilot study with 
CETZAM and three months in case of PRIDE. This is because the researcher was working from 
the UK and correspondence was through e- mails and telephone. This relationship proved 
difficult because, at the~ time;~ both Cnief. Executiveo-officers (CEOJ~ aifdT were strange-rs. -
Negotiation with PRIDE took longer because the process stalled due to changes at CEO level. 
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Gaining 'social access' required developing trust (Marshall and Rossman, 1999) 
with loan officers, maintaining some distance from management and getting 
closer to staff (especially loan officers) at branch level. Interpersonal 
relationships were important in negotiating for both 'physical' and 'social' 
accessibility along with researcher's own identity (Marshall and Rossman, 
1999). For example, at some point it was necessary to use the "native" facet of 
my identity (a Zambian and local university lecturer) to gain access to the loan 
officers and clients, while using the independent "researcher" facet (professional 
credentials) to align better with the executives. At times clients wanted to know 
whether I was a new branch manager or loan officer. Others asked: Are you 
from head office? Who are you doing this research for? Is it for donors or the 
MFis? These questions from participants partly formed the basis for building up 
relationships and trust before they could engage with the researcher, while 
seeking to establish an appropriate field identity. Throughout the fieldwork, it 
was necessary to consistently establish my identity as an independent researcher 
from the Copperbelt University, and not a hired consultant, in order to gain some 
trust and 'acceptability'. 
4.6 Selecting Research Sites and Institutions 
Based on early experiences, it was decided to select the Copperbelt province, 
where CETZAM and PRIDE Zambia are represented in five and four out of 
seven towns respectively. But because of the methods the study was going to 
use, a prolonged presence and in-depth work would only be possible in a few 
locations. Three mining towns of Kitwe, Ndola and Chingola (Map 4.1 ), with a 
heavy presence of both organisations were selected for focused observation and 
detailed study and the other two (Kalulushi and Chililabombwe) for less detailed 
discussion. 
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Map 4.1 Geographic Location of the Copperbelt towns and Research Sites. 
Source: 1999, Encyclopedia Britannica Concise 
The key criteria was borrowed from the case study approach, and has been 
determined by what Stake (2000) refers to as the opportunity to learn. 
According to Stake, the case study researcher examines various interests and 
selects a case of some typicality, but leans towards those that seem to offer 
opportunity to learn. The emphasis of a case study approach in drawing 
attention to the question of what can be learned from a single case is the key 
here (Stake, 2000: 446). Both institutions had been operational in the area for 5 
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years or more, which was important for understanding how Zambian MFis have 
evolved, and gaining access to experienced loan officers. 
In addition, with more urbanisation in Africa (Solomon, 2003), and urban 
poverty a problem (CSO-Zambia, 2004), microfinance is likely to be promoted 
increasingly as a poverty reduction strategy across Zambian towns and cities. 
The Copperbelt has the highest concentration of the country's poor (Zambia's 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2002) and unemployment had increased after 
the privatisation of its Copper mines. The province has experienced a dramatic 
economic downturn which has been paralleled quite closely by the national 
dramatic downturn itself (Ferguson, 1999: 11 ). The study also had to be located 
in an area where the researcher would have a local language advantage to 
facilitate direct conversation and interaction with clients. As Simmons and Elias 
(1994: 13) noted in their study of 'Client-Provider Interactions' with family 
planning providers, "language barriers can keep not only foreign researchers but 
even managers ... from understanding the exchanges between providers and their 
clients".47 In addition, financial and time constraints had to be considered. 
Lusaka the Capital city of Zambia was a possible research site but did not 
qualify on the basis of the above factors-especially that of the MFis 
representation in the area. Therefore no other province was as well qualified, for 
rural provinces could not be considered because microfinance in Zambia is 
mainly urban (Maimbo and Mavrotas, 2003; Musona, 2004). 
CETZAM is one of the largest MFis in Zambia, having established itself in 
1995. Prior to the fieldwork, CETZAM had 16,000 clients (of which 12, 000 
were on the Copperbelt), 12 branches and 85 loan officers (see chapter 3). By 
the levels of development of the microfinance sector in Zambia this is 
47 Zambia has 72 dialects and 7 main vernacular languages. It is possible to be Zambian 
researcher and be regaroea a 'foreigner' due to language barriers. I was going to use- -an-
interpreter had this study taken place say in Southern province of the Tonga people. 
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considered large48 . The other main factor was that CETZAM offered opportunity 
to learn and was more enthusiastic and co-operative from the very beginning, 
while others were less responsive. After analysing the pilot data, it became 
evident that to get a clearer picture of microfinance and the actual role of loan 
officers, a second MFI with a different mission/purpose, but operating in the 
same area also needed to be studied. The flexibility within the research design 
allowed such a decision to be taken. This would maximise the possibility of 
demonstrating different perspectives on the subject. The two MFis were thus 
selected not only on size or reputation, but also accessibility for research 
purposes (Creswell, 1998). This does not suggest that CETZAM and PRIDE 
Zambia are the only MFis on the Copperbelt, but others (like FINCA) were 
either relatively new to the province (i.e. less than 2 years old), or else still small 
scale. In the two selected MFis, loan officers were the major unit of focus on the 
basis of their relevance to the research questions. 
4.6.1 Fieldwork Timing 
The main fieldwork was carried out during 'normal time'- from May to July 
2004 - in order to minimise the adverse seasonal effects. This was a harvesting 
period, normally characterised with much local selling and buying of produce in 
the markets. The pilot study, on the other hand, was undertaken during the rainy 
season (November and December, 2003) and, according to the loan officers, 
these were 'bad months' for business where most clients began to default or 
struggle with arrears. 'Delinquency' was therefore more pronounced during this 
season due to reduced economic activities of their clients who find it difficult to 
conduct business in open markets (with no proper roofs) or sell by the road side 
(see figure 4.1 of a typical market). The dry season is ideal in the sense that rains 
48 The pilot study revealed CETZAM was in crisis and these statistics had changed drastically. 
At the time of phase two of the fieldwork, client numbers had reduced, 5 branches closed and 
Ioail officers werlnedutea to 26: In addition, size and level Of develoepiTient of MFk in Zaml>ia 
compares unfavourably even with regional MF!s in East Africa. 
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would not disrupt trading and group meetings. 49 For mobility logistics, 
fieldwork, needed to take place when roads were dry and passable. 
Figure 4. 1 Typical Open Market - Kitwe 
4. 7 Learning from the Pilot Study 
The pilot study was conducted for six weeks (November to December, 2003) 
with CETZAM, branch 350 on the Copperbelt. The branch had 6 loan officers at 
the time, and less than 800 clients with active loans. The researcher went to the 
49 Some CETZAM Trust Bank clients met under trees and in open space. But rains would also 
have been a good excuse for PRIDE Zambia clients for not attending group meetings, even 
though they had proper meeting places compared to those of CETZAM. 
50 As with the rest of the thesis, the names of Microfinance institutions (MF!s) are real but the 
names of people are disguised for the sake of confidentiality, as promised. This pilot study was 
based on one branch out of the five branches on the Copperbelt. 
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field with an open mind in order to learn from the actors at the grassroots (the 
loan officers) and also flexible enough to adapt the actualities of micro finance in 
action. At the end of the pilot study, preliminary findings and what was learnt 
from the study process, was produced and discussed with my supervisors. For 
example, it was learnt that organizing focus group discussions with clients was 
more problematic than had been anticipated given the intra-group power 
dynamics and other (constraining) cultural factors. The lessons learnt from the 
pilot study were especially valuable because they produced fresh insights into an 
issue which was differently theorized before and shaped the data collection 
methods for the main field study. 
4.8 Data Collection methods 
"Data of whatever form do not just appear or lie around waiting to be casually picked up by 
some passing social researcher but have to be given form and shape in order to qualify as 
data; made relevant, in a word, to a research problem" (Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992: 3). 
Although loan officers and clients individually make meaning of their 
experiences, these meanings are still shared from a social or cultural point of 
view (Arce and Long, 2000; Walker, 1996 in Tembo, 2001, p. 17). From this 
understanding, data for this study were gathered through a combination of semi-
structured face-to-face interviews, participant observation and 'shadowing' of 
loan officers, group discussions, questionnaire and informal 
interview/discussions with selected loan officers, MFI managers and clients, as 
well documentary searches. Interviews were also conducted with local 
specialists in microfinance and former loan officers. 
Bulmer (1993) and Denscombe (2003) however, point out that methods of 
collecting data have particular advantages and disadvantages and that no one 
source could therefore be judged necessarily superior to another. As a result, 
different l}lethods were selected, first for their ability to provide insights into the 
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dynamics of loan officer-client interactions and relationships, and secondly, in 
accordance with the particular circumstances encountered in the field to elicit 
different perspectives on a specific issue, or to investigate different aspects of 
the same research question. The opportunity to see things from a different 
perspective and triangulate findings does not however prove that the researcher 
has 'got it right'. The research methods adopted were guided by the processual 
questions of how and why, (Mikkelsen, 2005) and designed to develop an in-
depth understanding, even empathy, for the research participants and gain 
insights into how they saw their actions within the contexts of microfinance of 
which they are a part. 
4.8.1 Interviewing 
Burgess's term 'conversations with a purpose' captures the description of 
interviews (1984, p.102). The purpose was to elicit the perspective of the person 
being interviewed (Patton, 1990). Given that there is limited research and 
literature on loan officers' work in microfinance, the interviewees were arguably 
more like teachers than subjects to the researcher. As Denzin (1978b, cited in 
Patton, 1990, p.24) has noted, too often social scientists "enter the field with 
preconceptions that prevent them from allowing those studied to 'tell it as they 
see it"' The research aim was to let the interviewees tell their own story in their 
own way and discuss issues that were important to them, while appreciating how 
and why they may come to have any particular perspective (Arnaratunga et al., 
2002). 
4.8.1.1 Individual interviews 
Of the 60 individual interviews conducted for this study (31 for CETZAM, 22 
for PRIDE Zambia and 7 with external informants), a majority of interviewees 
were loan officers. Interviews were semi-structured and/or based on informal 
~iscussions. All ~ere conducted in EI_!glish _ ~xc~pt fo~_ with cli_ents wh~r~ th_e_ 
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local dialect (Bemba) was used51 . A semi-structured approach was taken in order 
to encourage interviewees to participate in a 'loosely guided conversation' 
(Horton et al., 2004; Maykut and Morehouse, 1994) as well as enable certain 
responses to be questioned. With this approach, clients and loan officers were 
allowed a degree of freedom to speak in their own "voices", thereby increasing 
their propensity to "tell stories" (Llewellyn, 2001 ). As the interview progressed 
the researcher focused and re-focused the conversation into issues of relevance 
to the research agenda (Goddard and Assad, 2006). However, while having an 
interview guide (see appendix 2), other questions emerged as the interview 
progressed (Byles, 1988). While it might be argued that the interview guide 
imposed some structure on each interview, the researcher attempted to ensure 
that interviewees' perspectives were gained, and therefore avoided using it in an 
overly constraining manner (Patton, 1990). Informal discussions with clients 
provided a 'check', exploring the fit between loan officers' and clients' 
perceptions. In addition, interviews were conducted with senior MFI managers 
regarding microfinance in Zambia, their organisation's niche and, more 
importantly, their loan officers 52• 
Because of the intense work schedule of loan officers, interviews took place at 
their convenience around their work places between 08.00 am and 10.00am53 . It 
is worth emphasising that dealing with uncertainty was part of the fundamental 
skills learnt. As noted by Bedard and Gendron (2004), the researcher needs 
especially to tolerate the uncertainty and frustration of not controlling the data 
collection process. For example, in spite of efforts to schedule interviews, a 
number were cancelled and rescheduled at short notice, while staying polite and 
51 Where clients were not comfortable using English, they would either have restricted 
themselves to short answers, depriving the researcher of much valuable information, or 
withdrawn from the interview because they did not want to be embarrassed. 
52 Interviews lasted from between 45 minutes and one and half hours. For loan officers, the 
duration was 1 hour at most. 
53 Goetz (2001) in her work on women development field workers in Bangladesh reports 
conducting many of the interviews with fieldworkers at night either in office quarters or in 
homes. This-was due-to the neavy work scliedule~ocmost -ofthe-respondeiits. Hoiaiili iriierviews 
at night in my research environment was not feasible. Mobility at night is difficult and insecure. 
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considerate; to be prepared to go away and return if need be, even if the 
interview was prearranged; and not to 'hurry' them. Interviewing loan officers 
cannot be done on a tight time schedule without compromising the quality of the 
data collected. Most loan officers agreed to have interviews tape-recorded, often 
with a strong reminder to keep them out of management's reach. As one loan 
officer observed; 'will management have access to this tape'? This underlined 
the importance of being trustworthy in the eyes of interviewees and the validity 
of the data may depend on it. The interviewee was assured of the promised 
confidentiality but methodologically, it meant using methods that were less 
threatening and created space for loan officers to express their feelings. 54 Most 
interviewees continued to provide information when the tape recorder was 
turned off, meaning that the researcher had to remain fully concentrated until the 
very end of the interview. Such information was rapidly taken into note offsite. 
However, interviews were not spared from the technological 'benefits' of mobile 
phones. Interviews with loan officers also suffered disruptions from clients-
especially at PRIDE Zambia, where clients hold their meetings at the branch 
offices, unlike CETZAM who travel to clients. In some cases the location 
offered little privacy and therefore had a bearing on what was discussed. For 
example, a middle manager at his office indicated that loan officers created 
problems for the organisation regarding client outreach. However, when space 
was created out in the field away from the office, the informal conversation with 
the same manager suggested that management lacked appreciation of loan 
officers' situation. Thus Patton's (1990) caveat that "interviews present the 
understandings of the people being interviewed, and that interviewees report 
selective perceptions" (p. 205) was appropriate. There were also cases where 
interviewees gave answers they thought were expected, or to impress [me] the 
interviewer (Peil, 1982). For example, answers like: 'I have a heart for the poor 
54 I had to reassure interviewees (especially Joan officers) that I was not working for 
management and that the research was an independently minded academic enquiry. I however 
had no difficulties recording interviews with senior managers and branch managers except for 
one bran-ch~mariager wno- refused ionavdli£iriteniieworecordecf. In- this casC, T relied. on note 
taking and expanded notes later in the evening. 
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people' to a question: 'Why did you join this organisation?' were suspicious 
when checked against what was revealed in informal discussions. Interview data 
therefore, tells you what informants say they do -but needed to be checked 
regarding how this relates to what they are observed to do. 
4.8.1.2 Informal Interviewing 
Data also arose from spontaneous discussions with loan officers during 
observation periods. These could be triggered by events or a lull in activity (e.g. 
when travelling to and from group meetings or following up those in arrears). 
The questions in these discussions were opportunistic and unstructured (Bowler 
and Isabel in Dingwall, 1997, p. 67). This kind of interviewing became 
dominant given the informality of microfinance and revealed nature of the loan 
officer's work. Loan officers thus required space in which they could 
communicate freely and effectively and informal interviewing and conversation 
while making observations in the field created the space which formal 
interviews could not provide (Eyles, 1988). Patton (1990) notes that the 
interviewer here needs to maintain flexibility to pursue information in whatever 
direction appears to be appropriate, depending on what emerges from a 
particular setting (p. 281). Devereux and Hoddinott (1993) in their book, 
"Fieldwork in Developing Countries" support the use of unstructured 
interviewing as friendlier and less intimidating55 • 
Doing research in Zambia, with MFis working with the poor (who are spread out 
in open markets and communities), usually involves walking, motor biking or 
using public buses (see figure 4.2). This is what loan officers do and it was 
necessary to fit in their daily routines and so these journeys were usually 
55 Most MFI clients in Zambia are women and a great number of these have low literacy levels 
and therefore felt uncomfortable with the formal interviewing. However, it was the environment 
where their businesses are conducted that determined how I collected data from them. Interviews 
took place at markets where their businesses are (except for 3 that were interviewedin their 
- homes). The fo'r'rnal approadi was not suifable an(fi only took notes aftciThad-lefdl1e ri1terVTew 
situation. Recording an interview always attracted on lookers and proved quite disruptive. 
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conversational. These conversations were often illuminating and provided 
further information which was not always available during more formal 
interviews (for example, box 1 shows the issues discussed). 
Figure 4.2 Motor biking: female loan officer taking a ride from her male 
colleague56. 
56 Researcher experienced that kind of a ride to one of the Trust bank meetings with a male 
officer. The experience was scary as I had never been on a motorbike before! What saved me 
from 'falling' off was my finn grasp of the loan officers ' waist! 
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Box 4.1 Informal conversations during travels with loan officers 
Conversation with CETZAM loan officer 
Context: This loan officer had spent two and half hours (instead of one) in a 
meeting with a Trust Bank, trying to put their accounting records in order. The 
group treasurer was in attendance but unconcerned with the state of record 
keeping. So the loan officer took over the roles of both the group leader and 
treasurer to ensure money was collected. 
After the meeting: 
Loan officer: Did you see how long it took to address those book keeping 
problems? 
Researcher: Oh yes! 
Loan officer: You see, we had cases of loan officers being fraudulent where they 
take advantage of the illiteracy levels in Trust banks (TBs) and 'eat' their money. 
Sometimes loan officers would collect money from TBs that have been written off 
without depositing money with CETZAM. Fraud has been rampant. The loan 
officer continues, "This job is very demanding and sometimes it affects you so 
much that you need a good sleep to have a clear mind. 
PRIDE Zambia loan officer. 
We were on our way to a MEC meeting (away from their branch office) and the 
loan officer began the following conversation: 
"You know, this is a hectic job you know, one knocks off with headaches 
everyday and there are so many queries such that, headaches are the order of the 
day. You can't even put on weight because we rarely have lunch but spend 
ourselves a great deal. Besides, you have to be an honest person because we 
handle money and sometimes clients give money to us anytime anywhere. So we 
are on duty all the time. If one is not honest, client's money can't be properly 
accounted for." 
Such informal conversations revealed what could not be gained through formal 
set ups. In this case, two loan officers from two different MFis raise similar 
issues: nature of their work, dishonesty and fraud. Their work was so intense 
that they felt a sense of, 'being on duty all the time'. It had not been realized 
(during the formal interviewing) just how prevalent fraud was in the two MFis 
until loan officers found real space to disclose such sensitive matters. 
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4.8.2 Focus group interviews 
Focus group interviews are a valuable tool of investigation allowing researchers 
to focus upon group norms and dynamics around issues they wish to investigate 
(Bryrnan, 2001; Krueger and Casey, 2000; May, 2001; Morgan, 1993; Krueger, 
1994). Unlike individual interviews, the focus group is dependent upon social 
interaction between participants (Cronin, 2001; Morgan, 1988). In this case the 
focus group interview was used to produce data and insights that would be less 
accessible without the interaction found in a group. It aimed at understanding 
how loan officers feel or think about an issue, product, or service. Participants 
were encouraged to share points of view without pressurising each other to reach 
consensus. This interaction created an opportunity to observe interactions among 
loan officers as they validated each other's everyday experiences and accounts 
based on what they know and nature of relationships in the field (Krueger and 
Casey, 2000; Morgan, 1998; Robson, 2002; Tembo, 2001). 
The focus group was selected as one method for data collection for the following 
reasons. First, an exploratory method was desired. Second, as a study based 
upon grounded theory (Goddard, 2004; Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 1998), an 
open ended, rather than deductive approach to data collection was required. 
Thirdly, because one aim was to examine loan officers' roles, it was important 
that a method allowing for group interaction and testing their own capabilities to 
work as a group (as required of clients by the group lending methodology) was 
chosen (Bryman, 2001; Smithson, 2000). This facilitated an understanding about 
why loan officers feel the way they do and how they together make sense of it. 
4.8.2.1 Focus group participants 
Fifteen loan officers from CETZAM and PRIDE Zambia, who were available to 
meet at a common time and location, participated in the focus groups. Out of 
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fifteen, only three were females. 57 Loan officers ranged from 23 to 35 years old, 
and their employment ranged from 3 months to 4 years. Two separate focus 
groups (one for CETZAM and for PRIDE Zambia respectively) were held on 
different days. Prior to the group discussion one loan officer asked, 'who else is 
going to be with you?' which could be interpreted as asking for space and 
wanting to be with someone they could trust58 for fear of being reported to 
superiors. The focus group meetings therefore took place on two Saturdays, at 
the Copperbelt University, Business School conference room, away from their 
organisations' premises. Participants were not paid but were informed that bus 
fares would be reimbursed and refreshments provided during the focus groups. 
4.8.2.2 Procedures 
The two focus group discussions lasted 1 hour and 45 minutes each, as a 
reasonable time period in which to expect the loan officers to stay focused on the 
topic. After the introductions, it proved useful to let the participants know that 
the opinions of all were important for the research project and valued. Some 
ground rules were used to order discussions. It was emphasised that there could 
be no "right" of "wrong" answers to any questions and that they were free to 
disagree on issues. The response was: "free space at last!" This was important as 
most Zambians have been socialized to agree outwardly with others' opinions 
and to reserve their own. This approach worked out well for the groups as it 
encouraged participation even from loan officers with less experience 59. In 
addition, loan officers in each group were not strangers to each other and did not 
publicly disclose years of experience and qualifications (a demographic 
57 All the nine credit officers for PRIDE were invited, seven turned up, representing all the three 
branches on the Copperbelt. One female and six males participated. CETZAM had I 9 loan 
officers in 5 branches. 8 turned up, representing 4 out of 5 branches. In attendance were 6 males 
and 2 females. 
58 While as some researchers (Greenbaum, I 991; Carey, I 994) argue that an experienced 
researcher does not necessarily have skills needed for leading a focus group, I moderated both 
groups because loan officers did not want a 'stranger' in their midst. I think that I also had been 
observed, evaluated and could be trusted. Secondly, I could not hire an outside moderator due to 
financial constraints~ - · 
59 Focus group for Pride Zambia had 3 newer loan officers a year and Jess experience. 
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questionnaire had been completed by each one at the start of fieldwork). Loan 
officers were reminded of the purpose of the study and asked for permission to 
audio-record the group discussions before switching on the recorder, to which 
they did not object. It was again emphasised that, the purpose of the group 
discussion was not to judge opinions (as this can be limiting), but discuss 
different perspectives and experiences (Morgan (1988). Since discussions were 
held on a Saturday morning when loan officers did not do official work, the 
time requested had to be adhered to except for one group that agreed to a 15 
minutes extra. 
However, focus group discussions were difficult for probing sensitive 
management related issues such as where loan officers felt that management 
lacked passion for the work of microfinance and the poor. Most participants 
were reluctant to express their independent views (but the same loan officers had 
been very open while observing them in the field). Each loan officer (though 
familiar with each other) was not always sure whether other participants in the 
focus group would disclose information and did not want to be seen to be 
'against management'. Although, discussions were recorded, there is a 
possibility that certain group dynamics (Robson, 2002) and other non-verbal 
cues could have been missed out as result of combining the role of a moderator 
and that of researcher. 
Focus group discussions with clients did not take place because of the lessons 
drawn from the pilot study. Group discussion with clients revealed that it is not 
only those who are vocal that talk more but also that men could dominate 
women, the older dominate the younger, and that generally only group leaders' 
views were tacitly accepted as 'representative'. In addition, loan officers 
influenced the selection of participants, which raised questions about client -
loan officer patronage. Above all, may had busy schedules and it proved very 
difficult to get them all together at the same time. It was important not to keep 
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clients from remunerative activities critical to their ability to support their 
families. 
However, realizing that interviews depend on people's capacities to verbalize, 
interact, conceptualize and remember (Mason, 2002), understandings are not 
conceived as facts. In addition, interviews may suffer from 'courtesy biases' 
(Claude, 1998) and possibility that individuals may simply give the known 
public account and little else, observations and informal conversations were 
therefore used as a check. The researcher accompanied loan officers to their 
daily work to observe their interactions with clients. 
4.8.3 Observations 
Researching rnicrofinance in action calls for observing live what happens. Thus 
Marshall and Rossman argue that: 
"Observation is a distinct way of collecting data. It does not rely on what people say they do, 
or what they say they think. It is more direct than that. It draws on the direct evidence of the 
eye to witness events first hand. It is based on the premise that, for certain purposes, it is best 
to observe what actually happens" (1999, p. 192). 
For rnicrofinance in practice, it is useful to observe what happens and 'shadow' 
loan officers' actual time with clients. The resulting data pertains to observed 
interactions, rather than to another actors' subsequent rendering and recollection 
of what occurred. Observing program operations and activities gave a detailed, 
first-hand and multidimensional picture of the loan officer's role and enriched 
understanding of their verbal accounts and the context within which they 
operate. Secondly, this firsthand experience allows for the researcher to be more 
open, discovery oriented, and inductive (Patton, 1990). The value of these 
observations and 'shadowing' (McDonald, 2005) was that they provided the 
researcher with both informal and unstructured opportunities for inquiry 
(Solomon, 2003) and to identify issues to be pursued later. In addition, the 
researcher could experience the shape and form of loan ~officers' day and 
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discover recurnng patterns of behaviour and relationships (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1999) between loan officers and clients, and their supervisors. It also 
created an opportunity to learn about other matters participants were less willing 
to be interviewed about (Mason, 2002; Mikkelsen, 2005). 
There were several opportumtles for doing this. For example morning staff 
meetings60 (which they described as 'ritualistic') between loan officers and 
supervisors were observed, and so were MEC and Trust Bank meetings and 
'delinquency' follow-ups. This enabled a more direct type of observation, the 
"participant as observer"61 approach (Adler and Adler, 1994; Denscombe, 2003). 
To understand, or indeed capture, microfinance at work, the researcher must 
ideally be on site, not only to see but also listen to what occurs (Kalnins, 1986, 
in Marshall and Rossman, 1999, p. 133) in their world. By observing and 
interviewing individually and collectively, the researcher became aware that 
actors often presented themselves differently in different contexts and for 
different audiences. Therefore an interview or informal conversation could also 
be used to validate the meanings of what had been observed. A primary source 
of data was thus the words and actions of the actors concerned. To guard against 
forgetting, field notes were written at the very earliest opportunity, in most cases 
at the end of each day, along with crucial events observed during lunch breaks 
(where the break occurred as it was rare for loan officers once out of their 
offices to have lunch a break). 
Observation therefore enabled collection of 'real' information on the key issues 
arising. If loan officers are the 'link-pins' between clients and MFis how was 
this actualized in practice? A truer picture, though not always vivid enough, of 
loan officers' role and 'real' time with clients thus emerged from the field. 
60 The researcher attended morning staff meetings for CETZAM and not PRIDE. PRIDE did not 
have such an institutionalised arrangement. 
61 Participation in this case meant 'being there' and where the researcher's identity as researcher 
is openly recognised and takes the form of 'shadowing' a person or group through normal 
activity, wittfessifig firsfl1and the uiifol(ling eVents. Tnerefofe the partiCipant-obserV-er role did 
not involve total immersion (Denscombe, 2003, p. 202-203). 
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However, these observations were not always pre planned, but were captured in 
the process of moving around townships and markets with loan officers or 
indeed attending client group meetings. Such encounters and unplanned 
conversations, like the example below, extracted from the Nvivo document 
browser, were particularly revealing. 
~ field observations and MEC meetings - DocumenfBrowset, 
Browser Document Ed~ View Format Links Codlng 
717/04 Bnmfb l , clwnlmi ton·1lSlut) ~IEC 3 
Accompanied the credit officer to the meeting and found no one at the meeting place. They 
all came late, one hour after stated time. The credit officer was not bothered by the 
development. 
While waiting for clients to come, we chatted over a couple of tllings and it became apparent 
that the credit officer was disappointed or disturbed by some developments at the office . 
From nowhere this is what followed: 
Stut~x : Isn't a salary advance a right? 
JNS: Why do you ask? 
Slmex: TI1ese people [refen'ing to management] have rejected my application for a salary 
advance saying unless if it was for educational purposes. So how do they expect me to 
concentrate when I have problems of my own to think about? So today, I'm not in the mood 
to tolerate any nonsense from clients, I just want to collect ilie money and go back! 
JNS: But will clients understand? 
Slmex: Yes what should I do? This organisation is hopeless and I certainly feel disturbed and 
not motivated. So if I can't ~et monev the Mbt wav how else should I solve mv problems? 
Figure 4.3 Sample: Unplanned interaction between researcher and credit 
officer 
Such interactions as in Figure 4.3 meant that clients and loan officers often put 
the researcher into the role as mediator or sympathiser with management. Clients 
expected my comment on what they considered were 'tmfair' practices by MFis. 
Loan officers, as the above case depicts, would communicate their personal role 
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and struggles with clients and management, in terms of selected pressures and 
frush·ations they experienced. They communicated as if they found a 
'sympathetic' ear in me. These interactions were an opportunity to appreciate the 
dilemmas loan officers faced. In addition, they provided the "moving picture" 
aspect of data (Catteral and Maclaran, 1997). 
However, as Handley et al. (2005) have noted, observation as a method of data 
collection has the possibility of excluding motives, reflections and broader 
structural contexts which are hidden from the observer. The observer may also 
affect the situation being observed in unknown ways. There were instances 
when loan officers and clients behaved in some atypical fashion when they knew 
they were being observed (see researcher's reflective field notes in Figure 4.4) 
!!l Cetzam -field observations and meeti ~ Document Browser : ii::. " 
:::::J IT imes New Roman 
We arrive at the meeting place and find a few members waiting for the loan officer. I observed that 
the TB was trying hard to do things differently to what they always do. I suspect the person chairing 
the meeting was 'warned' of my presence. I say so because members were not aware of the agenda 
and for them, meetings are for collecting money that's all. But the treasurer was trying to make an 
impression tbat things are not done that way. She remarked, "Lelo natukwata abeni, so takuli ati 
mwaletafYe impiya mwaya-kwikala" meaning: "Today we have a visitor so there is nothing like just 
making your loan repayment and disappearing. You have to stay on." We will sort money issues later 
and for now we will try to conclude on last week's discussion on women empowerment. 
Figure 4. 4 Researcher's Reflective Notes 
Being a woman 'visitor' the loan officer could have thought of an 'ideal' topic -
women 'empowerment', which he sensed was the most appropriate, given the 
observers' presence. Several writers (Bryman, 2001; Goetz, 2001; Fineman, 
1998; Spradley, 1980) have cited observer bias as one of the limitations of this 
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method. However, while the researcher's presence may have elicited a "best 
behaviour", the bias often attenuated as the researcher developed rapport and 
more trusting relationships with loan officers (Simmons and Elias, 1994). For 
the purposes of this research, observational data was complemented with semi-
structured and unstructured interviews (individual and group based) to obtain 
loan officers' and clients' perspectives and reflections. In addition, the risk of 
bias in this case was controlled by applying a triangulation method to cross-
check different forms of data with each other (Denzin, 1989, Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005; Mikkelsen, 2005; Patton, 1990). The chief strength on the other 
hand, is that it allows the researcher to get 'inside' what Brodkin (2000) calls, 
'street level practice', understand its logic on its terms and see what occurs 
beneath the surface of policy rhetoric, and seek to explain it. 
4.8.4 Questionnaires 
"Do you have a questionnaire for the loan officers?" Senior managers and 
branch managers often asked this question upon my explaining the aim of the 
study. This question could reflect managers' curiosity in finding out exactly 
what the questionnaire was seeking from loan officers. Alternatively, it was one 
way of ensuring the investigator 'left them [and the loan officers] alone' to do 
their work, and questionnaires could be attended to later (if 'you are lucky'). The 
message was: "We are too busy to accommodate you". 
Questionnaires were distributed in person to 43 loan officers in 6 branches for 
CETZAM and 7 branches for PRIDE Zambia. Out of 6 branches under 
CETZAM, 5 were on the Copperbelt and 1 in Lusaka. PRIDE Zambia had 3 and 
4 on the Copperbelt and Lusaka respectivell2. Questionnaires were personally 
delivered as opposed to posting which created excitement and anticipation 
among loan officers as one remarked: "This is the first time someone is devoting 
62 Lusaka is the Capital city of Zambia and is about 400 kilometres away from the Copperbelt. 
PRIDE Zambia has its head office in Lusaka, while CETZAM's is in Kitwe on the Copperbelt. 
At the time of the study, there were plans to move its head office to Lusaka. 
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their research on us". This approach also initiated a relationship that helped 
make contacts directly with them instead of working indirectly through their 
managers. 
The questionnaires included both closed and open-ended questions (see 
appendix 1 ). They addressed the personal background of the respondent, reasons 
for seeking employment, preferences of type of clients to work with, services 
that clients needed most, types of training received, knowledge of their 
organisation's activities and what they considered as most challenging about 
their work. A few open ended questions provided qualitative data on their 
perceptions of their work and clients, and their opinions of service delivery. 
However, even with questionnaires, loan officers needed space and 'protection' 
from their superiors, as one asked: "Are you discussing these questionnaires 
with management?" In other words, could they trust the researcher? 
This was an ethical issue and there was need therefore to protect the 
confidentiality of loan officers by asking them to remain anonymous when 
filling out the questionnaire. Nevertheless some loan officers were still 
suspicious and wary and three did not answer the questionnaire. This might 
explain the blanks on questions regarding management. The trend was more 
evident with questionnaires from CETZAM than with Pride Zambia. Self 
addressed envelopes were provided for those completed. 63 Participation on the 
part of loan officers was voluntary and questionnaires were completed in their 
own time and took two weeks in all to collect. However, it was observed that 
questionnaires are not necessarily useful for collecting data on perceptions and 
expressing of opinions. Loan officers filled in closed questions with options but 
were more evasive with questions asking for their own opinions and feelings 
although the same open ended questions were freely dealt with through informal 
63 I collected all the completed questionnaires from CETZAM loan officers (both on the 
Copperbelt and Lusaka). With Pride Zambia, the Lusaka branches posted them to me but I 
personally collected the ones on the Copperbelt. This proved expensive but it Was wcnth it. 3 
loan officers did not complete the questionnaire, while 3 were on leave at the time. 
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conversations. It therefore made sense to complement the questionnaire with 
interviews because respondents seemed more comfortable in "telling their 
stories" or describing the meaning they attached to their experiences 
(Baumeister and Stillwell, in Orbuch, 1997, p. 461 ). Questionnaires were not 
used with clients because most had literacy problems. With such a group it was 
possible the questionnaire would need much explanation before they could 
respond. In the process, as Seur (1992) observed in rural Zambia, the researcher 
ends up defining categories and concepts which clients may then emulate as 
their own. 
4.9 Data Analysis 
Interviews, focus groups and field notes were the main sources of data used in 
this study. Documents on loan policies and procedures, loan officers' roles and 
organisations' mission statements also influenced the analysis. All the interviews 
were conducted, transcribed verbatim, and analysed. After completing the 
transcript, the recording was listened to again and the transcript checked for 
accuracy. 
Although some analysis took place during the field work, most analytical 
procedures occurred subsequently. The data analysis which occurred throughout 
the period of data collection (Singleton and Straits, 1999) was iterative 
(O'Dwyer, 2004), guided by grounded theory principles and later assisted by a 
software programme QSR NVIVO. Grounded theory methods allow the 
structure of the data to emerge from data rather than from an a priori set of 
expectations (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). By following the principles of 
grounded theory, the coding process was guided by some prior categories while 
others emerged from data (Bryman, 2001; Gibbs, 2002). In this project, word 
documents of transcribed interviews for individuals, focus groups, informal 
discussions and field notes were saved as rich text files (RTFs) and then 
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imported into NVIVO where analysis was consolidated64 • Data analysis from 
questionnaires was aided through the use of SPSS package. 
The NVIVO software was chosen to facilitate coding of the data and 
development of concepts, themes and theory (Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Richards, 2002). The software provided facilities for data management 
(Crowley, et al., 2002), and allows for open coding, axial coding (making links 
between codes), and hyperlinks to non-textual data such as audio-clips or 
photographs (Bryrnan, 2001; Gibbs, 2002) and also exploring of ideas visually 
with a modeller. The aim was to "search for patterns in data and for ideas that 
help explain the existence of those patterns" (Bernard, 1994, p. 360). This 
process involved generating categories, themes and patterns (guided by the 
language of the participants) in an inductive fashion where the salient categories 
emerged from the data (Marshall and Rossman, 1999; Patton, 1990), while at the 
same time comparing and contrasting themes and concepts. New themes and 
"competing interpretations" emerged within the overall "story" (Ahrens and 
Dent 1998; Silverman, 2000). 
The process of reviewing coded material together and recoding was on-going 
and iterative. This process enables the researcher to become less immersed in the 
literal dimension of data and more immersed in concepts and their relationships 
(Strauss, 1987). In addition, the node browser within NVIVO offered the modes 
of reflecting on and re-viewing the results of coding (L. Richards, 2002). This 
software allows for text searches, ideas to be linked, data coded and searched, 
and models explored much more easily than with manual methods (Bringer, 
2002). Analysis oscillated between coding, writing memos and modelling in 
order to build up theory from data (Denscombe, 2003). Memo writing in 
particular, enriches the analytic process, builds arguments, and puts the data 
64 Documents for this research project were imported into NVIVO after five months of trial on 
the pilot study data and consultation with a Durham University NVIVO trainer, Dr Lydia 
Martens. However, analysis begati before intervieWs arid field ·notes were importedc into the 
software. Earlier reflections were recorded manually. 
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back together (di Gregorio, 2003; Morrow and Smith (1995) in Creswell, 1998, 
p. 302). The generated memos themselves became a focus of analysis and 
provided a method for achieving analytic distance in empirical grounding. 
The advantage gained in usmg NVIVO memos was that they were easily 
retrievable and could be related to other aspects of data. In addition, NVIVO is 
designed to facilitate these iterations within data coding and analysis. It was 
possible to move from open coding to a more focused coding of building out 
properties and categories, and back again to open coding as necessary, all the 
while writing conceptual and theoretical memos (Bringer, 2002). Since these 
memos were dated, they served the purpose of a written research diary that 
showed the different ideas at the different phases of the research65 . 
To keep the iterative process live, links were created between nodes, memos and 
documents as the analysis developed (Bryman, 2001; Bringer, et al., 2004; di 
Gregorio, 2003). Furthermore, a comparison of emerging categories (represented 
by nodes) was made easier by organising them into hierarchical trees, while 
reflecting on their appropriateness to the investigation at hand (Rich and 
Patashnick, 2002). The tree structure as seen in Figure 4.5 is simply an 
organising system that enables more efficient interrogation of its databases 
(Crowley, et al., 2002) and can be restructured very simply to respond to the 
emerging conceptualisation. 
65 During the field study, I wrote these memos manually (later used Nvivo memos in analysis 
stage) as my 'floating' thoughts about an interview account or the observation I made about their 
reactions during the interview and also my surprises or confusions. I could then revisit these 
preliminai'y thoughts oii a later date and develop some understanding from- them. This process 
often encouraged me to find out more in order to strengthen some areas of data. 
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IJodes 
Images of a loan officer 
El· ~ key player 
[±] ~ implementers 
iiJ ... ~ centre of all the activities 
rB ··· ~ linkage 
[±]··· ~ service provider 
ffi ... ~ qualities of loan officer 
B ! Relationships 
s 
• · · ' with management 
•. · ' amongst all staff 
• /"
$ 
[±] 
s 
[±] 
· ' relations with clients 
' amongst loan officers 
Nature of the job 
- ~ who to hire 
- ~ what the work entails 
t experiences 
l±l ·t work as described by LOs 
[±] - ~ character transformation 
rB ··· ~ painful experience 
·t challenges 
ttJ · ~ Job expectations 
· ···· ' Pressure of work 
[±] · ~ what they ejoy most 
B· ! microfinance and type of clients 
Figure 4. 5. Node explorer illustrating the tree structure as of April 2005. 
This structure evolved from free nodes into a more ordered stmcture of tree 
nodes. The approach was iterative in that data and analysis was revisited on 
several occasions over an extended period of time (Stoner and Holland, 2004). 
The approach taken to coding will vary according to the focus of the analysis. 
For example, a post- positivistic project would approach coding deductively by 
predefining categories and then organising the data segments according to these. 
The value of the approach here rests on its relatively more objective use of 
empirical data because it does not require data to fit into the preconceived 
standardized codes. It was from such a process that the research resu lts were 
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developed. However, this does not mean that the computer was doing the 
analysis. The software is open-ended and may be used in many different ways. 
The researcher asks the questions, interprets the data, records thoughts in a 
journal or memo, decides what gets coded and simply uses the computer 
programme to maximise efficiency in these processes. As Okely (1994) and 
others (Kelle, 1995; O'Dwyer, 2004; Seale, 2000; Weitzman, 2003) noted, it 
cannot be a substitute for the analyst core role of searching for meanings behind 
any given data and the imagination that is a necessary ingredient of analysis. The 
process adopted was based on the research question guiding the use of methods 
and analysis tools and not the reverse. This detailed section on analysis is 
included here to provide an 'audit' trail and transparency to the data analysis by 
explaining how grounded theory was applied to the analysis and how this was 
facilitated by NVIVO. 
4.10 Evaluating Research 
As stated, a central reason for making a researcher's epistemological stance 
more transparent is to enable the reader to better account for the research itself. 
In describing different forms of inquiry, Lincoln and Guba (2000) examine 
researcher values as a way of differentiating between positivistic and 
constructivist methods of inquiry. A researcher's values will ultimately influence 
the choice of research question, theoretical framework, methods and even 
dissemination of results. Lincoln and Guba (2000, p. 169) further suggest that 
axiology (the study of values) is inseparable from the basic assumptions of any 
theoretical perspective. Whereas an objectivist epistemology requires research to 
exhibit internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity, constructionism 
is judged for trustworthiness and authenticity. Quantitative studies are evaluated 
upon criteria such as reliability and validity (Ryan et al. 2002). 
According to Scapens (2004), "reliability is the extent to which evidence is 
independent of the person using it, and validity is the extent to which the data 
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are in some sense a 'true' reflection of the real world" (p.268). Scapens goes 
further to state that, 'in case research, such notions of reliability and validity are 
unlikely to be appropriate'. He instead talks of procedural reliability - where the 
researcher adopts appropriate and reliable research methods and procedures. 
Bryman (2001) notes that in qualitative research, the aim is rarely nomothetic, 
most, often leans towards an idiographic understanding of individuals or specific 
experiences. To judge whether research findings are trustworthy and authentic, 
the researcher's values must be stated and ethical issues considered (Seale, 
1999). In this study, the quality of data however, required sustained observation 
(Hall and Hall, 1996) and attention to principles of 'self-reflexivity' and 
'reactivity' (Evans, 2000; Holliday, 2002; Singleton and Straits, 1999). 
Reflexivity, according to Holliday, refers to 'the way in which researchers come 
to terms with and indeed capitalize on the complexities of their presence within 
the research setting, in a methodical way' (2002, p. 146). This was possible 
through proper access procedures, use of appropriate methods and checking the 
data for validity. 
4.11 Validating procedures 
Measures were taken to ensure validity. The strategy of 'triangulation' was 
adopted (Bryman, 2001; Shaw, 1999; Silverman, 2005; Stake, 2000). 
Triangulation across data sources and data collection methods here strengthened 
the emerging concepts. The research used grounded theory building and 
deployed multiple empirical methods, through which qualitative data was 
generated from a variety of data sources. Emerging concepts were checked for 
representativeness by examining them across participants and multiple methods. 
Verbal expressions were linked to practice by combining interviewing with field 
observations. It also linked views of loan officers to perspectives of clients by 
interviewing both sets of actors. Additionally, data was collected from local 
experts, MFI senior managers and branch managers and accountants. The value 
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of this procedure was that it secured an in-depth understanding of the research 
question and ensured the meaning was discovered consistently. 
The researcher, in ensuring validity, offered guarantees of anonymity and 
confidentiality. While organisations (with their permission) would be identified, 
guarantee was given that informants would not be identified by name in the 
thesis and future publications. This minimised the possibility of 'cover-up' 
(Simon, 1969, p. 104) and built trust. The data analysis process used grounded 
theory coding procedures with the help of Nvivo, in order to avoid pre-
conceived views. For example, the concept of accountability and role conflict 
itself emerged as the fieldwork progressed. In addition, self-reflexivity 
(Holliday, 2002) allowed limited bias influence from the researcher by adopting 
less preconceived measures noted above and through a loosely structured 
approach to data collection. Therefore the detailed self-reflexive methodological 
overview should enable the reader to understand the decisions made, changes in 
thinking, and the impact on the research process and final text. As part of the 
validating procedure, data-preliminary themes or categories were then confirmed 
with local experts. 
4.12 Methodological limitations 
The research adopted a qualitative interpretive approach and a methodology that 
sought to understand microfinance process from participants' perspective 
through interviews, while corroborating them with what they actually did 
through observations. The adopted methodology allowed for close interaction 
with participants in generating data. A common limitation, therefore, is that it is 
difficult to establish whether participants are responding openly, or doing so in a 
socially desirable manner (Morgan, 1998). The use of focus groups for example, 
potentially increases the likelihood of such responses when participants may be 
concerned about their mutual perceptions. While this happened to some degree 
in the two focus groups with loan officers, there was sufficient participation and 
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variation in responses to indicate that it was not a serious problem. In addition, 
individual interviews helped minimise the problem of 'sameness' of opinion 
prevalent in groups. 
A related limitation concerns the standpoint of the methodology used. It was 
based on the Grounded Theory approach of allowing themes to emerge from 
data (Unerman and O'Dywer, 2004) and sought to adopt the views of the 
participants on how microfinance works while observing the process in the 
field. The potential limit of this approach is that participants may lead the 
researcher into being a voice for their cause, rather than providing data relevant 
to the research question. The researcher must be aware of such issues when 
allowing the research question and themes to emerge from the data. Adopting 
views of research participants and the problem that the researcher may lose the 
ability to critically analyse the data by taking an empathetic stance (Bringer, 
2002; Bryman, 2001), posed as a big challenge. However, continual reflection 
in the research journal prevented the researcher from losing ability to critically 
analyse data and produce an accurate interpretation of events (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). 
As an exploratory study, however, it is important to remember that the 
participants' responses presented are not immediately generalisable to the wider 
population of loan officers and clients. This was an intra-country study with 
evidence from two microfinance institutions, focusing on the Copperbelt 
provmce, so any further generalizations of its results to the Zambian 
microfmance sector or beyond require considerable caution. However, the 
process of microfinance and the experience of problematic interactions with 
clients may perhaps be related to the wider population of loan officers in 
Zambia and other SSA countries. Therefore the study may be less relevant to 
areas where microfinance is already more developed, but can still offer valuable 
lessons for developing microfinance in other newly emerging areas. 
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4.13 Conclusion 
In order to understand microfinance in action and explore the role of loan 
officers, this study argues that, rather than just take a top-down and managerial 
perspective, a further 'bottom-up' perspective can also offer important 
perspectives upon 'real world' ofmicrofinance development. Loan officers need 
to be understood in terms of what they observably do as well as what else they 
claim. The research methodology followed an inductive and qualitative approach 
which recognizes that actors' interactions have potential to shape practice in 
ways which are not fully measurable was employed. Such an approach discloses 
the processes by which meanings are created, negotiated, sustained and changed. 
A case study scenario approach was used in order to provide answers to the 
exploratory type of questions of the 'how' and 'why'. This approach departs 
from previous evaluation and impact driven research which has focused on the 
outcomes ofmicrofinance in seeking to answer the 'how much' and 'how many' 
type questions yet failed to fully explain how microfinance actually operates. 
However, because the research sought to adopt the views of the participants on 
how microfinance works, observe the process in the field and allow the themes 
to emerge from data, it had the potential limitation of losing the ability to 
critically analyse the data by taking an excessively empathetic stance (Bryman, 
2001). The Nvivo software was used as a data management and analysis tool for 
emerging themes and data interrogation for evidence of patterns, while allowing 
continual reflection in the research journal. The next three chapters detail the 
results regarding microfinance in action. 
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Chapter Five 
A Profile ofMicrofinance Loan Officers at Work 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is based on the understanding that loan officers are the key link 
between clients and MFis (Ahmad, 2002; Chua, 1998; Goetz, 2001; Ito, 2003) 
and that their personal and social characteristics influence resulting actions. It 
asks: What is their background and how do the personal characteristics of loan 
officers enable or constrain their interactions with clients and delivery of 
service? What motivated them to join these MFis and the effect this has had? 
The research results are based on face-to-face interviews with local microfinance 
specialists, loan officers and their superiors and the questionnaires described 
before. 66 The chapter begins with their educational background, initial 
recruitment and selection, and then considers gender and age factors and pre-
work socialization. It details the 'public' and 'private' motivations for working 
with MFis and shows how these have shaped their work and its problems. 
5.2 Educational Background 
Educational background helped form the original expectations of their job and 
their interactions with the poor and socially marginalized. It is often assumed 
that those with lesser qualifications would find it easier to relate and interact 
with the poor. This might be so in societies where level of education attained is 
synonymous with status and job expectations. From a research standpoint their 
background is often unknown or else unspecified. Previous findings have 
indicated that the work is not attractive to well-educated young men and women 
when compared with other government/official jobs. Most loan officers in 
66 See Chapter 4 for detailed information on the fieldwork. 
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Zambian MFis had diplomas or lesser qualification (field notes, 2004)67 . 70% 
had either certificates or diplomas (figure 5.1 ). Out of 40 loan officers, 11 were 
former university graduates (with 8 at Pride Zambia and 3 at CETZAM), of 
whom 7 joined straight from university. 
Educational background (n=40) 
Grade 12 
3% 
D~i:J,/1 D ur 30% 
C> 
Diploma 
39% 
Figure 5. 1 Loan officers' Educational background 
Note: Grade 12 means 12 years of schooling and no training. Certificate means 
12 years of schooling plus a certificate in a short course. Diploma means 12 
years of schooling plus 1 to 2 years college training, Degree means a university 
graduate (BAJBSc ). 
Source: Field Survey, 2004. 
There were more certificate holders at CETZAM than PRIDE (Z). PRIDE (Z) 
hired university graduates as credit officers while those with diplomas were 
recruited as assistant credit officers, whereas CETZAM initially recruited school 
67 Informal discussions with officials from two other MF!s - FINCA and PULSE suggested a 
similar pattern and that the job was unattractive to university graduates. 
122 
leavers and diploma holders. It only recently started to recruit graduate loan 
officers as one senior manager observed: 
"We have a bias for those who have professed Christian faith. On top of that, we would want 
people with a specific qualification. Quite recently, we have been targeting university 
graduates but unfortunately not successfully retaining them in those positions because of the 
kind of work, and also the pay not being attractive enough to keep them. Normally the bulk 
of our loan officers are those who have '0' levels and some additional qualification in some 
kind of social studies". 
There were mixed reactions about prior educational attainment with most mid-
level managers and senior managers claiming to be satisfied with loan officers' 
educational levels, even though their retention was difficult. More specifically, 
graduate loan officers were here judged to be 'over qualified' for this work. One 
senior PRIDE Zambia manager believed that performance was more important 
and therefore preferred diploma holders: 
"1 think in Zambia, diploma holders perform better than university graduates. Diploma 
holders easily accept any type of a job. Graduates compare themselves to fellow graduates in 
other sectors and any perceived differences tend to create instability in them" (OPM-July 
2004). 
A local microfinance specialist added: 
"The idea of employing a university graduate as loan officer is not working out for the MFis 
and so I favour those with diplomas and below. This is because the work involves stepping in 
the 'muddy' markets and being where the poor people are -in their 'home' environment. 
Therefore on paper, both MFis now have a policy to target graduates, but the realities on the 
ground do not favour them, and they quickly move on to other attractive higher status jobs" 
(MC- Lusaka, July 2004). 
Loan officers' supervisors at CETZAM (often non graduates themselves) had a 
similar perception of graduates 'not being suitable' thus: 
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"This is my opinion -apparently the more people are educated the bigger the problems you 
have in terms of them having to work as field officers. Because they don't want to be where 
the poor people actually are, they don't want to eat -aah- let me call it 'street food'. They do 
not want to do that because they feel they are too educated for that kind of life. I have had 
graduates in my branch and normally they don't perform very well. They have to be pushed 
and it's more of a transit job for them while they are looking for something better. The 
thinking is that if you are going to work in the field and with NGOs, you should get a lot of 
money. And with that line of thought, graduates tend to have a problem as the loan officer's 
job does not pay that well and involves having to use the social side you know!" (BM (3)-
Nov. 2003). 
The reactions were slightly different with PRIDE (Z), where more credit officers 
were graduates. In their case, while admitting that graduates were 'not suitable' 
for the work, they (supervisors) nevertheless empathized with them68. The 
inference was that degree holders did not work well enough with the poor, while 
loan officers with lesser qualifications mixed easier. Graduates were thus 
represented not to work so 'sincerely' and were less intimate with the poor and 
would not 'bother to walk in muddy and dusty markets' or even ride motorbikes. 
A former chief executive officer asserted that lower qualifications were better 
suited for such 'grassroots' work: 
"I am for the argument of hiring school leavers, straight from school as these can be moulded 
into what you want them to be. For school leavers, they are excited with the work and for 
microfinance to succeed it must have a presence in the community. And so a University 
graduate is not willing to jump on the motorcycle. You see microfinance depends on the link 
between clients and MFI, and this means going out into the community. Fieldwork in 
microfinance does not favour university graduates as they find it boring but is a challenge to 
someone with just a college certificate". 
In one focus group interview those with diplomas and less claimed that: 
"University graduates do not seem to be doing well as usually they are seeking more status 
and therefore compare themselves with their friends elsewhere who they want to impress. 
68 This is because most supervisors were graduates themselves. 
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Most degree holders just come to use the organisation as stepping-stones for better paying 
office jobs. Papers are not considered most of the time. In fact those that seem to be doing 
fine in this job are diploma and certificate holders [not university graduates]. The job 
description of a loan officer can even attract a grade 12 and they tend to perform well and 
also enjoy riding motor bikes". 
The two further issues, which emerged were that loan officers' work lacked 
status and the 'well educated' were 'too complicated' and 'theoretical' to the 
poor themselves. Why then did MFis still recruit graduate loan officers? Why 
were their managements changing their recruitment strategies? Most diploma 
holders believed that, graduate loan officers were considered more 'professional' 
and 'business-like' in their interactions with clients, yet a former CEO 
commented: 
"The problem is that these MF!s think that by employing graduates, they are solving 
management problems at branch level, which is wrong. You know there is a lot of analysis 
that goes on with graduates which is good but microfinance thrives on you being able to 
reach clients. May be individual loans [meant for the less poor] might be the best products for 
university graduates at micro level". 
On the other hand certain graduate loan officers themselves indicated that they 
did not appreciate the realities of the job prior to taking up the positions and 
soon became frustrated thus: 
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Box 5.1 Illustrating work frustrations by graduate loan officers 
A loan officer who had been in the system for just 3 months said; 
"I am sick and tired of reading the loan officer's manual. You see JNS, this work is not for 
university graduates. I spent 5 years at university and then I must be treated this way?" Surely 
there must be some minimum standards to start from even if one has no experience. The job 
needs someone who can bring themselves low and 'fit into' the environment. It's not just 
anyone-because these people we deal with are slow to learn, need to repeat the same things 
over and over again. You need patience, understanding and be able to hold your emotions. I 
have a target to meet by end of June and so far I'm trying and will see-that is if I stay on. 
Researcher: But you have just started? 
L/0: "Oh no! I'm already looking elsewhere because these people (CETZAM) when we 
were being interviewed they told us that loan officers were key and so I thought loan officers 
had some status- but oh no, we are nowhere. There is no real regard for a loan officer, that is 
what I have seen, and they expect a lot. Initially, CETZAM just used to employ schoolleavers 
but now are trying to employ graduates. But what graduate can work like this? Besides, you 
don't need to be a graduate to work as loan officer. It just needs someone who can quickly 
assimilate and do things. Things out there are tough and rough and yet none of these senior 
managers have been out there. I find it depressing even though I do like working with the poor 
but the conditions under which we operate are not good enough. In some cases loan officers 
are more knowledgeable and experienced than some branch managers -so you have to humble 
yourself." 
Another graduate at PRIDE Zambia, said: 
"As a graduate, I would rather be in management positions making decisions rather than in the 
field, coming back with dusty shoes. Maybe diploma holders would be happy with this 
environment and they seem to be doing well. I am not content with the present job". 
University graduates had therefore joined with expectations of high professional 
status yet, as the extracts in Box 5.1 show, they were soon 'disappointed' with 
the routines they encountered and their low status. This did not mean that 
graduates actively resented working for MFis, rather, they disliked particular 
aspects of the job-which were not intellectually engaging, 'invisible' to others, 
and meant 'going down' to the grassroots. However they would still accept 
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managerial positions with MFis as indicated by a second graduate loan officer 
quoted above. Equally this did not mean that nongraduates enjoyed being loan 
officers more, because they also indicated that working with the poor required 
'commitment' and 'passion', something that was a challenge and a source of 
dilemma whatever their prior education. Many would only stay because of 
limited alternative employment opportunities69 . 
Interestingly, chief executive officers (CEOs) of both MFis believed that degree 
holders should be employed for the position of loan officer, but admitted they 
were difficult to retain. The scenario in Zambian MFis differs from that found in 
Bangladesh where, for example, microfinance NGOs soon attracted graduate 
field workers (loan officers). However, Ahmad (2003b) and Goetz (2001) found 
that despite their numbers, many would prefer government jobs and found it 
difficult interacting with the poor. Overall, the data on educational background 
suggests an evolving situation with newer loan officers being university 
graduates. However, 'informal' realities of the loan officers' work within the 
group-based methodology were thought to favour those with lesser 
qualifications. As a result, microfinance institutions in Zambia could experience 
high staff turnover and regularly rely on far less experienced loan officers. 
5.3. Gender and Age 
Microfinance is gendered by design and purpose (Johnson, 2004). Microfinance 
primarily targets women, works with women and is made sustainable where 
women are better re-payers. But what does it require of the gender of loan 
officers? The demographics of the loan officers of Zambian MFis suggested a 
group that was particularly representative of clients: Most were predominantly 
from poor families and could identify with the deprivation being experienced by 
69 The study found that, most were engaged in some form of further studies (majority pursuing 
accounting related courses) with a view to broaden their job search or be eligible to apply for 
vacancies in the accounting department (or others) within tlieirrespective organisatforis. -
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those they served. In addition, nearly all spoke the most popular local language 
(Bemba) on the Copperbelt. However, two dimensions along which loan officers 
were less representative were age and gender: they were on average relatively 
young and overwhelmingly male (68%), even though most clients were female. 
Branch managers reported that 78 % of credit borrowers were female, a pattern 
that conformed with the gendered participation in informal (rotating credit 
associations) types of financing (Kea, 2004; Tsai, 2002) and also rnicrofinance 
as well. Figure 5.2 indicates an interesting picture with 67.5% and 32.5% being 
male and female loan officers respectively. Six (6) out of 25 loan officers were 
female, and 7 out of 27 loan officers were female at PRIDE and CETZAM 
respectivel/0 71 . Of the 32.5% female loan officers, 61.5% were single, which 
may suggest that fieldwork could also be difficult for married women thus: 
"Working as a woman is challenging and I would not want to work as a loan officer when 
married. For instance one of the female loan officers is expecting a baby and her input is not 
up to scratch. She easily gets tired, goes hungry for hours and I don't think its right. This 
work is tiring and I don't know for how long she will have to endure this!" 
A comprehensive database about the gender of loan officers was not found, but 
informal discussions with loan officers and clients indicated that figure 5.2 
might approximate to the broader picture. 
70 Note that 67.5 and 32.5 percentages are based on the number of loan officers that completed 
the questionnaires (17 and 23 for PRIDE and CETZAM respectively. However, at the time of 
study PRIDE Zambia had a total of 25 loan officers with I 0 branches and CETZAM had 27 and 
7 branches. 
71 At branch supervisory level, CETZAM had 4 women and 3 men, while PRIDE Zambia had 2 
won1en and 8 men. On tl1e other hand, the CEO for CETZAM was female and that for PRIDE 
was male. 
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Male 
67 .5% 
Loan officers by Gender (N=40) 
Figure 5. 2 Loan officers by Gender 
A senior manager at CETZAM explained: 
Female 
32.5% 
" We had a deliberate employment policy to have more women than men but we seem to have 
retained just a few women . Clients themselves even in TBs seem to have a preference for 
ma le loan officers. But that does not explain the smaller numbers of women. We also have 
had more women leave than men for a number of reasons: (i) restructuring, (ii) matTiage and 
searching for 'greener pastures' . Besides, mobili ty is a big prob lem for women who tend to 
use public transport, whi le male loan officers use motorbikes. And as you have seen in the 
fie ld, it is really demanding and men tend to take risks whi le women might have the heart-
they fa il to contain the pressure from the office" 
This could suggest that here rnicrofinance fieldwork could be more problematic 
for females than males. The belief that women can usually work better together 
did not fmd support from the data (surprisingly). Some female clients (for 
different reasons) preferred male to female loan officers. When asked about 
their work most married males indicated that they would not allow their wives to 
become loan officers because of the pressure, emotional stress, physical 
exhaustion and 'dangers' concerned. Because rnicrofinance was gendered 
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masculine, women had an additional burden of establishing legitimacy as 
effective loan officers. Women loan officers were therefore subject to what 
Blake (2006) calls, ' a kind of gendered legitimacy' that men do not ordinarily 
face. 
Loan officers were also from a specific age group, partly because fieldwork was 
demanding and required a level of physical fitness. 
Age distribution of loan officers at PRIDE and 
CETZAM (n=40) 
25 
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Figure 5. 3 Age Distribution of loan officers at PRIDE and CETZAM 
85% were under 36 and 65% were under 31 years old. Ahmad (2002) found a 
similar trend in Bangladesh, where young field workers did not expect to stay in 
their jobs. Fieldwork requires 'commitment' (which those with families may not 
offer), involves rigorous physical activity, and may require better health than 
many over 40 can here offer. This has further consequences in those cases where 
clients accuse youthful loan officers of being impolite and lacking what was here 
popularly referred to as 'people managing' skills. A local microfinance specialist 
and private consultant added: ' age of loan officers matters, as in most cases 
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clients tend to be much older and do not take kindly to attitudes and behaviours 
that show lack of respect for them' (see section 6.3 for details). In another 
related work, Parker (2003) found that where facilitators (fieldworkers) were 
younger than many of farmers they worked with, difficulties arose. As a result 
most young loan officers here confirmed they had difficulties in managing 
clients' groups and sustaining relationships. 
In addition, these loan officers had no or limited expenence of alternative 
employment, and came to microfinance without prior relevant experience. 
Others have reported similar interpersonal issues within the SSA region, in 
particular South Africa, where Baumann (2004) found that loan officers joined 
straight from high school, or else had a few years of post-secondary education. 
They tended to be young, and many lacked life skills and a 'mature' work ethic 
or else considered their MFI jobs to be neither a career nor as particularly 
'developmental'. 
Loan officers here contended that their job was too demanding and stressful and 
female loan officers often resigned upon getting married, while older male loan 
officers preferred more stable and pensionable 'safe' office jobs. As a result, 
none had worked for more than five years at the time of study. Although 
CETZAM had operated for nine years, most loan officers had between three and 
four and half years experience (Figure 5.4 ). 
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Figure 5. 4 Loan officers' length of employment 
PRIDE (Z) n=17 
CETZAM (n=23) 
The spread for Pride (Z) was relatively even (figure 5.4), but with a higher 
percentage for relatively newer and youthful officers. This could have further 
implications if institutions and the rnicrofinance process itself could not benefit 
from the 'tacit' knowledge loan officers had accumulated over time, and sharing 
of 'best practices ' could suffer. MFis could also face a situation where the 
' learning curve' was almost minimal and client groups likewise destabilized due 
to turnover among loan officers. 
5.4. Work Motivations 
Nearly all had no previous experience in NGO developmental work. However, 
over half had different experience from both public and private sectors, and 
claimed to have left mainly due to closures, redundancy or poor salaries. Loan 
officers were asked why they had chosen to seek employment with rnicrofinance 
institutions that primarily dealt with the poor. This question might appear 
tangential, but figure 5.5 discloses its relevance thus: 
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JNS: How would you describe a credit officer's job? 
MJ>: Very frustrating Qaughs briefly). It is demanding and there is little rest. It's tough as we deal 
with individuals who may fail to pay back, yet the organisation needs money back and not 
stories . So the concern is to get money and one can't even enjoy a weekend or holiday 
without thinking about arrears and other related issues of your job. 
I think that credit officers should believe in what micro finance is there for. For instance- do 
we credit officers believe that Pride is there to work with the poor and alleviate poverty? 
Are we here to realize that mission or is it just for jobs? I ask these questions because the 
job itself is frustrating and one needs to have that conviction to persevere. The lack of 
conviction means that you don't do the job with a passion. For instance we are supposed 
to train clients to grow their businesses and not just paying back loans. 
Figure 5. 5 Interview extract: comment on credit officer's job 
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Responses here fell into three main areas (Table 5.1): because they had interest 
in working with the poor, put their education to use, or just needed the money. 
Table 5.1 Reasons for taking up present job 
Question: Why did you decide to take up this work? 
PRIDE (Z) CETZAM %of Total 
(n=l7) (n=23) (n =40) 
Reasons 
Interest in working with the 8(47%) 21(91%) 72.5 
poor 
I like this work itself 7 (41 %) 17 (73.9%) 60 
Want to provide for myself 10(59%) 9(39.1%) 47.5 
Want to utilize my education 9 (53%) 9 (39.1%) 45 
Good salary and benefits 1 (5.8%) 11(47.8%) 30 
Inspired by others 3 (17.6%) 4(17.4%) 17.5 
Limited employment 4 (23.4%) 1 (4.3%) 12.5 
opportunities 
Convenience m working near 4 (23.5%) 0 10 
home 
Other reasons 0 3 (13%) 7.5 
Source: Field survey, May- July 2004 
Most of CETZAM loan officers indicated interest in working with the poor and 
liked the work itself. Unlike PRIDE, they were expected to empathize with the 
clients as if they were 'called' to serve the poor. According to one senior 
manager: 
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"CETZAM wants people who are called to do God's work and not just people who see it as a 
professional obligation or a professional job. We look for people with a heart to serve the 
poor, willing to sacrifice and of a sober character". 
By contrast, Pride (Z) loan officers generally saw theirs as 'just any other job', 
though a few sought to work with the poor. However, certain contradictions 
emerged from the additional detail provided through face-to-face interviews, and 
other informal conversations. For example, while responses from questionnaires 
(table 5.1) indicated that 60% liked the work itself, and also had interest in 
working with the poor, other data suggested that financial need was the most 
important motivation, even with those from CETZAM. A majority needed 
employment given high unemployment levels. 
"I came to the job not out of interest but out of need. I had to make a living. I was not 
looking at microfinance and the poor per say" (Punta, June 2004). 
Another said: 
"At the time I was joining, the organisation had just established itself and there were rumours 
of good pay, a lot of money and so I applied. So from the beginning, I had no idea about 
what all this was about. All I knew was that they were giving out loans. So since I was not 
working, I thought it was an opportunity for me too". 
University graduates were very particular with their explanations as illustrated 
by one frustrated loan officer: 
"I did not plan to work here -but speaking from the heart, there are no jobs in Zambia! So I 
would rather do something to keep me going and that's why I am here. As a result, I am not 
really proud of it. I would rather go into the profession I trained for but circumstances can't 
allow. The moment I find a job that goes with my training, I will leave". (G 1) 
The apparent contradictions in the 'public' and 'private' motivations should be 
interpreted within the wider Zambian context. Cefh1in loan oificers- may weir 
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have feared that the questionnaires would be seen by their superiors and so may 
have given answers to please them (especially at CETZAM-see Table 5.1). In 
answering this question, loan officers may also have responded in terms of what 
they knew (from their induction) should be the case, rather than what they 
thought was the case. But when space was created for them they volunteered 
other explanations of their motivations and behaviours. Simmons and Elias 
(1994: 1 0) noted that such reference to formal prescription occurs frequently in 
situations where expectations and practice diverge. Empathy for the poor is not 
the main quoted reason (Ahmad, 2002, 2003a). Loan officers first come to the 
job out of their own desperate need. However, a minority in both said they 
genuinely wanted to work with the poor, took pride in it, and would recommend 
the work to others, albeit with caution- 'it is a job without recognition'. This 
kind of commitment was unusual among many loan officers and probably 
'fading" given the fears about how MFis are changing (Fernadino, 2000; 
Panayiotopoulis, 2002). 
That so few loan officers mentioned being directly motivated by concern with 
poverty or the poor should raise questions about the preparedness and 
willingness to engage into the social and developmental work that microfinance 
NGOs are expressly committed to. As noted by Goetz (2001), 'there should be 
no romantic illusions about the motivations of development agents'. The reasons 
given by loan officers for taking up this work are different from what Onyx and 
Maclean (1996) found in Australia. They found a preference for work that was 
both personally challenging and socially meaningful. In the case of Zambia, 
limited job opportunities have attracted candidates to apply for this work, 
without appreciating what was then needed. As discussed later loan officers' job 
calls for capabilities which many lacked. Consequently, fieldwork was not 
attractive (especially) to young graduates who then learn to make 'everyday 
adaptations'. Field workers or loan officers do not join the MFis 
enthusiastically, but rather to solve their own subsistence problems and not so 
much to help the·poor manage their own livelihoods. 
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5.5. Perspectives on Microfinance Work 
Fieldwork was seen as a low-status job, undesirable and generally on the lowest 
rung of their hierarchical ladder. In terms of their organisation's structure, a loan 
officer was the lowest rank. All loan officers claimed that they did not obtain 
their due status, even likening themselves to "doormats" or "slaves". Loan 
officers are 'trapped' in the field. There was a sense of marginalisation among 
loan officers, most keenly by young university graduates who had hoped for 
higher status office jobs as discussions with some of them revealed: 
"For single ladies like me, most of us feel we need jobs that require being in the office most 
of the time. It gives dignity and respect than being out there in the field". 
Another added: 
There is no regard for a loan officer, we feel belittled and yet they [management] expect a lot 
from us. We get instructions from everyone and I find this frustrating sometimes". 
So why has this work attracted a low status 'tag' when salaries (figures could not 
be disclosed)72 in the two MFI's may have been higher than other jobs 
available? Complementary factors emerged which suggested that there was an 
implied stigma associated with loan officer's work. First, it was associated with 
poor and semi-illiterate clients, whom many loan officers could find difficult to 
work with: 
"It's very challenging working with people and seeking to transform their lives. It is not easy 
to deal with people of low education, they don't accept change easily. Their understanding is 
slow and shallow" (d2). 
"Two months later into the job, I said to myself, surely I am wasting my time after spending 
4 years at the university how do I end up doing this? To come and sta1t dealing with people 
72 Most institutions are very secretive about their salary scales and benefits and in this case the 
two MFis. are seen as competitors and were therefore unwilling to disclose what to them was 
regarded as •s-en-sitive' information. This applied to fitfaricial-dat~ a:s-well: Salary estimates-were-
in this case, revealed by two former loan officers. 
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who don't even understand and in certain cases can't even reason with you. When you are 
telling them to pay they think you are being harsh. In short, I felt degraded as a graduate but 
with rime I have come to realise that not all people are the same and have adjusted myself to 
a level where I can reason with people I am dealing with and that has helped me a lot in 
terms of appreciating my job" (Gile -graduate loan officer- June 2004). 
Clients were of diverse backgrounds and generally of limited education (this is 
changing as targets include non-poor). Volschenk and Biekpe (2003) and 
Mukama, et al., (2005) found similar trends in South Africa and Tanzania 
respectively, where limited education of clients was cited as one of the factors 
affecting growth of MFis. On the other hand, loan officers were young and 
highly educated but their work demanded that they interact at the level of their 
clients -in other words, manage the 'social distances'. 
The second factor that lowered its status was the means of physical mobility that 
loan officers had to use. Fieldwork generally involved much travelling covering 
long distances into outlying areas. This is an outdoor activity and accessing 
clients in their own respective localities can be a problem. Baumann (2004) 
noted the same problem with South African MFI loan officers who relied on 
generally inadequate transport and their feet. In South Asia, microfinance NGOs 
and other NGOs originally involved in programmes such as family planning and 
gender have often relied on bicycles and motorcycles. However, Goetz (2001) 
notes that, even in these areas, some did not approve of women fieldworkers 
riding bicycles and motorcycles for 'health consequences', - suggesting that 
women's chastity was violated by riding bikes' (2001 :143). 
Interestingly, Zambian women did not face the same scrutiny as their female 
counterparts in South Asia. Female loan officers had other reasons for not 
wanting to use motorbikes. Personal safety (given the bad state of roads) and 
social status were often considered more important than the potential motorbikes 
offered to reach many groups and clients in a given time. In addition, most either 
lacked confidence or were not trained riders. One was 'scared- of falling -off 
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motor bikes' and besides, women would have to put on trousers (not a preferred 
way of dressing as elderly clients interpreted it as being disrespectful) to be 
cornfortable73 . However, there was an added dimension to how female loan 
officers viewed the use of motorbikes as illustrated by a single and married 
officer respectively: 
"I don't like motorbikes. I don't fancy them anyway. I prefer public transport, although with 
a motorbike, you cover a bigger area than one on foot or public transport. But what matters 
is for one to be strategic in planning. Besides, it would not be comfortable for me to hold a 
man on a Honda and my fiancee would be very uncomfortable with that too" (F2) 
"Now that I am married, my husband does not want to see me on motorbikes holding other 
men. I have to make sure my husband does not see me as he finds it embarrassing. But at 
times you are left with no choice" (F3) 
Loan officers in this case, relied mainly on public transport and walked. For 
women (married or not), motorbikes were unsuitable and they preferred public 
transport (often unreliable), which concealed their identity as loan officers and 
also 'protected' their husband's or fiancee's status. Male loan officers 
(especially from PRIDE) however claimed that, motorcycles were not for urban 
areas but the same can confer status if used in the rural areas. Interviews 
illustrate this perception very well: 
Researcher: Any comment on the use of motorbikes? 
Suleni: When these motorbikes were bought there was no consultation from people who 
were going to use them. My personal opinion is that I will spend less if I go by bus than a 
motorbike where I have to spend K20, 000 (equivalent to $4.50) for fuel. I would rather 
spend K2, 000 and walk all the way. 
Besides, I don't like them. They are dangerous!! I have no confidence and have no plans to 
ride them. You see Kitwe is a city and not rural. I am also conscious of what on lookers will 
say. Most loan officers are university graduates- may be school leavers are excited about it. 
73 As researcher, I had to make adjustments to my dressing in order to fit in and be flexible 
·enough to sit myself anywhere- on a stool or bare floor. Therefore a chiiengi{usuaiiy material of 
two metre length) was acceptable and most elderly women in TBs came in their chitenge attires. 
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How do you expect a degree holder to ride a motorbike in a city? It does not give the status 
that goes with the paper qualification." 
It was therefore cheaper to use public transport and walk (even if that reduced 
the number of clients or groups visited). However, certain loan officers would 
rather have had cash 74 and control its use rather than be given fuel money and 
then account for it. They too (like their clients) considered [that] money had 
multiple uses, which could include pressing personal needs -such as buying 
lunch or food to take home. Secondly, motorcycles were not considered safe (a 
concern voiced by all users as well as non-users). But interestingly, the graduate 
loan officer was more concerned with social status and not cost of transport: 
"As an organisation, we don't have cars and for a long time we did not even have Hondas 
until last year 2003. But they are not peoples' favourite I must say. They are not being used 
by loan officers as they should. 
Researcher: Why? 
Zika: They are not safe and credit officers have a feeling that I will be laughed at when they 
see me on a motorbike. I look funny and motorbikes do not give you the status that you want 
others to perceive. You would rather be in a car because people will admire you rather than 
on a motorbike. This is contributing to avoiding motorbikes" (May, 2004). 
Contrast this with the following from a male graduate field worker in 
Bangladesh: " ... I work for an NGO, it has an office, I ride a motorcycle, and this 
is a much better identity than saying that I am a farmer or a small businessman" 
(cited in Ahmad, 2002). However, there was a marked difference in the way 
motorbikes were viewed in the two MFis. Male loan officers at CETZAM 
appeared comfortable with motorbikes, and used them extensively. So why were 
CETZAM loan officers not as 'status' conscious as their male counterparts at 
PRIDE? The most probable explanation could be that, PRIDE (Z) had more 
graduates critical of motorbikes. 
74 Both PRIDE and CETZAM gave an amount of money (about KIO, 000) to those who could 
not use motorcycles, each time they went out and they did not have to account for it at the eng of 
the day: But if one Lised a motorcycle, then they -would get mo-ney for fuel and- a receipt had to be 
submitted. 
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In terms of who should be hired, from the perspectives of loan officers rather 
than senior management, levels of education were important. Graduates may 
partly have considered social status a functional substitute for money (Coleman, 
1990 cited in Baker and Jimerson, 1992: 678) but also associated education with 
jobs that distance them from other social classes. In a society where driving a car 
(not riding a motorcycle) itself symbolizes money and 'privileged' status, 
graduate loan officers may feel more 'stigmatized' than others - "You would 
rather be in a car because people will admire you rather than on a motorbike" a 
graduate male loan officer emphasised. It is not surprising therefore that the 
graduates were those who expressed most dissatisfaction yet this is the very 
category of loan officers MFis presently favour. 
5.6. Conclusion 
The chapter has considered an important question: who are these loan officers, 
where do they come from and what knowledge and expectations do they bring to 
microfinance? It has shown that loan officers' perspectives on microfinance 
work were at odds with formal policy and few were positive about working with 
the poor. Therefore to develop an understanding of the context of loan officers' 
work, it was necessary to examine their education backgrounds, pre-work 
socialization, their recruitment and selection and actual practices. This is 
important because a variety of backgrounds means that fieldworkers or loan 
officers come to MFis with very different and occasionally contradictory ideas 
about what microfinance development is and how it should be implemented. In 
addition, personal characteristics of loan officers could enable or constrain their 
interactions with clients. For example, graduates found it more difficult to 
interact with the poor because of the perceived 'social distance', while fieldwork 
was particularly problematic for female loan officers. Equally, what motivates 
them to join developmental MFis has an impact on how they promote 
microfinance and later cope with the demands and dilemmas of their work. The 
discussion has shown that, none here came to microfinance enthusiastically, 
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equipped with knowledge of all it entailed, nor the skills and background 
experience required. As a result, the unanticipated work requirements and 
'informal' realities that went beyond job descriptions soon made their work less 
attractive. 
Though most loan officers originated from non-rich families, they were not 
'microfinance missionaries', and did not consider their work as particularly 
'developmental'. They were more motivated by a desire to be financially 
independent and thus deal with their own subsistence needs rather than an 
overriding altruistic commitment to facilitating or 'enabling' processes of 
'empowering' clients. How loan officers interacted with clients was most 
influenced by their educational levels and pre-socialization. These findings 
suggest that there is no 'standard theory' about the 'perfect' candidate for the 
work and neither is it easy to have transferable recruitment strategies among 
MFis across societies that are culturally different. Each society must find out 
what works best for them, just like MFis in Zambia. However, knowing who 
these loan officers are does not tell us much about how they go about interacting 
with clients. Therefore since microfinance is about 'participation' and enabling 
the poor to have access to financial services, the next chapter takes the 
discussion further by considering the nature of loan officer- client interactions 
and relationships within microfinance. 
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Chapter Six 
Loan Officer - Client Relationships 
"Microfinance is a relationship. You need to have ... You remember we don't ask for 
collateral and even if we did, they do not have anyway. But these are our target group- the 
poorest of the poor, but economically active. These clients need to be oriented, they need to 
be cared for and loved and that's all you got. And if that is taken away, how then do they 
fair? This is the problem. I think that the backbone of microfinance is relationships, social 
relationships. You can never make microfinance professional, where you give money and 
expect it back just like that." 
(Branch manager, CETZAM, Nov. 2003) 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five presented the background of loan officers at work in rnicrofinance 
institutions, and found that among other factors, levels of education had 
particular influence on how they formed their job expectations and adapted to 
the demands of their work. This chapter takes the discussion further and 
considers how loan officers, clients, and management interact and use 
relationships as a resource which can be manipulated to serve respective 
interests. The maintenance of relationships (especially at loan officer-client 
level) meant that the practices of 'implementation' were shaped less and less by 
formal procedures and more by other 'informal realities'. The main questions 
being addressed are: what characterises loan officer-client relationships? What is 
the significance of this relationship, and how did loan officers and clients 
actually interact? Within these interactions, the field study sought to discover 
each respective actor's views about relationships. This meant observing the 
actual interactions in the field between loan officers and clients, and attending 
group meetings to observe interactions amongst clients and their leaders. 
Interviews were _u~ed _to C()mpl~ment observati()J1~1 da~a. This is imp9rt_a~t fc:>r 
three reasons. Firstly, rnicrofinance is intensively social. The assumed social 
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capital and networks reveal the embeddedness of micro finance transactions: i.e. 
the infusion of the financial intermediation with social relations of a non-
economic nature (Granovetter, 1985). Secondly, it is important to know how 
loan officers mediated relations between clients and the MFis because this 
relationship is the crux of group-based lending microfinance. Thirdly, it is 
important for MFI management to know how these relationships and interactions 
impact upon service delivery. 
The chapter firstly considers the dynamics of interactions between loan officers 
and the MFI's clients. It illustrates how a loan officer is embedded within group 
and community relations and makes choices based on constraints and 
opportunities presented by both the MFI and the groups that provide him/her 
with social and professional support. This formed the context for much of 
'informal' microfinance, where the use and interpretations of relationships 
differed - before formality took over as loan officers related back to 
management in their mediatory role. At this formal level, conflicts were often 
disguised rather than openly expressed. It concludes that relations at different 
levels were shaped by specific cultural norms and practices and governed by 
norms of reciprocity. In addition, the nature of these relations was changing 
because of the changing emphasis towards 'accounting' for the institution's 
survival. 
6.2 The Field: Client - Loan Officer Relationships 
The question here is: What characterizes loan officer-client relationships? Why 
are they important? Relationships and interactions between clients and loan 
officers are analysed against the contextual framework shown in figure 6.1. The 
interactions as indicated were embedded within a wider context that then 
included MFI's performance and culture, societal norms and the broader 
economy. At a micro level, client -loan officer interactions were influenced by 
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the individual client and group's performance and personal qualities of loan 
officers more than the institution's espoused lending methodology and formal 
policy procedures. 
Macro-context 
Societal norms &practices Institutional factors: MFI's mission, 
performance, methodology and culture Economic &Legal 
framework. D 
Interaction 
Background &personal characteristics 
of Loan officer Clients' orientation 
Micro-context 
status 
Client's loan repayment 
status 
Figure 6. 1 Loan officer-client relationship: contextual factors 
As frontline staff, loan officers are usually situated at the organisation - client 
interface and thus represent the organisation to the clients they are expected to 
build close ties with. The service transactions (loans and other services) often 
involve face-to-face interactions between MFis agents (loan officers) and 
clients. Several studies have reported that loan officers and borrowers develop 
special rel'atioriship-s Tn the field (AJimad, 2002;- Ito, 20-63; Ledgerwood-,-(999; 
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Montgomery, 1996; Rahman, 1999). These encounters could change and 
strongly affect client's regard for microfinance. As a result, loan officers 
claimed that considerable time was required to establish and maintain 
relationships 'downwards' with clients and group leaders whose cooperation 
they needed in order to perform what they thought management expected of 
them. The researcher was informed on many occasions that: 'A good 
relationship was one where there was mutual respect and trust, as well as 'being 
there' for clients'. Throughout field work the aim was to appreciate how clients 
and loan officers interacted. Loan officers, the least secure in their jobs, often 
worked to cultivate 'good relations' with clients. CETZAM, corning from a 
'missionary' background, openly expressed its desire for loan officers to create 
space for social interaction. In the words of one manager: 
"The Mission and vision for CETZAM supports the idea of having a 'heart for the poor'. Our 
relationship and interaction with clients is cardinal as we wish to make an impact and not just 
profit. Relationships form the basis for what we are as CETZAM". 
Loan officers were like informal lenders (Y otopoulos and Floro, 1991) who 
usually have more detailed knowledge of their borrowers through long-term 
interactions, and also build 'amicable' relationships with their clients/borrowers 
to help with client screening while accessing 'insider' information. Informal 
lenders directly draw on the traditional patron-client relationships or a set of 
hierarchical social interactions to be able to separate out high-risk and low risk 
borrowers (Bastelaer, 1999) and calculate interest rates. Similarly, loan officers 
claimed that good social relations encouraged cooperation and repayment of 
debts because clients would then act out of loyalty to 'reward' the loan officer's 
'kindness' rather than see it as just their obligation to repay: 
"Social relationships with clients are critical for us loan officers because clients can either 
protect you or have you fired by their repayment habits. You have to reduce yourself to their 
level, interact with them, chat with them and make them feel you're part of them. That way, 
you will be assisted-not only in loan repayment but also on accessing information on 
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problematic clients or those planning to run away. I am of the opinion that MFis like 
CETZAM can't operate like a bank unless we do away with our social goals. In MFis, you 
need to be where people are and you can't do away with direct contact with people. 
Microfinance is a lot more personal". 
High repayment rates and client recruitment were tasks that loan officers 
claimed were enhanced by developing particular relationships with group 
leaders and clients. In such cases, loan officers initiated and preserved relations 
on the assumption that clients would reciprocate and cooperate in meeting their 
loan obligations. However, expected cooperation was not always guaranteed 
(especially from defaulters) as the conversation in Box 6.1 demonstrates: 
Box 6.1. Field encounters: Loan officer and defaulting Client (CETZAM) 
We arrive at the client's business premises and the loan officer greets the client 
and straight away the client replies: 
Client: "I don't have anything to discuss with you and I mean it". 
L/0: Oh is that so! Let me just hear that very reason for not wanting to talk to me. 
Client: I will pay you when I have money. Right now, I'm just waiting to be paid and then I will 
also pay you and thereafter exit. 
L/0: That is fine; it's just that I wanted also to have something to report back to the office. So 
when will this be? 
Client: When I have money paid to me as well. Haven't I told you? (Throughout the conversation 
the client kept on browsing through a newspaper and avoided eye contact with the loan 
officer) 
After leaving the place the loan officer says: 
"You see how some clients respond as though they have no obligation to pay the loan. So one 
has to learn to manage their emotions otherwise you end up quarrelling with clients." 
Many loan officers lamented that, as their MFis placed more emphasis on 
institutional sustainability above clients', amicable relationships could gradually 
- ---·-~-- --
disappear. As Hulme and Mosley (1996) have noted, NGOs are not necessarily 
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vehicles for social mobilisation. Their own institutional sustainability can also 
take priority and, as a result, those loan officers who were pressured to meet 
targets could not easily hide their animosity towards clients who failed to settle 
their loans. Discussions with defaulters were sometimes potentially acrimonious, 
laden with threats, and could invoke bitterness and anger as the encounter in box 
6.2 clearly demonstrates. 
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Box 6.2. Field encounters: Loan officer and defaulting client (PRIDE) 
The researcher accompanied two loan officers on a mission to make loan recoveries. We had 
difficulties locating physical home addresses but nevertheless managed to locate four from a 
long list. What follows illustrates the nature of communication and interaction with 
defaulters. 
L/0: Where have you been all this time? You have not been paying anything towards the 
loan arrears? 
Client (female): I had gone to Lusaka and only came back recently. 
L/0: So why are you not making an effort to clear your outstanding balances? This amount 
has been there since last year December 2003 and now it's end of May 2004. What do you 
want us to do? 
Client: You credit officer! I had problems in Lusaka and my husband has not been bringing 
any money home because of deductions from his salary. So I am trying to clear off the debts 
in Lusaka and then will pay your loan. 
L/0: I don't want to hear those 'stories' as I am fed up with you and besides, why should I 
be the one to talk to your husband as if he's the one who got the loan? Why did you have to 
use the money for something else? This is the problem! 
Client: Ala! (Implying-'are you out of your mind') So you wanted me to see my mother 
suffer and yet I had money with me? I will pay your money but you don't have to talk to me 
like that. 
[At this point the credit officer got upset and raised his voice and started threatening her.] 
L/0: I think you have a problem and every time we come here you seem not to appreciate 
our efforts. Do you think I can come here just for these 'stories'? This is what I don't like. I 
hate it and wouldn't want to waste time on you again. So we will just get a freezer that you 
pledged or get you locked up. 
Client: Oh! You can't get the freezer and you can lock me up if you want because I have 
explained everything to you. 
L/0: Did we give you money in order for you to sort out your personal problems? This is 
the same as stealing -you are no different from a thief1 
Client: Oh so I am a thief1 And you have never stolen anything? Excuse me you are now 
annoying me. 
L/0: You will see what will happen to you 
Client: Are you now cursing me? 
There was no money collected and the woman was left talking and the credit officer was 
emotionally disturbed and also continued (now to the researcher and the new[ish] loan 
officer) talking, "This woman is a problem. Last time we came here with the BM, a fight 
almost erupted with the husband. They are both stubborn. I will just ask our bailiff to come 
and sort them out". 
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Such protracted interactions were quite common in both MFis, and with further 
probing it emerged, that was the only way to handle 'difficult' clients and cope 
with the situation of 'delinquency'. Delinquency meant more debtors/defaulters 
to pursue, thereby requiring skill in managing emotions, since as 'debt 
collectors' they worked at wearing down the client's resistances to paying and at 
times creating fear in them. Such experiences made loan officers talk of 
'character' transformation [and not client transformation as the intended goal] 
and that their behaviour towards clients was situational, likening themselves to 
chameleons. The encounter described in box 6.2 shows that such relationships 
were situationally constructed and could not be further generalized. 
In addition, loan officers (especially the men) took advantage of the unequal 
power relationships, as demonstrated by the loan officer's (see Box 6.2) 
threatening language and tone of voice. Loan officers usually admitted to finding 
these encounters not only problematic but also emotiv~ as suggested in the first 
extract below. In other cases, the pursuit of money borrowed made loan officers 
appear 'cruel' as narrated in the second extract by the loan officer from PRIDE: 
"I hate it when I get to follow clients who are in arrears and then we end up exchanging 
words because I am pressured at office, my job is at stake and I need to collect that money. 
But you find that this client has got nothing worthy seizing in order to pay back the loan and 
then a bitter argument ensues. I feel bad. You see in the process of quarrelling, some clients 
lose respect and yet I am expected to respect them, but at times I also react and lose respect 
for them. This I don't like doing. Then I would ask God (being a Christian)- is this the kind 
of job that you have given me to quarrel with people, elderly people ... because I have to 
secure my job?" (Female L/0-CETZAM) 
"In the office, I might be understanding, but will not be like that in the field because one 
defaulter can destroy the entire MEC. Will I have met my target? I would rather deal with a 
defaulter ruthlessly and get them out of the program to preserve the rest of the group. So 
getting items from such people is actually for their own good so that they are disciplined. I 
don't care if I am disrespectful to a defaulter if this will save the big MEC. But it hurts me to 
shout or use strong words on my 'mother' who has the money but does not want to pay! 
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What am I supposed to do? You know- it hurts me and I don't want to do that but we are 
forced to do that [looks emotionally disturbed]" (Male L/0). 
One branch manager in an attempt to support loan officers' use of threats on 
defaulters, confessed; 
"My dear things are rough. These clients need to be threatened or else they won't pay. They 
need to see one of their friend's properties grabbed to induce fear and then you will see 
increased flow of payments". 
Loan officers indicated that defaulters were likely to give them a 'hard time' if 
they were 'too nice' with them. "You have to be harsh and use threats to match a 
defaulters' resistance," claimed one angry loan officer. Consequently, loan 
officers changed their practices, language, and behaviour to accommodate the 
different demands made on them by supervisors, management and clients. 
Elyachar (2002), quoting a trainer for NGOs engaged in microlending in Egypt, 
says: 
"In every culture there is something that works, and the thing is to find out what it is. Is it a 
headman, the religious leader, community pressure, or the police? Find out what it is, and use 
it". 
In an effort to improve collection of loan arrears, loan officers in both MFis 
found out what worked for them - negotiation, intentional embarrassment, 
threats and use of the police.75 Interestingly, male loan officers resorted to the 
use of threats and intentional embarrassment (see figure 6.2) more than their 
female counterparts who instead claimed that negotiation worked better. 76 
75 Ahmad (2003) reports that fieldworkers made use of local leaders to exert pressure on clients 
to repay loans and that loan repayment records were usually better because clients were under 
obligation to abide by pressure exerted by local leaders. Urban communities in Zambia are not 
organised around local leaders as such and therefore loan officers relied more on the use of the 
police instead. 
76 Further probing suggested that female loan officers feared confronting defaulters in an 
aggressive way because they feared being abused by clients and most felt it to be against their 
expected 'nature' as women. They have been domesticated to be more soft, kind and 
accommodatin-g.-As-such,' femaie-Ioan-officers inCiicte-d't:JfeY-wo-uid'iiormaTiTask-for heTJ)'fioln 
male loan officers to deal with 'difficult' clients. 
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Credit officers' work is so demanding that one has no time to teach things like HIV 
AIDS when on the other hand top management wants their money back. While ta.llcing a'~f,:i 
client waJks in to pay and the credit officer tells me, "I visited her and went there with the ; ,, 
police and so she got scared" , •. :i~ 
Clicmt: "I was shouted at by my husband and so now I had to finish the loan". 
The credit officer continues after the client leaves, "We use the police (because these are 
enforcing officers and take advantage of the client's ignorance) just to threaten them and also 
helps to create pressure (psychological) on them to pay. But excessive use of police 
affect your client outreach because potential clients become fearful. 
Still ta.llcing about his field experiences, a man walks in the office and the credit officer says, 
"shani boss"? It's good to see you, as I really need to see you. The man quickly says, 
problem'. 
JNS: Who is this one? 
Cre•lit officer: He is our officer and really helps and then adds, referring to the policeman, 
"imwe mulibantu besu" meaning, 'you are our man' so I have to see you. :J.dE: 
Figure 6. 2 Nvivo Document Browser on use of the police and 'delinquency' 
One former loan officer commenting on 'delinquency', disliked 'dragging 
people to the police station' or the branch office because it damaged loan 
officer-client relationships. In other instances (especially at CETZAM), the 
Bible became a 'double edged sword' which clients and loan officers often 
manipulated to clarify each others' position and obligation as the following 
extract from the conversation between a male loan officer and two women 
indicates: 
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Loan officer: I have come to collect the overdue amounts and it has to be today. 
Client (1): "Ba loan officer, mulibantu tamuli ba computer ebo teti tulande nabo" (Mr Loan 
officer, you are a human being and not a computer that we cannot relate or talk to). [She 
continues], "elyo you are a Christian organisation- meant to be forgiving and helping. If that 
is the case, you should delete the word 'Christian' from your organisation's name. Your 
conduct as an organisation is not in line with what the Bible teaches about how you ought to 
handle the less privileged". 
Loan officer: If you are a Christian, then you should pay, as the Bible does not encourage 
non-repayment of debt. 
Client (2): Ba loan officer tamumfwa, you seem not to appreciate your clients' 
circumstances and you have never assisted us. Are you not our representative? 
CETZAM loan officers had learnt from their past mistakes (chapter 3, section 
3.5.2) and were working on rebuilding the institution's admittedly 'dented' 
reputation. In the field, certain loan officers would 'plead' with clients to help 
recruit others and form groups, while restraining themselves from threatening 
defaulters. However, this 'soft' approach was likely to work against them if 
clients interpreted it as a sign of desperation to meet targets, as a former client 
illustrated: 
"Oh! In fact these people (CETZAM) have followed us and are literally pleading with us to 
go back to them. So we have formed a group and will soon start the orientation. The loan 
officer who came told us that they have stopped getting clients' property even if they have 
problems in paying back. The loan officer said, 'this money is there for you and even donors 
want the money used up'. So we are going to start afresh and see what happens." 
Comparatively, loan officers from PRIDE were found to be more assertive in 
how they communicated and related with clients (especially defaulters). The 
search tool and the assay facility in Nvivo were used to determine how 
widespread the issue of relationships was, and if they too thought it had a 
significant bearing on loan repayments. It emerged that loan officers at PRIDE 
did not emphasise relationships as much as their counterparts at CETZAM. 
-Howevertlfeir-operati6ns-mimage'f, woo-mid wor.Ke<:r mranolnef ).1Frpri6r"to · 
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JOimng PRIDE, spoke at length about relationships, while emphasising that 
relationships between management and loan officers were as important as those 
between clients and loan officers. Relationship problems increased when clients 
did not fully understand the loan officer's position. For instance, they did not 
appreciate why a loan officer would appear rigid over money being paid 
immediately. In addition, most groups were not self managing; defaulting was 
the norm than the exception, coupled with loan officers' paucity of skill in 
communication and human relations. 77 
According to one local microfinance specialist, loan officers were not trained to 
work with people of a different social standing, and therefore needed other skills 
to initiate, develop and manage relationships better. Senior managers from both 
MFis believed that their loan officers were least prepared to deal with 
problematic relations, compounded by an 'on the job' training approach. In 
essence, loan officers provided their 'own' training and shared peer experiences. 
Various loan officers claimed they were simply 'thrown' into the field and 
expected to 'pick up things' as they go. Unfortunately, there was no opportunity 
to reflect on what they were doing. Other difficult relationships have been 
reported in MFis in Bangladesh (Ahmad, 2002; Rahman, 1999) and in Kenya 
(Sunday Times, Sept.5, 2004), where members of the Kenya Women Finance 
Trust (KWFT) in Kericho District threatened to exit if the organisation failed to 
address the problem of alleged arrogance of its officials (loan officers). 
However, with good relationships, loan officers claimed they exercised personal 
discretion and 'got around' the institution's rules, often to the benefit of the 
borrowers. Admittedly, this was not being done simply as a favour to the 
client(s) in question, but also improved their own performance records. 
77 There were limited incidences observed that portrayed good interaction partly because loan 
officers as a strategy often prioritised problematic individuals and groups since they were under 
pressure to achieve repayments. They paid less attention to well performing groups (in terms of 
loan repayment) and when they visited such groups, they took the opportunity to teach from 
'relevant'-verses- iii-thebii5Ie-(thos-e-at: cf:TZAM:) -ana'afi>R.l:bE,Toan--officers]ust-waited .r;;~- --
money to be collected. 
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However, some loan officers reported having few problems maintaining 
relationships with clients as one boasted: 
"I have been on the ground for 3 years and right now I even have what I would call 
'personalized clients'. I just have a clientele that is attracted to me and I don't have to push 
or persuade them. They are willing to work with me compared to my friends". 
This illustrates the extent to which relationships can be paradoxical - attracting 
clients to individual agents personally (loan officers) rather than to the services 
offered. From the perspective of TB members, individual loan officers formed 
an important feature of the service. A loan officer had to first succeed in 
'marketing' themselves before they could represent the services of their 
organisation. Loan officers therefore typically claimed, 'clients have to like you' 
first. When that loan officer exited however, group performance could 
deteriorate. 
6.3 Expectations of relationships 
Interestingly, clients not only expected loan officers to be honest (especially in 
money matters), but also give something of themselves as well (i.e. emotional 
labour). They expected an emotion-based bond that goes beyond the typical 
social distance that characterizes arm's length, transactionally oriented relations. 
Emotional labour for these purposes (as discussed in section 2.9) required actors 
to genuinely feel, induce or suppress feelings in order to sustain the outward 
countenance that produces the appropriate state of mind in others (Hochschild, 
1983; Fineman, 2006). Loan officers performed emotional labour by either 
masking unpleasant emotions or at least presenting a 'calm face' to clients 
(where possible), for the sake of 'maintaining good relations' (especially with 
more elderly clients). There were common expectations concerning appropriate 
emotional reactions. Loan officers were in this case expected to feel empathetic 
and supportive. Meeting such expectations was a challenge given prevailing 
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cultural norms where those older [than yourself] are to be familiarl/ 8 addressed 
as 'mother', 'father', 'aunt', grandfather/mother' etc. In return, clients addressed 
them as "baloni officer" and the very older clients addressed them as 
"mwanawandi" (meaning my child). The terms 'mother' and 'my child' 
illustrate how valued relationships were part of the code of honour expected 
between the young and the old and also point to the strong moral dimension to 
these relations. These are common cultural expectations that loan officers had to 
deal with in order to win cooperation from most clients79• As the younger (loan 
officer) respects the elder (or any other younger client), the latter must, in return, 
take care of the former by helping them achieve high repayment rates and so 
secure their jobs. The conversation below between the loan officer and a client 
in default illustrates these expectations quite well: 
Credit officer: Why haven't you been paying? Do you want me to lose my job? 
Client (Woman): No my 'son' I have had serious problems. 
Credit officer: If PRIDE Zambia fires me are you going to look after me? So don't call 
me my 'son'. Ifl were your 'son' you would be caring for me by repaying your loan. You 
are not serious and so don't transfer your problems to us. Why are you not paying? Tell me? 
Client: I am suffering and I have genuine problems. 
Credit officer: No, you are not suffering. It is I suffering. How can you suffer when you 
are the one who has 'eaten' our money? So I am going home with you to get anything from 
your house. Why are you doing this? 
Client: I have no money and I'mjust waiting to brew some local beer then I will pay. 
Credit officer: eh! You mean you don't eat at home? And please don't call me 'son' 
because you will not keep me ifl'm fired. 
Client: I do apologise for calling you 'my son'. I am using it as a matter of respect and not 
to 'bribe' you in anyway. I have gone into beer brewing because of suffering. I am not used 
to it. 
78 Loan officers however claimed that a high level of familiarity between them and clients 
(especially of male loan officers and female clients), was potentially detrimental to the integrity 
of the loan officer, and in tum, weakened group discipline in loan repayment. Therefore the line 
between enabling relationships and detrimental ones was very thin. 
79 Beugre and Offodile (2001) find respect for elders a common cultural expectation across SSA 
countrfes.~ Howe\ler,-theY-do poirit ourtnaYsucli "resp-ecfimfilies" a reciprocal reHffionship~--Irr-tnis · 
study loan officers expected to be reciprocated through prompt repayments of loans. 
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Both parties were expected to feel towards each other and reinforce the bonds of 
indebtedness thereby fostering a relationship of mutual interdependence (Beugre 
and Offodile, 2001; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 15). Kea (2004) found similar 
relations in a Gambian community. From this standpoint, social constructionists 
would argue that the social and cultural contexts provide the rules and 
vocabularies of emotion (Fineman, 2000) by focusing on how social norms and 
'feeling rules' shape work behaviour (Hochschild, 1983; Scheff, 1990, in 
Fineman, 2000, p 2). Loan officers were thus expected to express the wider 
emotion rules of their society (for example on politeness, embarrassment, 
kindness, pity), while also adapting to institutional expectations. The dilemma 
was in finding the right balance between the 'rules of society' and those of their 
institutions. Interestingly, use of such culturally defined titles (as in the above 
conversation) and relations failed to produce the expected mutual respect in 
times of intense pressure where loan officers felt their authority challenged (as in 
box 6.2), while personal familiarity also risked their jobs. As observed in the 
field, more often than not, there were tensions - what the institution required of 
loan officers could be different from societal and indeed clients' expectations. 
Loan officers were also expected to reduce the social distance between 
themselves and their clients, while at same time being sensitive to differences 
between the clients represented in groups. To achieve this, loan officers and 
clients needed a relationship based on good communication and mutual trust. 
One branch manager with a previous banking experience made a striking 
observation in reference to clients' expectations of relationships: 
"In Microfinance, we have informal relationships as opposed to formal relationships in 
banking. With microfinance, these are the people we live with, and as you interact with them, 
it is like interacting with relatives and they look at you as a child and not a loan officer. The 
relationship is highly informal. If you maintain formal relationships, clients think that you are 
isolating them and so you have to learn to carry yourself to their level. For example, you 
might be forced to drink or eat what you would on your own not eat or drink, but this we do 
in order to maintain-relationships and identify with them". 
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Many loan officers believed that group peer pressure was not sufficient to 
enforce good loan repayment because they needed to build a rapport as well. 
Unlike nurses (Harris, 2002), loan officers here found it difficult to develop a 
'professional detachment'. This reality was well captured in a focus group 
discussion with loan officers as they commented on their job; "This work 
requires you to relate at the level of clients, be their family and help out where 
possible. It is a job that exposes you to real life situations of poverty and 
suffering". Developing a trusting bond with clients meant incorporating the 
social world of clients - getting to know what happens in other facets of their 
lives. This expectation was closely linked to a "pastoral care" role, made more 
evident with CETZAM clients than PRIDE's. Based on these expectations, 
clients described a good loan officer as: humble, understanding, patient, 
respectful, kind, cheerful, caring, peaceable and sympathetic. A group of five 
women of a TB put it this way: 
"A loan officer needs to have all these qualities so that when he finds that some people have 
not paid they should not be shouting at us. And some of us are slow to learn and so a loan 
officer must have the patience to teach and explain things again. They need to keep repeating 
certain things. A loan officer should be cheerful and understanding in order to work with 
clients of different backgrounds, ages and education levels He should be loving and not 
argumentative because some clients don't like that and at times in response to that they say; 
"Kanshi nafi loni fine nalafileka" {"If that is the case, I will not finish off paying the loan") 
So who will he work with if he has such a temperament? So he/she has to be accommodating 
to work properly with clients". 
Loan officers needed to have, and to know how to show, 'umuchinshi' (respect). 
A loan officer who engaged in 'showing off or being 'pompous' (Kuikusha), in 
contrast would find it difficult to maintain contact with clients80 . However, these 
expectations were actively gendered in ways that made the task of female loan 
officers harder. As 0' Reilly (2006) notes, "planners [and MFI managers] 
assume a natural communication [and bonding] between all women, despite 
- so~Porter -(2003f found' similar cuiffirar expectations -=- where many~tllianaia'ris -stresseCi-ii1e- -
importance in their culture of the need to be polite and to avoid confrontation. 
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socioeconomic differences between female loan officers and their clients" 
(p.l 076). Female loan officers, simply because they are female, are expected to 
enable relationships and local participation. In this setting, however, younger 
and single female loan officers in particular were reportedly 'bullied' by female 
clients who questioned their authority, while others accused them of being rude 
when they argued with elders at meetings. In such instances, cultural norms and 
practices (Kea, 2004) added to the complexity of relations. Female loan officers 
faced a dilemma and needed to make sense of this contradiction that surrounded 
their position. They were required to work in ways that challenged stereotypes 
and established norms of gender behaviour, while at the same time maintaining 
behaviour that would allow them to command respect within clients' groups and 
the community: 
"They expect me to be a friend and not boss. Actually being a friend to them helps a lot even 
for me to do what my organization expects of me. When you lower yourself to their level and 
become a friend, it becomes very easy for them to follow the policies, unlike where you keep 
a distance and show that you are above them - there will be some kind of inferiority complex 
and their performance will be affected. 
Researcher: How do you do this? 
Kopeka: I present myself as one of them and lower myself to the level of a marketeer - that 
lower class. I forget about what I am, forget about my husband's achievements, what kind of 
a husband I have, or the things he has and lifestyle I lead at home. When I am with them I act 
in the way they do, even eating and the language that they use just to fit in. And I don't talk 
about other things that I have achieved in life because I don't want them to feel I am special 
than them". 
This extract illustrates that building relationships did not just depend on the 
personality of a loan officer, but other aspects of social identity (such as: gender, 
age, educational level, marital status, class) were important. For instance, clients 
generally expected female loan officers to express feminine softness, a 
'pleasant' virtue that run contrary to what was often obtaining in the field. In 
practice, building effective relationships with clients was problematic as clients 
and_loan offi~ers~ both came"to microfi.nance with _mixed cexpectations ... For~ . 
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instance, clients expected loan officers to empathize. On the other hand, loan 
officers were expected by their organisations to be 'detached' from what they 
saw, and also experienced in the field- to act 'professionally'. 
There was however, a problem of reconciling what clients looked for in a 'good' 
relationship with that of loan officers. Most clients had varying conceptions 
about good relationships with loan officers. To some, an understanding loan 
officer was to them one who accepted every excuse presented. In the words of a 
new loan officer (four months into the job); 'I used to be very lenient and 
sympathetic but now I have learnt to be tough with them. I have been advised not 
to listen to clients ' stories as most of them will only pay after much pressure and 
pushing has been applied on them'. According to most clients good relations 
also meant being 'protected' by a loan officer, a former CETZAM client 
recalled: 
"Our loan officer used to encourage us and protect us a lot whenever we had payment 
problems. He understood our situation in the sense that at times he would even use his 
money to cover you up and then the client pays later. But he was very strict with the 
attendance of meetings and would advise us on how to ensure we manage our loan 
repayments". 
Loan officers had difficulties accommodating client's view of good relationships 
in the context of pressure to meet targets and conflicting demands placed on 
them. For instance, one loan officer questioned how clients expected him to be 
patient with them in a situation where there were loan arrears and yet the 
security of his job depended on clients' performance. To interact with clients, a 
loan officer could not simply operate according to an individualistic "market 
logic", but had to take many social, cultural, and moral concerns into 
consideration. In such cases, social relationships became a 'double-edged sword' 
and thus situational, working for the loan officer in so far as it helped the loan 
officer access 'insider' information and motivate clients to pay back their loans 
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on time. But at other times these relations worked against both the loan officers 
and clients as each took selective advantage of the other. 
6.4 Intra-group interactions 
The literature suggests that an awareness of the tensions which exist in groups is 
all too often overlooked in microfinance (Marr, 2002). Emerging evidence from 
Cajamarca, Peru, suggests that solidarity groups are open to abuse by group 
leaders (Wright, 2006) and in the case of Zambia, by loan officers of the lending 
institutions as well. Both CETZAM and PRIDE Zambia primarily use a group 
lending approach81 • Relationships within TBs and MECs were expected to be 
more horizontal, where all members knew each other quite well and possibly 
lived or traded within view of one another. Interactions and relationships 
amongst members were therefore best observed in their weekly group meetings. 
Within these horizontal relations, group members were expected to share the 
same value orientations and power status, but these relations could be prone to 
envy and conflicts. 82 These groups were not homogeneous social entities but 
were also divided along class, power, age and gender lines. For instance, the 
traditional social structure in Africa makes women submissive to men (Takyi-
Asiedu, (1993). Within groups the interplay of power and control in hierarchical 
relations (such as between leaders and the rest of the members) and role of 
traditional norms (respect for elders) weakened group management. This 
problem was compounded by the fact that TBs and MECs operated in urban 
townships where traditional community and kinships ties or even basic 
knowledge about other members were weak or did not exist83 . Raising (1999), 
81 Individual lending is gaining momentum and at the time of study, CETZAM had just 
introduced it on the Copperbelt after Lusaka. PRIDE has also introduced salary guaranteed loans 
which basically operate on an individual basis. This study focused on the group based, and 
therefore only attended TB and MEC meetings. 
82 Copestake, et al., (2001) in their study: 'Assessing the impact of microcredit: Zambia' made 
the same observation and attributed it to lack of trust and weak urban community ties. 
83Thamlee:Emily Wiignt (2005ffoun·d-tliafgrou!J"::l(::noing offered a pclor ci.ilillral fit withthe· · 
target population of urban Zimbabwe. 
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studying Zambian kitchen parties, noted that family and kinship ties were 
waning partly because actors in towns (urban areas) came from diverse 
backgrounds and ethnic groups. As such, social bonds depended more on the 
neighbourhood, membership of churches, or indeed business trading relations. 
Group relations and networks were therefore often weak and characterised by 
potential antagonism and mistrust. A former client asserted: 
"At PRIDE, we also experienced disturbances in MECs in cases where some MEC leaders 
would bring their relatives into MEC without the knowledge of other MEC members. So 
these relatives would form an EG and pretend to have businesses and yet the money being 
accessed would be for the MEC leader who brought them. This meant getting loans on behalf 
of the leader (aggregating smaller amounts) but of course this would then affect the weekly 
loan repayments, delay other members' loans, forfeiting of loan insurance fund and a number 
of clients would simply leave because the MEC leader could not be challenged". 
Discussions with several clients from different TBs and MECs suggested that 
inter-client relationships had deteriorated due to increased levels of defaulting. 
This factor has been established in other places such as Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Philippines and Uganda (Sebstad and Cohen, 2000). Being unable to repay on 
time or at all could strain or break relationships with other credit group members 
and in some cases defaulting on a loan may cause loss of face, self-confidence 
and self-esteem (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Zeller et al, 1997; Rahman 1999). In 
addition to increased defaulting, clients claimed that some group leaders were 
dishonest and assumed too much power: 
"I [the group leader] just slave for you [referring to the rest of the members] and I don't get 
paid for this. If I want, I can't give you a loan and loan officers won't do anything. If I refuse, 
it means just that and you have to take it that way" (MEC chairman). 
In areas or situations where social capital is low or deteriorating (Bastelaer and 
Leathers, 2006; Weinberger and Jutting, 2001), as was the case here, cooperative 
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arrangements were unlikely to develop. The question however remains: why did 
the groups display such mistrust and tension? 
Data revealed accountability was an underlining factor in groups' tensions. 
Group lending goes hand in hand with group accountability and members 
together with their leaders needed to account (both financial and social), to and 
for each other. In addition to weak accountability, several group members 
claimed they had little mutual knowledge, and often had not met before, as 
illustrated by two members during a tense meeting: 
First client: "I have lost my loan insurance fund (LIF) for the sake of others in this MEC 
and for people I don't even know. I don't mind paying for those in my EG because I know 
them and so can recover the money. But why should they use my money for someone I don't 
know? So this means that I will not qualify for the next loan because my LIF is now not 
adequate. I have even stopped paying the weekly K6, 000 and I am thinking of withdrawing 
soon after completing the current Joan". 
Second client: "For me, I have never even met the people in my EG. They just found this 
group for me. I had no say in it. These people (PRIDE) are stealing from us and we can't be 
losing money just like that". 
Working with unfamiliar people could polarize relationships further. In some 
cases these groups were actually formed by loan officers, who were under 
pressure to increase client volume and meet their targets84 . This led to group 
instability and ultimately disintegration of TBs or MECs and minimized the 
'social multiplier' (Mosley, et al. 2004) effects of group working. Group 
members did not feel significantly obliged to each other. Post and Inkoom 
(2004) reported similar findings with Ghanaian community based organisations. 
In Burkina Faso, work by Kevane (1996) found cases of ill-formed groups, 
several of which had been established by program officials, and included 
84 Bastelaer and Leathers (2006) studying the performance of-farmer groups in Southern Zambia, 
found that group formation in rural Zambia was often the result of promotion by NGOs, which 
then~tai'sed~q-uestiorisofsocialcapiiarbeingtheoasisofgrou!ffofiruifion. =~"=-==~,~~---~-~=·-~---~ 
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members who had never met each other. Researcher's interactions with clients 
indicated that relationships within groups were unpredictable and could not be 
relied upon for client screening and applying of peer pressure because members 
did not want to be responsible for the failures of others. Loan officers, on the 
other, claimed that such collaborations (although problematic in urban areas) 
continued to be very important in the rural settings where people were more 
genuinely close. The urban poor, being more mobile, do not always know their 
neighbours well enough and are not tight-knit as those in rural Bangladesh 
(Economist, 3rd Nov, 2005). There was less social cohesion within TBs located 
in the urban environment than in the rural outlying areas due to greater socio-
cultural heterogeneity and individualism.85 Kristiansen (2004) found that native 
African ethnic groups in Tanzania lacked cohesion and a shared identity, while 
Hyden (2001) found a serious crisis of confidence in the values of collective 
action and a preference to act on their own. Confirming to this phenomenon, a 
senior manager at CETZAM (with experience of rnicrofinance in South Asia) 
claimed: 
"The people we are dealing with are generally individualistic, and not keen to promote self-
help activities. And so the social bonds amongst themselves are not strong and yet this is the 
main ingredient to the methodology of group lending". 
The findings here run contrary to what Wright (2000) and others (i.e. Edgcomb, 
et, al., 1996; Lont and Hospes, 2004; Woolcock, 1998) have observed where, 
'borrowing group members in the developing world have strong, embedded ties 
and know one another prior to group membership, thereby creating a higher 
level of trust'. 
85 To verify this observation further, the researcher attended two TBs meetings in two outlying 
areas in Kalulushi and observed that leaders had updated information about every member and 
· tneirwnereal:iouts~-~fi-both--case-s; · memlfers ·sai<r ureif.'vi llages·-w-ere-sosmall-they kneW eacl1 
other well and were willing to help each other. There was a members' connection to place. 
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As noted earlier, this argument is based on the concept of social capital 86 87 
which assumes that relations of trust exist (to lubricate cooperation), as well as 
reciprocity (acknowledging mutual obligations). In this case the social capital 
concept was not socially grounded and people came together with the principal 
aim of drawing economic benefits. Ito (2003) makes similar observations with 
borrowers' groups of the Grameen bank. On the positive side however, some 
groups were better organised and members said that they had learnt from the 
business experience of others and received help with problems. However, many 
believed that relationships between loan officers and clients and amongst clients 
were particularly governed by norms of reciprocity, dependent on whom you 
knew, and how you could benefit from them. 
6.5 Relations Within: Loan officers and their Superiors/Management 
"If you treat a loan officer badly, you get the results that you deserve. You get high 
delinquency; you get fraud and clients without transformation and the organisation sinks. But 
if you place a loan officer where he/she deserves to be and appreciate him, you get the results 
that you want to see". 
(Manager, CETZAM, Dec. 2003) 
"You see, work in microfinance also depends on work relations amongst staff. It is important 
to know that unity of purpose is fundamental. You can never succeed in microfinance if you 
don't have people (staff) on your side. You can't. Relationship with clients is important but 
you also need a strong relationship between field staff and management. Those in 
management have to initiate that and keep working on it." 
(Manager, PRIDE, June 2004) 
86 Social capital as a concept has been variously defined and applied. The World Bank defines it 
as 'the norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of societies that enable 
people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals' (World Bank, 2000:1). See Bebbington et 
al. (2004) for social capital debates at the World Bank and Coleman's (1988, 1998); Woolcock, 
(1998) and Rankin (2006) for detailed work. 
87 In the literature, a useful distinction is made between communal (bonding) and collaborative 
(b~~~~~2_s~J.a!~,a£_i~a~ In_ !~is_ca~ we _a_re __ i llte!~s!e~_,~n -~h! Lo,~e_r_!)'l)~_t_~~ ~~.I:s !<:>_~h~_le~f:!_ 
of community (group)'ifitegration and accountability of group le-aders towards their.meilioers an-d 
amongst members. See Woolcock (1998) for details. 
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The contextual framework for existing relationships between loan officers and 
management was different from that obtaining for client - loan officer 
interaction (section 6.1 ). Whereas clients looked for familiarity, informality and 
loan officer's personality, management-loan officer relationships touched upon 
power and performance targets (quantitative rather than qualitative). As such, 
loan officers claimed, communication was mainly one way, from top to bottom. 
Consequently, relationships were formal, based on the expected upward 
accountabilities (see figure 6.3). 
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Head of 
Credit 
~~ 
Branch 
Managers 
/~ 
Loan officers 
Finance Mana 
Manager MIS 
I 
Branch 
Accountants 
/ 
Figure 6.3 CETZAM's Hierarchical Structure 
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ger-
Senior and mid-level managers claimed they ideally preferred innovative, honest 
and hard working loan officers because loan officers in the field were 'difficult' 
to supervise. Under the structure in figure 6.3, direct supervision by branch 
managers of dispersed loan officers becomes problematic given the difficulties 
of communication (when out in the field) and transport. Informal discussions 
with loan officers and questionnaire data however, suggested management rarely 
created 'free' space for loan officers to review, reflect on and learn from their 
practice on a regular basis. 88 
Loan officers claimed that relationships were first, dependent on meeting the 
performance targets set, and second on the background and personality of their 
superiors. Familiarity with loan officers' work on the part of direct supervisors 
and relevant senior managers enhanced close trusting working relationships. In 
addition, 'performance targets' defined the nature of relationships as one loan 
officer indicated: 
"Top managers don't care about what a loan officer is or not doing in the field. All they want 
is money to be paid back. One is in good books with them as long as there are no loan 
arrears". 
The support that loan officers could expect from their own hierarchy was ill-
defined, a practice that contradicted the principles which loan officers 
themselves were asked to apply towards their clients. This was not a surprise 
given Zambia's small MFI sector, where there are few experienced MFI 
managers, and many managers learn by doing (just like their loan officers) rather 
than bringing proven micro finance skills with them89 • Overall, relationships 
were limited in both organisations because of difficult communication and 
88 Most loan officers did acknowledge that the study had provided a safe space to review, reflect 
on and be open about their practice and understanding of microfinance. These sentiments came 
after much time was invested into building some trusting relationships with the researcher (Field 
notes, July, 2004). 
89 This point is based on the interview with CETZAM former Chief Executive Officer (May 28, 
-2004fano Operations-manager-PRIDE(June-14; 2oo4rail-d supported by otherstudles-ln SSA-
(Mukama eta!., 2005 and Bauman, 2004). 
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mistrust. There were challenges from each side. For example, superiors could 
accuse loan officers of dishonesty, and therefore maintained close surveillance 
over them. Loan officers claimed top management constantly threatened them 
with dismissal, denied them the opportunity to speak, and failed to show respect, 
sympathy or emotional support for their work. In particular, loan officers 
(especially at CETZAM) claimed that having their work checked constantly 
through daily reports indicated a lack of trust. However, certain loan officers 
claimed that, they were themselves to blame for the breakdown in trust as the 
extract illustrates. 
"But on the other hand, this trusting bit is really a two-way system, as sometimes, this 
mistrust and Jack of respect might be caused by Joan officers themselves. As you are aware 
by now, a Joan officer can manipulate a Jot of things-including financial records. But for 
those who are committed, working hard and honest, I think they need to be respected, trusted 
and motivated". 
The hierarchical organisational structures at both CETZAM and PRIDE did not 
seem to support mutually trusting relationships between loan officers and top 
management. Power, fear and 'blame culture' added to the complexity of 
relations. A former CEO perceptively put the point across: 
"In a large organisation, how do you ensure that relationships are continued even when you 
have expanded? So what is happening in MFis as they expand is that layers of management 
are added in between. So they end up with a tall structure, which is a very big mistake if you 
are going to do microfinance. And once the middle management hinders that link between 
the client and the institution then you have lost it". 
Loan officers at CETZAM in particular narrated incidences of difficult 
relationships with their immediate superiors and management, which came as a 
surprise to the researcher who held other expectations before the study, given 
CETZAM's strong foundation on Christian principles. The core constructs that 
were expected to inspire both loan officers and management approach to this 
reiationsliip were: empafliy aiici ~ mo-tivation -and~ -ac-coul1tabilii)'. -.-But furth~r 
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probing revealed that the institution had just been through a 'crisis' that 
threatened its very survival due to fraud, or at least allegations of fraud and loan 
'delinquency'. As such management claimed loan officers were less transparent 
in what they did and could not be trusted with clients' money. Reported 
incidences of dishonesty (figure 6.4) within staff (especially loan officers) had 
made it difficult to have trusting relations in institutions giving out group loans 
on the basis of trust. 
"You see clients don't like seeing different faces time and again. They somehow lose: 
confidence when faces begin to change as they suspect that their money is not safe and ii 
takes time to build trust. For instance at our branch the manager has been suspended, but we 
have been telling clients that he is on leave. The branch manager's suspension will cost us a: 
~ ~ ' ... ' ~ .... -· - .. ' ' .. ' . 
lot especially when clients get to know about it. Already one client is accusing us of stealing 
money so how are we going to handle this? 
JNS: So what happened~ 
Credit office1·: You see there have been a lot of irregularities and credit officers know about: 
it but no one said anything or brought it to the attention <>f management. What w<:>uld happen 
sometimes is that, head office sends money for loans, the branch manager would hold on to: 
the money (use money to cover up some fraud) while clients are kept waiting. At other times 
the branch manager would use the floating cash from head office to balance up the brancli 
bank statements. meanwhile there would be no cash at the office. Even the keys to the safe; 
were under his custody for a long time. The branch manager had been using clients' loan 
insurance fund for personal things. Now the organisation is finding it difficult to break the: 
news of fund misappropriation as they fear clients might lose confidence and trust in us. 
Figure 6. 4 A case of fraud at branch level 
Stemming from such cases as in figure 6.4, the nature of relationships amongst 
_ ~c---branch staffand between-branch~and~head-office-significantly changed; leading-· 
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to increased demand for upward accountability. Both MFis reported several 
cases of fraud, clearly manifesting a gap between expected and actual behaviour 
(Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999), which some superiors were arguably too eager 
to discipline and control loan officers. 
Relationship dynamics at branch level between loan officers and their immediate 
supervisors, though hierarchical, displayed more closeness (horizontal). Loan 
officers and other branch officers had to work together to meet the targets set for 
their branches and remain sustainable. Most loan officers claimed that branch 
managers who shared similar experiences before they became managers were 
more sympathetic than those coming from 'outside' microfinance90 . A former 
loan officer and now branch manager put it this way: 
"You know, microfinance is a sensitive business. The moment L/Os are frustrated you have a 
problem because it's going to affect their work whether you like it or not. They can easily 
start off from here and go home! So I motivate them by constantly talking to them. Just 
telling them the truth and being part of them and trying to be with them and feel for them. Let 
them not carry these problems on their heads alone- I try to share it with them". 
In some branches, loan officers and their immediate supervisors felt isolated and 
claimed they were always 'under pressure' from top management to fulfil their 
targets. Some superiors were too concerned with the performance indicators of 
the institution and when the branch failed, they were threatened with warning 
letters. They claimed relationships were such that senior managers were not 
willing to listen to their explanations -which were treated as "mere stories". This 
kind of superior was obviously unpopular among the loan officers and other 
branch staff as the conversation below illustrates: 
90 There were divergent views however. To some, what mattered was the personality of the 
- ----- ---- SliJ:fervisor-atld~tni~-ciOan 'offiCers' p-erformance arfd-ho-t"the-·supeTViSt)f;S ramrrrarrfy-With -th-elr--
work or previous work experience. 
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BM: So how is your work going on? (Asking the researcher) 
Researcher: Quite well and I'm enjoying myself- but it's very tiring. 
BM: My dear, you are probably one of the few that have taken time to go in the field and 
learn from them. The people at the top don't seem to care. In fact one of them is now a 
'public enemy'. All they are interested in are figures and don't care how those figures are 
aiTived at. Our relationship is target dependent. For instance I have a target of 1000 clients 
for the branch by June. And in all probability this is not achievable. All the loan officers as of 
now have an average of about 180 clients (as against 350) and I have written letters to all 
those affected. I had to do it because that is what management expects of me. But the loan 
officers do not seem to care and have simply said, "What management wants to do- let them 
do it. If they want to fire us let them fire us". 
Loan officers also claimed they were constrained in what they could say by their 
position in the organisation's hierarchy and that at most times superiors 
undermined their tacit knowledge91 , while that of consultants taken as 'expert' 
knowledge, a practice they found frustrating and alienating. 
"We feel sidelined even with the knowledge that we have about microfinance in Zambia. But 
management is quick to take on board suggestions from external consultants and yet what 
these consultants do is take our ideas and make them appear as their own ideas and 
management buys that! Also top management is fond of 'hijacking' our ideas and making 
themselves look like heroes!! So why don't they listen to us? (FGD- Loan officers). 
Masse (2005) reported similar relations on a British aid project in rural India 
where he worked as the projects' expatriate 'expert'. Granted that consultants 
are able to bring specialised skills into diverse situations, they do so only for a 
limited time and within defined (contractual) obligations. Consultants may even 
divide the local staff and perhaps complicate relations between management and 
field staff depending on the extent to which their intervention acknowledges 
valued local knowledge. In this case, CETZAM loan officers claimed to be 
suspicious of both management and consultants. This mistrust pervaded relations 
and created a divide that left loan officers and management pulling microfmance 
work in different directions, which ultimately affected policy implementation. In 
91 The knowledge loan officers gain through work. 
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the words of a long serving loan officer, "it is working relationships more than 
poor salaries that currently needing attention." There was need to build trusting 
relations as the basis of micro finance. What was lacking here was the capacity of 
both MFis to instil high levels of trust and mutual support among their loan 
officers, which, in turn, impacted on their ability to successfully draw on the 
diverse social elements of their environment in developing successful client 
groups and programs. Negative tensions and emotions were common and 
exposed the problems felt by loan officers under pressure to perform. 92 Different 
expectations strained relationships as management pushed for results, and on the 
other, clients were still grounded in the NGO - 'charity' background, leaving 
loan officers in a dilemma. 
6.6 Locating relationships 
The social construction of micro finance can be understood from the perspectives 
of economic sociology that argues for the embeddedness of economic processes 
(Granovetter, 1985, 1994; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). Microfinance is anchored 
in a framework of interpersonal relationships and depends on a whole range of 
interactional features like trust, reliability and reciprocity (Preda, 2002). Most 
theorists highlight norms such as trust and reciprocity as permissive cultural 
factors and trace them back to personal and social networks (Tsai, 2002). In this 
perspective, relationships can be a positive resource that both parties may reap 
gains from (Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001), as the relationships enable loan 
officers to limit the possibility of inappropriate members joining groups and, in 
particular, of delinquency and defaults. On the other, stable relationships give 
clients greater confidence in the groups as well as in loan officers. Consistent 
with the embeddedness framework, both clients and loan officers claimed that 
the embedding of financial transactions in social attachments created mutual 
expectations of trust and ongoing reciprocity. These expectations enabled loan 
92 This was evident in morning meetings -(ofloan- officers- and -supervisor) and In inforn1al 
conversations with researcher. 
172 
officers and clients to offer each other 'favours' or transfer idiosyncratic and 
restricted information with the conviction that it was to their mutual benefit. 
6.6.1 Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is a key element in many theories of relationship development 
(Altman and Taylor, 1973 quoted in Lois, 2001, p. 134) and social exchange 
theory (Coleman, 1990). For example, researchers have shown that reciprocity 
increases feelings of commitment to the group (Lawler and Yoon (1993, 1996) 
in Anthony, 2005, p.497). Arlie Hochschild refers to an "economy of gratitude" 
wherein actors keep favours received and extended against what is "expected" 
(1989, p.18) and Candace Clark uses a banking analogy "sympathy accounts" 
(1987). While Gouldner (1960) cited in Anthony (2005, p. 511) notes that, 
reciprocal relationships demonstrate both the trustworthiness and trustfulness of 
actors and entails mutual obligations that require conditional action to maintain 
connections over time. Other scholars focus on how social relationships among 
group members influence cooperative behaviour where actors embedded in 
social relationships, for example, are more likely to trust one another and to 
cooperate (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). As such reciprocity provides group 
members with a powerful mechanism for encouraging compliance and enforcing 
sanctions on non compliant members and is also an important factor in group 
formation93 . Borrowing groups were expected to demonstrate cooperation and 
compliance in ensuring their continuity and repayment of loans. In addition 
group loans were unsecured and therefore collateralized social relations were 
used instead to assure economic relations and help reduce risk (Biggart and 
Castanias, 2001). Evidence to the contrary showed distrust and divisions within 
groups that made most of them unmanageable with limited signs of the assumed 
social collateral (Mosley et al. 2004; Woolcock, 1998, 2001) as the basis of 
group formation and interaction. 
93 Some clients indicated that they feel obliged to help others because as ~ CQlll!fl_!!!lity, YQ!.I haye 
ro-tai<e care of-each otner as you rriay-aiso neea help-from th~m-~t ;-~epoint. This contradicted 
MFis' policy regarding eligibility. 
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6.6.2 Trust 
The success of group - based lending depends largely on the assumption that 
those who participate in them can be trusted, and is thus based on social 
relations, and less on trust in institutions (Smets and Bahre, 2004). As Putman 
(1993: 171) argued: 'trust lubricates cooperation'. Fisher (2002) notes, 'Credit' 
after all means 'trust', and for Prahalad (2005: 20), 'Trust is a Prerequisite.' 
Without trust, no financial intermediation would take place. As with taxiing 
(Gambetta and Hamill, 2005), trust within solidarity groups comes about 
through an expectation that those being trusted will cooperate (Lyon, 2000) and 
are of a 'good sort'. The extensive use of groups and social intermediation in 
rnicrofinance recognises this. Drawing a parallel from relationship banking, 
several studies suggest that trust, among other factors, play a key role in the 
development of relationships (Berger and Udell, 1995; Lehmann and Neuberger, 
2001), which primarily emanate from positive experience in the past. However, 
significantly low levels of trust were noted at all levels of interaction and in 
particular, at client - loan officer interface. Certain MFis are facing a collapse in 
trust. The loan officer and client lacked trust in each other. Mistrust was 
attributed to the incidences of negative experience in the past and growmg 
suspicion that MFis were just there to make money for themselves. 
Clients claimed that loan officers were not sympathetic and could not be trusted, 
while loan officers contended that most clients were in the habit of withholding 
information and at times colluded with others in 'shielding' defaulters. The 
research however, established that even loan officers were in the habit of 
withholding information from clients for their own advantage and that of MFis 
as illustrated by a loan officer in a conversation with the researcher. 
Researcher: Would you comment on your clients' claim that PRIDE Zambia is no 
different from moneylenders? 
Loan officer: Oh yes- it is about interest rates ch_~rged _o!l_t~{:i~ lom~s. 
Researcher: What about them? 
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Loan officer: They are very high, and what we normally do is not to give them full 
information on the total amount they will pay in interest. Figures are 'sugar coated'! 
ltesearcher: VVhy? 
Loan officer: VVell, if we did that then many would not borrow. So we simply give them 
weekly interest charges and frankly most of them do not know the cost of these loans! 
Consequently, relationships as it emerged were problematic (Biggart and 
Castanias, 2001 ). This is because social trust which is an important lubricant of a 
social system was less prevalent in these interactions and actors could not have a 
fair degree of reliance on other each other's word. In fact Zambia itself has a 
legacy of distrust (Musona, 2004) that is partly historical and continues to 
manifest itself in many social institutions. However, these findings suggest that 
loan officers should focus on building trust among and between themselves and 
clients as a critical element of program success is the existence of trust between 
borrowers and lenders (in this case lender is represented by loan officers). In 
their work environment, where attitudes toward the program have been slow to 
change, this task can be challenging. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the rnicrofinance process within a group lending 
methodology as a set of relationships at the level of client-loan officer and the 
organisation (loan officer- management), and how relationships were shaped less 
by formal policy than loan officers' own background and personality as matched 
with client expectations. Both loan officers and clients set their own values 
about relationships based on what 'worked' for them and their past experiences. 
On the other hand, expectations within these relationships were shaped by the 
institution's founding mission and societal values, which were then linked to 
their social relationships. Loan officers often found themselves placed in a 
tenuous position of being like clients but not like clients. Intra-group relations of 
members and-those-with-knm officersWere fluid-in naturt;coiisfantly -negotiated~ 
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renegotiated, and manipulated by both clients and loan officers. The discussion 
has shown that realities of relationships were diverse and complex. 
While the obligation to repay the loan is in theory strictly a business decision, in 
practice this decision was influenced by the existing social relationships 
(between loan officers and clients) and loan officers' personality. Relationships 
between MFis and clients were therefore not simple commercial transactions; 
rather, they were grounded in more complex social norms and practices. 
However, a dearth of mutual trust between clients, loan officers, and 
management produced deteriorating relationships. Thus the evidence has 
demonstrated that many of the assumptions about relationships were not borne 
out by the actualities of the 'field'. The nature of relationships limited the 
participation of the poor and development of rnicrofinance at the grassroots. 
What therefore characterises loan officer-client relationships and how they 
interact should be situated within the particularities of the community and 
organisation. The next chapter presents an 'insider' view of loan officers' work 
at the interface with clients in order to illustrate rnicrofinance from their 
perspectives. Here multiple factors contributed to how loan officers experienced 
their work and further re-constructed their role in the field in order to meet 
different demands. 
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Chapter Seven 
Microfinance in Action 
"Commercial banking and microfinance are not the same because in microfinance one needs 
to be very close to clients and interact directly with them. You can't direct things from the 
office; one has to be where clients are. So there is a link that is critical and that link is what 
loan officers are supposed to be. For microfinance to succeed it must have a presence in the 
community." 
(Former CEO, June 2004) 
"Microfinance institutions make a presence in the community through credit officers (unlike 
commercial banks) who are important to the success of their programmes. As such, there 
must be a level of acceptability of the job on the part of credit officers who need to know that 
serving most of microfinance clients means they have to be willing to 'step in the mud."' 
(Senior manager, PRIDE, May 2004) 
"But we could make it a little easier if we had support. For instance, transport money is 
inadequate for us to see all clients and so we do more of the walking (whatever the weather 
conditions) than get on the buses. Our shoes are worn out! There are no vehicles. We do have 
motorbikes but they have limitations. Instead of going out in the blazing Sun, I would rather 
just sit in an office and let clients bring the money. This is my dream- to just swing in the 
chair and do my work in a 'civilised' environment". 
(Loan officer, July, 2004) 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the central role of loan officers in mediating transactions 
between MFis and clients. It reveals that a loan officer job has several 
dimensions and presents an understanding of the 'multiple realities' of such 
work. It pursues answers to the two questions: What is the role of loan officers? 
What do we know about the nature of their work and how does that impact on 
the development of microfinance? Chapter Two detailed the importance of loan 
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officers to microfinance in references to them as the "heart of microfinance" 
(Chua, 1998). They do not make 'strategy', but do make numerous individual 
decisions of real significance to their clients in particular (i.e. the survival of the 
institution may not rest upon these decisions but their clients' lives may do so). 
Loan officers are also referred to as the micro finance institutions' 'warriors' and 
it is their own informal narratives which inform this chapter. As individuals, the 
loan officers in this study illustrate aspects of the social process of micro finance, 
as it is indeed a social process (see chapter 6); while at the same time 
demonstrating the dilemmas of 'doing' microfinance within the local context 
(chapter 3), and the overall socio-cultural expectations (see chapter 8). The 
objective here is to examine (a) the role of loan officers as they themselves 
understand it and their clients, (b) the detailed content and practice of loan 
officers' work by assessing their own observed activities and reported 
challenges. 
The chapter starts with a presentation of the intended role of loan officers and 
contrasts it with their actual role as understood by loan officers themselves and 
their clients. Their role was contextual, experiential and socially constructed. 
This is then followed by a consideration of how loan officers constructed their 
nature of work and the tensions that characterised their work. The third section 
considers the challenges faced by loan officers in their delivery of service and 
the coping strategies employed in the context of competing demands and 
conflicting expectations. The chapter ends with a summary of the nature of work 
which in effect depicts microfinance in action. 
7.2 The Loan Officer's Role 
Loan officers' role here was not clear cut. It was important to use a different lens 
to come to some understanding of their actual role because what MFis present as 
the role of loan officers in group-lending methodology, may differ from what 
they themselves consider their role to be, which itself could differ from what 
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clients judge their actual role to be. Therefore, a triangulation of different views 
proved useful. An overview of their role is presented first, followed by loan 
officers' own 'perspective' and then the clients'. 
7.2.1 Overview 
According to the espoused lending methodology, loan officers were expected to 
mobilise or recruit clients and facilitate the formation of new groups, and then 
offer training and/or 'orientation' before disbursing loans. They were also 
expected to monitor how loans were utilized to ensure that borrowed money was 
suitably invested. Loan officers interact most with groups and their leaders in 
weekly meetings and business visits. Group leaders are responsible for 
managrng groups and also ensure that their members do not default. Loan 
officers serve as facilitators and mediators and are expected to work through 
group leaders to ensure money lent out is repaid on time. CETZAM loan officers 
in particular, were therefore formally expected to 'develop', 'empower' and 
'transform' their clients'.94 
Using Mintzberg's (1980) classification, loan officers pursued interpersonal, 
information and decision roles. Under interpersonal roles, they acted as liaisons 
who maintained horizontal relations with peers and the wider community and at 
another level, relations with clients and management. In performing this role 
they were to be seen as: facilitators, mediators and at times, advisors as well. In 
the informational role, the loan officer also received and collected information 
that could help them understand their clients. Similar to bank lending officers 
engaged in 'relationship lending' (Berger and Udell, 2001; Lehmann and 
Neuberger, 2001; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003) and also Personal Business 
Advisors with their clients (Sear and Moran, 1999; Mole, 1999, 2002), these 
loan officers who work directly with clients, had the most access to 'soft' 
94 CETZAM states that loan officers have a transformational role. By this they expect loan 
officers to empower clients in three dimensions: economically, spiritually and socially. Most __ _ 
~- ~- --loai{offic·ers\':oula nofeX))lain"fuiiy howthese-if&e place-lll'a cllenfwiiliTnT!le'Ser;ic~-deii~{y. -
They reported 'not having time' for spiritual and social transformation. 
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information about clients based on their extensive interactions with them. Within 
this role loan officers transmitted information 'down' to clients and 'up' to 
higher management (see Figure 7.1). 
"A loan officer is a person who acts as a bridge between the organisation and clients. He/she 
is in constant touch with clients and should know what's happening in client groups' and pass 
on information to the branch manager and then senior management. So a loan officer is a key 
person" (Branch manager). 
MFI/ 
Management 
l 
Branch office 
Clients 
Figure 7. 1 The Position of Loan Officers 
It was not just the range of interfaces to be maintained which was important 
however: some were clearly more important than others. So in the decisional 
role, they frequently acted as if to solve disputes and conflicts among clients and 
sometimes selected group leaders themselves rather than wait for them to be 
'elected'. A loan officer in effect was what Long (200 1) called a 'multiple 
interface manager' or 'relationship managers' (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003) who 
I il1J~-~~L~Ji~P.!~~~<?~t}]_~0 brmwb_oft}f~;J~!i~l.l!~J2 Ji!~~M,FJ ~( fig\lr~~OI.l) _a_n.d_,as_se~nJit_ _ ----- --- -
180 
the field, they at times were the human 'glue' that made group members 'stick' 
together. 
"For us there in the field, we are almost everything when we meet clients. When you are 
there, you have to behave like a fieldworker and at the same time representing the 
accountant, the CEO and branch manager. And all these things are acted out by you. This is 
what makes it different. For clients, it is the loan officer that really matters". 
As acknowledged in the microfinance literature, loan officers were indeed the 
'linking-pins' (Likert, 1967) in the micro finance process as well as the potential 
vanguards of social transformation (Prahalad, 2005). But as a group, loan 
officers felt marginalised by the organisation structure, as they were neither part 
of management nor the grassroots. Yet both groups expected representation from 
them. 
7.2.2 Loan Officers' Own Perspective 
This section deliberately commences with a lengthy own "voice" of a long 
serving loan officer that is illustrative of what loan officers understood 
microfinance to be about, their role and related dilemmas and challenges. 
"MR LOAN OFFICER MAN." 
"When you come across such titles like the one above, the picture that gets introduced to the 
mind is that may be this is the person in the accounts department who works on the loans, or 
may be is the master of micro-finance or may be he is the one who dishes out money and he 
is never broke, who ever wants money goes to him because with him money is not a problem. 
One or just a few could be correct depending on what the reader of this article wants to 
believe a loan officer is. 
Many microfinance institutions would define the above based on the core of that 
organization. Others call them credit officers, project officers, field officers. Microfinance 
institutions use different approaches but the personality of most micro finance institutions is 
almost the same. Common feature is just to take money from somewhere, devise an interest 
on that money and give it out so that the person getting it brings it back with interest on top 
after a specified time period. 
~Now.talking.about.Mr. Loan officer.man<[sic],-he.is a.man.ofthe.people, public.figure,-and-a- ~- -~- ----~ ---- • ~ ---
people manager. He specializes in handling characters of different people. He is an 
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indispensable asset (and can be a liability) to micro-finance institutions. To assume a blind 
eye to this man is shutting a door to the source of micro lending success. This man will use 
the skill to assess people from all works of life concerning business capacity and ability to 
pay the loan. The loan decision lies with this man and that is why if a loan turns bad, he is the 
one the organization holds responsible. 
Finally, a loan officer is not from an accounting background, he is not from a marketing 
background. He is a social scientist, he is not an office bound person, but a man of the 
community, being where the grassroots are, the people who are the target of a particular 
organization. He feels with the people of the community he is serving and that is why he 
should work hard to ensure people are not burdened with the loans. Neither is he supposed to 
under loan them. There are countless ways I can talk about this man, but this will suffice". 
Pipo from Branch No. 4 - CETZAM 
This description was typical of many other loan officers' perceptions though to 
varying degrees as reflected in the other extracts below. Some loan officers 
readily described themselves as the link between clients and the organisation and 
also regarded themselves as mediators. Others, however, claimed that their role 
was more immediately situational because they found themselves being 'many 
things' at the same time: 
JNS: What do you see as your role? 
Suleni: "Role depends on situations. What is on paper is what the people experienced and 
developed from where the methodology came from in East Africa. But our environment does 
not fit neatly in this methodology. Attitudes differ and so the roles of credit officers in these 
regions differ from the roles of credit officers (COs) in Zambia. A CO is supposed to recruit 
clients, train them and facilitate a cohesive group for clients to work properly. There after 
they administer the loans and then start collecting until work is done. But in this country, a 
CO goes beyond that. In more instances than not a CO has to take an extra job by actually 
recovering the money as well". 
Others simply said they did not have any clear understanding of their intended 
role as indicated thus: 
"It's difficult for me to answer the question accurately because even me I don't understand 
who a credit officer is, and what they are supposed to be doing. In short, we don't understand 
ourselves. We are just groomed to meet the targets of the organisation [Others laugh]. We are 
n()t ii_IV()I_y_t~t in_ th_e_planl}iJ1g __ QL§.,h•m!ngpJ_JI!j~~o_fjp~!l.£~~JEGJJ), __ . 
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Still others said they were 'everything' to their clients and found themselves 
playing multiple, potentially conflicting roles, should client groups become 
dysfunctional. In practice, loan officers were experiencing growing tensions 
amid increasingly inconsistent work and personal demands: 
"In many ways, our job has changed a lot over the years, it's no longer the case of just loan 
business - 'you are everything'. You are the person with many hats. You know you're a 
social worker; you're a counsellor, and even a manager! I think we tend to be dealing with 
lots of things than management realises" (CETZAM L/0). 
Another claimed: 
"We go beyond what is stated on paper because our job descriptions are not adhered to. 
There's quite an overlap and sometimes we end up doing an accountant's work. We even do 
banking!! We don't stick to what is on paper, as nothing will be done. We are forced to do 
that because a credit officer has to be answerable" (PRIDE L/0). 
Consequently, these loan officers felt that they had potentially 'boundless' roles 
that did not always match with what was envisaged in the lending methodology. 
Their roles were also in a state of flux, changing in response to the unfolding of 
events (section 3.5.2) -hence their use of the term-'chameleon' in reference to 
their role. Their roles are much broader than what is depicted in literature. In this 
study, they were found to be 'everything'. In effect they were the 'general 
practitioners' of rnicrofinance. In addition, a number also noted that having to 
work to visible financial targets, especially 'unrealistic' performance related 
targets, had made their role more ambiguous. 
7.2.3 The Clients' Own Perspective 
Clients' understanding of a loan officer's role was first based on their actual 
interactions and relationships with them. As a result, the role was considered to 
be that of processing loans as priority, then collecting payments, mediating, 
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followed by training, and managing group conflicts. Many clients however 
inferred that; "We see them to be more of 'debt' or 'money' collectors than 
anything else at this time". From their standpoint, some 'role displacement' had 
already taken place. Given that CETZAM began as a Christian based NGO, 
clients had also expected loan officers to have a 'pastoral' role as well (see 
chapter 3, section 3.5). In addition CETZAM clients did not consider that their 
loan officers had a transformational role as had been stated in interviews with 
branch managers and higher management: 
"The role of L/0 is one in which CETZAM has wanted to describe as the transformational 
role. We provide loan officers' services to a client so that we can see change in the client 
through the loan officer. The L/0 carries with him/her the financial services which CETZAM 
provides to the client, the vision of the organisation and also his/her personality. These three 
aspects need to be blended together so as to see change, which is measurable" (Manager-
Operations). 
Clients at PRIDE held a similar 'debt collector' view: "Loan officers just ensure 
money is collected by MEC leaders, and occasionally visit our businesses". In 
practice there was little agreement about what was expected of loan officers. As 
it emerged in interviews and discussions, their actual roles were defined more by 
what they then did - 'debt' or 'money' collectors and not as would-be 
development 'enablers' described in work manuals and other descriptions. The 
dilemma of loan officers-lay in the fact that they were both a 'toe' and a 'heel' 
each performing a different function (Hochschild, 1983, p.l37): one delivers a 
service, the other collects payment for it. Performing under pressure of targets, 
loan officers found themselves acting the 'bad guy role'. 
7. 3 Loan Officers' Work 
The loan officers' work has previously been characterised as pressured and 
intense with limited job security (Ahmad, 2002; Goetz, 2001; Montgomery, 
- l-996),- and--with-a-particular- sense cOf~dissatisfaction~--'J'he- findings--here-do -- -
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~-..:: .. 
support these views but further add that actual fieldwork was here characterised 
by rising tensions, conflicts, emotions and other social dilemmas as well. The 
nature of [field] work as constructed by both CETZAM and PRIDE loan officers 
drew heavily on their own daily experiences and surrounding local context. This 
reflected microfinance in action: 
"This work requires you to go down to the level of clients and is a job that exposes you to 
real life situations of poverty and suffering". 
"You have to be where people are and identify with them'. It requires one to be on foot most 
of the time and walk long distances". 
Still others said: 
"It is a result oriented job, tough, involving a great deal of social skills and also about people 
and conflict management. We are required to balance clients' expectations and those of 
management". 
Such views implied that their work was not so much about what administration 
they did 'in' the office, but how they handled clients, managed the tensions and 
balanced the competing demands 'out' in the field. Thus they found it to be a 
particularly tense job. In two separate group discussions their work was 
described thus: 
"This kind of work is about results, targets have to be achieved. It's hard work, full of 
sacrifice and about people management. It takes your energy, mind and emotions to perform. 
There is a lot of psychology involved in this work and a great deal of social skills is required 
too. In addition, it is about conflict management and balancing expectations of clients and 
those of management. As such it is usually a job full of pressure and threats and can be 
depressing if clients are not performing well". (FGD- PRIDE) 
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"It is a very challenging, result oriented and not the kind of a routine work. You become like 
a policeman or woman-trying to arrest someone and so you end up chasing a defaulter like a 
'wanted' person. A loan officer in this case becomes like a chameleon, changing to suit 
environments or situations. It is the kind of a job that even disturbs your dreams as the mind 
is never at rest. The worst part of the job is dealing with defaulters. If you have a group that 
is giving you problems, a loan officer is never at peace. Our work is therefore unpredictable 
and challenging. One has to be determined, and requires a lot of maturity on our part, as we 
tend to deal with own character, the manager's and that of clients as well". (FGD -
CETZAM) 
The expressed feelings and views about their work had to be interpreted in a way 
that would capture microfinance in action from the perspectives of loan officers 
and their clients. Figure 7.2 therefore illustrates the context within which loan 
officers' nature of work was framed. 
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Tensions: How 
to manage 
competing 
expectations of 
the MFI and 
those of the 
clients. 
Tensions: 
Clients' and loan 
officers' priorities 
not the same. 
MFI 
Management 
Loan 
officers 
Clients 
Exerting pressure on MFis to: 
-Achieve sustainability. 
-Demand internal accountability. 
-Maximise client outreach/volume 
-Adhere to 'Best Practices' 
Tensions: Balancing the 
requirements/expectations of 
the donors and poor clients 
within the existing 
hierarchical 
relationships 
mission. 
Influence and manage 
clients to meet the given 
tasks 
Tensions: Conflicts within groups, 
resulting in weak group 
accountability and problematic 
relationships. 
and 
power 
own 
Figure 7. 2 Framing the tensions and contradictions within microfinance 
(The-absence-ofarrows signifies the nonlinear nature-of the-process)--- "-.-- ----,~---~-·-=-, -----·---
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Potential for tension and conflict existed because loan officers 'participated' in 
two 'worlds', each with different practices and expectations. Tensions within the 
clients' 'world' were further accentuated by the inability to enforce joint liability 
and social sanctions in group based lending methodologies (Ito, 2003; Jain, 
1996; MkNelly and Kevane, 2002; Matin, 2000; Vogeldesang, 2003). They 
claimed that, their client 'nurturing' roles, which called for the use of more time 
and social skills than other tasks assigned by their MFis, were becoming more 
problematic. At field level this led to particular frustrations, since management 
looked for quick results. There were also tensions regarding the benign 
relationship of personal 'patronage', in which the loan officer can be recognised 
as empathetic and 'understanding' by clients, and new demands for making the 
institution more sustainable: 
"Clients expect me to be lenient as they expect you not to ask them to pay or push them. 
Others expect that a loan officer should not give them problems when they fail to pay back or 
indeed pay on time-they want to pay at their own time" (CETZAM L/0). 
Therefore there was the pressure towards personal patronage within groups, and 
against it from their institution's perspective, and this posed problems at the 
client-loan officer interface which often went unrecognised by management and 
supervision. Interestingly, male loan officers' accounts on the nature of work 
typically ended with reference regarding women's limited suitability for the job: 
"Ladies find the work demanding and easily get frustrated and disappear. Turnover is higher 
for women because the job is hard. You need to invest a lot of your time (which is hard for a 
woman who is married and with children) to meet some of the work demands". 
Another officer commented: 
"The women I have seen in our institution are the 'ruthless' ones and those who have made 
it are usually the tough ones. Soft ones have either resigned or been fired, as meeting targets 
is an issue in microfinance. A female loan officer has to be a 'man' to do the job". 
- --·-----~::--·--.---- .--- -:= ·:__--_------=--- ----·--.o-·~---=------·-------,------,.,---------:----::--- ---------_----;:-___ -_::_---;:-_·-
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This judgment was not only limited to loan officers themselves but also shared 
among those who directly supervised them, associated with them and other 
former loan officers as well (see Box 7.1). 
Box 7.1 Illustrating varied perceptions of loan officers' work 
"Working as loan officer for 2 years was a 'zero' option kind of arrangement. There was no 
peace and I used to be stressed up all the time. Why? It is a strenuous job. Every morning, 
you wake up, you would be imagining where to go, what to do to impress your branch 
manager. There is a lot of worrying and it calls for a strong heart and capacity to absorb 
pressure and frustration. There is no peace for a loan officer and you can't be happy at all" 
(Former loan officer, June, 2004) 
Researcher: Would you like to work as a loan officer? 
Soni: [Laughs heartily] Oh no! To be honest with you, I would not. With the current 
framework of products, loan officers face great challenges out there. What has worked 
elsewhere may not necessarily work here. Besides, as a nation, we don't have a good 
borrowing culture and that is what makes it tough for loan officers. Microfinance makes it 
so difficult for one to have a life free of its demands and cares. At times their work becomes 
stressful as they have to deal with clients that are in genuine desperate conditions or 
situations. For instance, going to pursue a client nursing a dying spouse or child! It's a 
terrible experience!! 
We return from the field and arrive at the office. 
Masiku: "Thank God, I am not a loan officer!" 
Researcher: Why? 
Masiku: It's hectic and rough especially for a woman. 
(Branch manager, July, 2004) 
(Branch manager, 2003) 
It is clear from these extracts, and also those of loan officers themselves, that 
active fieldwork was problematic and, as a result, loan officers could be critical 
of it. It follows that service delivery was not going to rise to the further 
---.challenge of-development or, of institutional--sustainability--until- some-of~these . ---,.~ ~- =-~ 
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problems were resolved. The question thus anses: What accounted for such 
critical perceptions and responses? The following factors dominated the 
explanations offered: 'heavy' workload, client groups' dynamics, loan 
'delinquency' or recoveries and the 'new' business orientation. All these and 
many others impacted on how loan officers regarded their work. 
Loan officer work is akin to middle management characterised by intense work 
and pressure by virtue of their intermediate position within any hierarchical 
organisational structure (Dopson, 1992). Similarly, a common source of pressure 
for loan officers here occurred in their attempts to reconcile client demands with 
those from their higher management. 'Pressure of work' was a common 'thread' 
running through many discussions involving loan officers in both MFis. The 
sections that follow explain the outlined factors in detail and show how they 
made loan officers critical about their work and microfinance in general. 
7.3.1 Workload 
Although loan officers here described their workload as 'heavy', none had the 
recommended client load at the time of this study. 95 With more pressure 
towards meeting targets, loan officers were reportedly working longer hours 
including weekends. The most commonly cited reasons for working these extra 
hours were 'to get paper work completed', 'reduce portfolio in arrears' and 
maintain their jobs. As a result some loan officers said their work was becoming 
increasingly overwhelming and demanding. 
"Currently, jobs on credit officers are piling up. A credit officer (CO) is doing everything to 
an extent that a CO has no free weekend! They expect us to do everything. For instance, we 
95 Recommended client load per loan officer for CETZAM was 375 and 500 for PRIDE. On 
average a loan officer at CETZAM had about 200 clients and only a handful of TBs had 20 or 
more members (see table 3.2, chapter 3). The situation at PRIDE was similar. All active MECs 
in the three branches on the Copperbelt had less than 50 members -the recommended MEC size . 
. 7.- ----=;:=,-=" -- -- --- - --THe._ ctietlflo-adJ)er·-~tOaTI"'OffiC-er~-ik· cOmpaTaote:":fO~ sOutll--.:XfriC1lflMFIS~OUt-mUCiltO·wer-tllaHlh:C:-. 
average for the region (see Baumann, 2004:9). 
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have to do the banking of money, compile loan insurance fund, do the filing, visit clients etc" 
(FGD-PRIDE). 
"There is so much contained in a loan officer's job and also the issue of delinquency makes 
our work really difficult and a long nightmare. So it would be better to reduce the work 
content. For instance, a loan officer does the job of everyone and everything. And if 
management is not on top of things, a loan officer might even do the work of an accountant 
just as to ensure loans are processed on time" (FGD-CETZAM). 
Other research (Ahmad, 2002; Goetz, 2001; Churhill, 1999; Rahman, 1999) 
elsewhere has suggested that loan officers often find their workload demanding. 
However the situation here was exacerbated because within client groups, there 
were few with ready-made skills (and willing) to help manage the solidarity 
groups. As such most client groups were not self-managing, and therefore 
needed loan officers' continuing attention. 
7.3.2 Client Groups' Dynamics 
Observations of client-loan officer interactions and weekly meetings gave 
additional insights into the alleged loan officer's actual workload. Attendance 
was considered poor at most meetings except in the run up to new loan 
disbursement96 . In theory, TBs and MECs were supposed to be self- managing, 
emphasising self-discipline and reducing dependency on loan officers to enforce 
explicit rules of attendance, while also keeping accounts and records (Anthony, 
2005; Hermes et al 2005; Morduch, 1999). This requirement deviated from 
what was actually practiced. In the group-based methodology, loan officers and 
clients were supposed to be co-managers of groups. Yet leaders and members 
did not want to take up all the demanding responsibilities of running the groups, 
as the following quotes suggest: 
96 The researcher observed that not all group members were present at any one meeting attended. 
At one Trust Bank meeting, surprisingly, loans \\'ere approved even for thosewho were not in 
· - attei:{ilancerlil aTnneetirigs-at fiR:toE; Clients amve<r=ar-differenCtimeS:~maae"tneir-p'ayments~- ~~··=-~ ----
chattered briefly to each and others left soon after making payments. 
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"It is not our job to follow defaulters and collect money. We are all poor-so how 
they expect me to ask another poor person why they have not paid?" "They 
[loan officers} are paid for it-so they should do it", and "there is too much work 
for leaders for nothing", "I do not own this group". This attitude pervaded most 
of the TBs and MECs visited as discussions with some clients indicate: 
"The rule says that you should know each other very well and visit each other to see the kind 
of business that each one has. But most of the time, like in our group when it was time to 
visit each other, everybody was saying, "who has time and money to go round checking what 
each one of us is doing in different locations? Ok, let's just do this, we'll tell them (loan 
officer) we visited each other", when we actually never did. That's why we had problems as 
some did not actually have businesses" (Client B). 
Another client claimed: 
"As for the group meetings, most people only come when loans are about to be disbursed, 
otherwise they just send money to service their loans through friends and children. You only 
see them when they want another loan and yet we still go ahead and agree to their loan 
application even when someone has not been attending meetings". 
Researcher: How come? 
Client: "Well, usually people say, "If you don't give him/her a loan what will they feed 
on?" or they say, "takuli ukuchinga umunobe kwati nimpiya shobe!" (Do not block others 
from getting a loan -after all it's not your money!) But even loan officers are lenient since 
they are supposed to tell these people about the importance of attending meetings. So they 
overlook this rule and as long as the previous loan was paid, then they have no problems with 
that". 
Yet another client likewise claimed: 
"Why should I come for meetings every week? Loan officers are only interested in money 
being paid back and not my presence! So it's OK to send money with someone and continue 
with your business at the market. You don't lose anything". 
.. These extracts serve to make an important point: the ways in which groups were 
• ~._.:-..--__:~--::=--_;;;;o-;.:_·-~-:..-----:· -~-T- -·•. ;o::~------~- • ..,.~,:-;:-.~:...-:=<::.:::::-._::_.--;"!"~:"::""~~-)--:-=-::;--···~,._--~--,::-_·~-----~-:::;c. ~-:o;:=e----~--:::--·:-;.-_;-•·::-.--;•~-.--:=~---:-;-~~--="0 -)<~~~~~-
formed - their rationale and composition - had implications for the ways in 
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which they later functioned. But they also illustrate clients' and loan officers' 
ingenuity in adapting the lending methodology design and challenging the 
assumptions to meet their own circumstances. Both sides preferably 'negotiated' 
more neutral positions: 'as long as weekly payments were done, they could 
overlook other 'peripheral' issues'. As a result, clients did not take group rules 
seriously, so attendance at meetings became optional rather than obligatory. In 
addition, borrowers did not see these groups as 'owned' by them, but as 
'institutions' created for the benefit of MFis which were to be managed by loan 
officers. This made some groups more dysfunctional, having rising repayment 
problems, which needed further loan officer intervention. Most clients claimed 
they did not have the time to attend the meetings and appeared to have a rather 
non-committal approach (just like their loan officers) to group meetings, 
regarding them simply as the time and place for making repayments and not as a 
venue for sharing knowledge. Similar views were reported in Bolivian MFis, 
where clients also found meetings difficult, taking time they would sooner 
devote to their businesses (Economist, Nov, 3rd 2005), while Paxton (1999) and 
Solomon (2003) found similar views in Burkina Faso and Ghana respectively. 
Under pressure to meet specified targets and account for their group's 
performance, loan officers were therefore adopting 'duties' which were 
originally meant to be conducted by clients themselves (such as client screening, 
group record keeping and reconciliation, collection of money) and thus taking 
personal ownership over these activities, in effect like group leaders. One 
particular TB meeting attended illustrated the contradiction in practice: 
"The TB members were on this day considering loan applications and 
deciding on individual amounts to be approved. In principle, this process is 
supposed to be managed by the group leader, with the loan officer as 
facilitator. But the loan officer intervened and took control over the chair and 
said, "/only reduce loan amounts, and not increase the figures. So don't 
complain if you find a smaller amount than what you have applied for". On 
the-otherchand,~each -time members= debated ·on~an·individuaFs' amount"toc-be;cc · ~~-~ -~ oo-~~ ~- -
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approved, the TB chairman would refer the final decision to the loan officer, 
saying; "Katwishi mwebene ifyo mwalabapela. Chili kuli imwe" (I do not 
know how much you want to give them. It is up to you). But the loan officer 
(probably conscious of the researcher) also kept on 'correcting' the 
Chairman; "It's not me, but the group deciding". Yet he had earlier on 
warned them of his powers to overrule their decisions" (field notes, 2004). 
This was difficult for any group lending methodology explicitly intended to 
foster self-management among borrower groups. The responsibility for 
managing the group and recovering the loan for example had practically been 
shifted to loan officers from clients themselves. Loan officers claimed to become 
so involved (because they ultimately recommend loans - i.e. they are 
'guarantors'), while realizing that such involvement could weaken group 
cohesion. An excerpt of an interview illustrates the point: 
Researcher: What keeps client groups intact? 
L/0: A good management team and a sense of ownership by the group where members feel 
they are in charge of their own affairs. There should be less involvement of the loan officer in 
the problems of the group. Let them resolve their own problems before you come in. In 
addition, a loan officer should not be seen to be discriminating against some and favouring 
others. 
In contrast to the above standpoint, in one case, a loan officer spent more than 
two hours (instead of one) trying to make sense of the group's record keeping 
and then account for money collected, while clients themselves continued 
disputing each others' individual 'accounts'. The frustrated loan officer 
concerned countered that: 
"If your Trust Bank is in problems and confusion, it means that I also get affected because I 
start doing what you should be doing on your own. This affects my work, asl cannot meet all 
the groups planned for the day. I am doing this because the office will ~a!l_t~IeP.Q!:!Jg>_lll '!1e __ 
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Musona (2004) studying the causes of delinquency in Zambian MFis, here 
argued that the group methodology was not sufficiently understood by either 
clients or MFis. Instead of clients taking a major role in the management of the 
group activities and delinquency, loan officers took over instead. Copestake 
(2002) also reported that client groups were unable to enforce appropriate 
internal discipline without the direct involvement and authority of the loan 
officer. Loan officers instead became informally 'co-opted' as group leaders and 
more accountable hierarchically for their groups' activities, and other workloads 
increased as a result. 
7 .3.3 Loan 'Delinquency' /Recoveries 
Although SSA microfinance institutions are reported to be among the most 
productive globally, as measured by the number of borrowers and savers per 
loan officer, they are, nevertheless, the lowest in efficiency terms (cost per 
borrower) (Lafourcade et al., 2005: 1) and have the lowest repayment rates 
(Microbanking Bulletin, 2003). Therefore, problems were most apparent in the 
loan 'delinquency' activity, where loan officers 'acted' as 'debt' collectors. 
Previous studies have concentrated on capturing how clients maintain the high 
repayment rates deemed to be the 'ultimate' indicators of programme success 
(see Rahman, 1999). Loan officers' experiences have not been central to the 
process, especially in such actively failing MFis as these, and where basic 
principles of group lending are problematic. Evidence here suggests that where 
MFis face the challenges of low outreach, high default rates and the pressure to 
be self-sustaining, loan officers can find developmental work so difficult that 
they simply focus on collecting money and keeping their own jobs instead: 
"My experience so far is that, it is not an easy job especially when clients have not paid. 
Sometimes clients have genuine reasons but they still have to pay by whatever means it 
takes. There is a lot of pressure from arrears and as a credit officer you tend to lose your head 
thinking of how you will recover the money". (Female L/0) 
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"I may not come for the focus group discussion this Saturday because of loan recoveries that 
have to be done. What are we going to input into that computer? For instance, yesterday 
people didn't pay and had to follow them up. I worked late and reached home about 22 hours 
and this morning I had to go out first before reporting to the office. The PAR has to be 
reduced". (Male L/0) 
Consequently, loan officers' experiences with recoveries or 'delinquency' were 
negative as reflected in participants' own words (illustrated by such metaphors 
as 'battlefield', 'hell', or 'psychological battle' and 'nightmare') each time they 
talked about their close field experiences with 'delinquency' management.97 To 
induce more positive responses from defaulting clients, loan officers had to be 
'forceful' and 'firm' in addition to the other 'acting' which made such close 
demands on them personally. In fact 'debt' collecting not only increased their 
workload but was so emotionally intense that some claimed it to be a reason for 
leaving: 
"Going through peoples' homes during delinquency made me see things differently-being 
able to experience genuine problems out there that were emotionally moving. These clients 
make you feel as if you are troubling them. Their interpretation of microcredit is different 
from the institutions' and it was left to us loan officers to handle the conflict". 
In addition to increasing the workload, delinquency in MFis made the work of 
loan officers similar to that of bill collectors (Hochschild, 1983). And not 
surprising, loan officers described themselves as debt collectors. They spent 
much time collecting loans as if that was their key task. 'Delinquency' related 
experiences and pressures thus partly offer an explanation for the low numbers 
of female loan officers, especially where being a loan officer was strongly 
associated with 'fighting battles' with clients. Women are not here customarily 
socialized or expected to be 'fighters' and personally 'cruel'. As a result some 
97 A search tool in Nvivo was used to ascertain the spread of the word 'default' to the document 
database. The scope results showed 34 out of 39 documents. In addition, loan officers and their 
-ilTimediate"=supervrs-ors"'talRea~more~"ablJufc-aefaiiH~c-relaH.'d~'probiems=ma-n-=tnose--ilfc.top~-~---~--~- ~ : 
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female loan officers faced further tension between wider cultural expectations 
and those of their job. 
7.3.4 A New 'Business Orientation' 
Most MFis in Zambia started as not-for-profit NGOs meant to 'help' the poor 
(Chapter 3). Consequently, the emphasis was on achieving client outreach -
getting numbers to 'please' donors and not firstly securing income for the 
immediate survival of the lending institutions. However, this financial paradigm 
has changed (Chapter 2, section 2.3). MFis are required to be sustainable and 
'commercial' with increasing emphasis on repayment rates and client numbers 
rather than other genuine social intermediation. Unlike Latin America 
experience, commercialization of microfinance is a relatively new consideration 
in Zambia. The term commercialization or for-profit carried with it a negative 
connotation among certain loan officers (and clients) who could easily equate it 
with exploitation of the poor. This highlights the conflicting interests (i.e. 
donors, MFis, clients) with which loan officers were confronted, but also makes 
explicit the underlying regard for microfinance. In a focus group discussion loan 
officers openly expressed their uneasiness with the 'new' orientation: 
L/0 1 "Are we in the business of helping people or making money? Why are we forcing 
these loans on clients? Don't force it on them let them express interest. We seem more 
interested in numbers and profit of course". 
L/0 2 "We should be honest and say we have failed to serve the poor and tell them we are 
here for profit. We have given up on the poor". 
A contradiction was perceived between profit and development and in particular, 
loan officers from CETZAM claimed that the original mission seemed to be 
changing its 'skin' to obey the logic of the profit. In addition the name of the 
institution (Christian Enterprise Trust of Zambia) was not suited to this change, 
~Jurther -creating-tensions-and'·suspicionsoanhecclient=loancofficer· interface;The -·-.-.--~ --- · · --· 
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idea of sustainability is therefore a recent development (within the Zambian 
microfinance sector) which has yet to be fully embedded into the working 
culture of both the clients and MFis. The comparative analysis of microfinance 
in chapter 3 showed that, most MFis in SSA are still in their experimental stage 
and are latecomers to the concept of sustainability in comparison with MFis in 
South Asia and Latin America. And even with SSA, MFis in East Africa for 
example are way ahead of Zambian MFis in reaching sustainability (Lafourcade, 
et al., 2005; Lapenu and Zeller, 2001). To be sustainable, MFis must maintain 
high loan repayment rates. This has been pressed upon loan officers whose own 
job security then depends more on how they perform according to explicit 
quantitative as well as other indicators: 
"You know as a loan officer I can do everything very well in the field but as long as money is 
not paid or taken to the office then it counts for nothing. It is even better not to do anything 
else but have money paid" (Piastor). 
Their position and nature of work was such that a loan officer knew that he/she 
carried part of the sustainability of their organisations [not their clients'] on 
themselves. For others, however, the priority given to measurable outputs had 
amplified their sense of conscience and guilt: 
"Sometimes we take harsh actions because we have a job to do but at times this can be a 
painful experience as there are clients with genuine problems. We feel very bad. But the 
office people don't understand, as they don't see these things in the field. The only way they 
will understand is when one brings back money. There are only positive results in a loan 
officers' job" (FGD). 
"These people or clients are our mothers, fathers, our brothers etc. It hurts me to shout or use 
strong words on my mother who has the money but does not want to pay! What am I 
supposed to do? You know, it hurts me as a loan officer and I don't want to do that but we 
are forced to do that (looks emotionally disturbed). What a contradiction!" (Kopeka) 
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These findings corroborate Rahman's (1999) observations in Bangladesh, where 
field staff were reported to have less time for social intermediation due to 
sustainability pressures. In group interviews loan officers confirmed that the 
collection of money (loan repayment) received most attention in their own 
performance assessment and evaluations were primarily based on 'repayment 
rates', 'portfolio at risk', 'client load' and timely submission of daily reports 
rather than to stable and sustainable client groups. Social intermediation, a 
founding characteristic of microfinance, was here being replaced by the pursuit 
of more visible, explicit outputs that also secured jobs for loan officers and 
legitimised continued donor support for their organisations. They further 
claimed that MFis themselves were under pressure to 'drift' from their mission 
towards becoming more like traditional banks in pursuit of greater profitability. 
As such loan officers were working in fear for their jobs and found change 
difficult. 
However, some also claimed that, there was 'nothing wrong' in pursumg 
institutional sustainability per se, just management's interpretation and use of 
that term- sustainability- was here thought to be almost synonymous with 
meeting targets, and therefore failure to meet such targets increased their sense 
of insecurity: 
"There is just too much pressure. Head office keeps on saying, "Donors want to pull out and 
we have to be self-sustaining". So that affects my work as I begin to worry about losing my 
job. The pace is too fast and if anything, it is a word that no one wants to hear. It scares us 
and the way it is being communicated to us is somewhat unsettling. But we don't realise that 
this will create problems for us when arrears start. Anyway, for now we are worried about 
numbers and amounts disbursed". 
So there was more pressure on all loan officers to perform to targets as none (at 
the time) had yet achieved the expected full client load. On the other hand, 
maintaining high loan repayments (where group lending was problematic) meant 
in~rt:_(!s_eQ_ _l_g~n ___ Q_(_(I__c~r_s' Lnvgl:v:~01ent j_n.~!he_~a.ct\llil ruJ.1Iling_ Qf_clienL,gr_o_up 
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themselves. Broader development goals such as 'empowerment' or 
'transformation' were thus disappearing from their 'acquired' working 
vocabulary as they turned their attention to more explicit measures. A long 
serving loan officer indeed remarked: 
"The language of empowerment is a 'technical fix' that finds its currency in management-
donor meetings and reports. What we worry about are loan repayment rates". 
The preceding discussion has shown that the loan officers' role is ambiguous 
and their work characterised with rising tensions and dilemmas. This role 
ambiguity and conflicting expectations have contributed to loan officers' 
negative perception of their job. What further challenges then do these issues 
raise for loan officers and how have they adapted to them? 
7.4 Further Challenges 
These challenges should be set against the shift from not-for profit to sustainable 
(profit orientated) organisations, and the broader Zambian context as presented 
in chapter 3. Microfinance is considered 'top-down', donor driven and lacking 
'local ownership.' Both CETZAM and PRIDE started as NGOs and have until 
recently operated without an explicit legal framework. The 'charity' tag still 
lingers on in the minds of many clients and the wider community as well. The 
following specific challenges emerged in the course of research: inadequate 
training, handling diverse clients and group forming. 
7.4.1 Inadequate Training 
Working as a loan officer here called for some personal determination, 
managerial and organisational support, but to do that without (or else only 
limited) training was increasingly challenging. The expectations of clients and 
management were demanding, yet few had been properly prepared for this on 
-- -:::----=-- -------- =-=-·:-.).!--= s~- -.;:::.--:.~------- ,...,-;=:_~--..----------~-~-=---
entering MFis. The problem of insufficient/inappropriate training has been 
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discussed before (Adair, 1992; Ackerly, 1995; Ahmad, 2002; Baumann, 2004; 
Goetz, 2001; Montgomery et al., 1996; Mukama, et al., 2005). Loan officers 
here also rarely received sufficient orientation, induction or training because 
they needed to be actively present in the community. The importance of training 
for loan officers therefore needs little further elaboration. Few loan officers 
however appeared to have gained the necessary skills to implement a group 
lending methodology, while many others had entered the 'field' without much 
appreciation of what was really expected of them. And Baumann (2004) 
observed elsewhere, that the educational system is least prepared to produce the 
kind of skills needed by MFis. He further noted that development courses at 
South African technical colleges and universities for example, tend to be 
theoretical and general. In this study, those with up to two years of service 
complained of lack of training: 
"I have had a very rough start in the sense that when I joined, they straight away 'threw' me 
in the field and also expected me to handle clients. I have not undergone proper orientation 
and have not received any training. They just gave me a manual to go through and also told 
me to learn from my colleagues. I have learnt it the hard way. At times, I have been 
challenged by clients during the MEC meetings over issues that I seem not to have 
knowledge or experienced. It can be embarrassing" (PRIDE Zambia). 
"Currently a loan officer is just given a brief orientation and sent to the branches to work. 
There is no proper training given. Management expects branch managers to teach the new 
loan officers and also expect us to consult our colleagues. It is learning by doing and no one 
sits down to teach the other. There is no time for such. You pick things as you go on" 
(CETZAM). 
But this all begs the question: Learn from whom? Whose practice did they 
expect new loan officers to learn and adopt? In those cases where loan officers 
had received training, they still had reservations about both its relevance and 
effectiveness: 
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"The initial training we received looked at the ideal situation where all people are making 
payments. It did not cater for situations where there were cases of default and how to go 
about it. So the training does not look at realities. For instance, the theory is that there is no 
room for arrears. But the reality is that, there are so many problems out there in the field and 
most things do not make sense. So the training gives a false impression or start to the job" 
(PRIDE Zambia). 
"I think there is a great gap in the training, that they don't prepare you. I mean when I joined, 
issues of client handling and relationships were not brought to my attention. I was never 
prepared for that and I think that a lot of loan officers don't do not have what it takes to work 
with the poor" (former Loan officer) 
Consistent with other studies, loan officers claimed their training now simply 
focused on ensuring they met targets, rather than enabling them to work more 
responsively in such complex and challenging contexts. Their work calls for 
capacity to deal with people rather than with things, for more interpersonal skills 
and fewer mechanical skills. This is not to suggest that accounting skills for 
instance were not important, but that in the field, loan officers also needed social 
skills (for building relationships) as well as other abilities, as a local 
microfinance specialist observed: 
"Loan officers have to be trained to work with people of a different social class and so inter-
personal relationships are paramount and one needs to have skills to develop these 
relationships and be able to manage the ties". 
The lack of or inadequate training for loan officers occurred in all MFis as 
observed by the AMIZ Director and a senior manager of one MFI respectively: 
"Training of loan officers is not being considered as key by most MFis. In cases where 
AMIZ has run some training workshops, turnout has usually been poor. Most MFis are so 
concerned about immediate survival that they actually disinvest in training. However, a few 
MFI's do undertake some in-house training for their loan officers". 
"Training is an expensive venture especially when faced with high turnover. We in 
management -do appreciate·the-facnhatnew-etltfafits (i:e:- Ioan·--officefs) neea proper-re=- -
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orienting and intensive training which takes time and money. But we are not giving them 
that leeway because they have to be in the field". 
Because of how loan officers were groomed by their organisations (in terms of 
immediate survival), inadequate training was not regarded to be as challenging 
as meeting targets. As such, challenges with an immediate financial implication 
for the MFI (such as: managing loan delinquency, reducing portfolio at risk, 
meeting repayment targets, maintaining expected client load and being 
accountable) inevitably concerned them most: 
"Our challenges are multiple but getting client numbers, reducing the PAR and meeting 
targets top the list. These are most challenging and worrying issues for any loan officer". 
7.4.2 Handling diverse clients 
It is at the interface with clients themselves, however, that loan officers felt most 
vulnerable. Chapter five examined how loan officers' personal and social 
characteristics constrained or enabled their interaction with clients. Age, gender 
and educational background all impacted on how loan officers related with 
clients and empathized with them. Those of lower education (diploma and 
below) could break the 'social class' barrier easier than those with university 
degrees. Similarly, youthful loan officers were alleged to be 'rude' because they 
lacked respect for the elderly. Female loan officers were perceived to be 
emotionally unstable. These issues constituted a big challenge (but to varying 
degrees) for loan officers.98 
How they met institutional targets was said to be largely dependent on how they 
'marketed' their own personalities and handled their clients. They thus claimed 
that, 'microfinance is about character': 
98 The challengeaJSo-vanecroeiween-MFIS.--r:oan~o:fficers·catf>Rfi5£-roflns1anc'(were not as· · · · 
close to clients as their counterparts at CETZAM given their Missions (see chapter 3 for details). 
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"It is not easy to manage a number of people in a trust bank. First as a loan officer you must 
be able to manage yourself well (in terms of your social behaviour and financial integrity) 
and work towards changing your own attitude and that of clients. In order to perform, you 
need to be focused, determined, courageous and firmly committed. In addition, one needs 
good public relations skills to 'connect' with various people and build relationships". 
Inevitably, they faced the challenge of building trusting relationships and 
managing them, changing clients' attitude [and their own] towards debt and also 
managing their own emotions. For instance, creating an awareness that could 
help them change community and clients' perceptions of MFis was a difficult 
challenge, which only received the rhetorical attention of management. Clients' 
perceptions of MFis in general needed challenging and changing if micro finance 
work was to both expand and also remain sustainable. The extracts below 
illustrate the point: 
"These people are thieves! They have come here to make huge profits and should not cheat 
us that they are there to alleviate poverty!" (PRIDE client) 
"CETZAM is using donor funds meant to assist us the poor people, and not make profit. So 
why should they harshly demand repayment from us the poor people?" 
The 'charity' mentality went deep and most clients regarded their loans as 'a 
small piece of cake cut from a bigger 'public' cake donated by 'invisible' 
donors'. Important as these issues had been to realising institutional 
sustainability, loan officers were not prepared to deal with the social aspects of 
their work responsively without also risking being antagonistic and emotionally 
affected as a result. 
7.4.3 Group formation 
On another front, client mobilization and group forming were a challenge (in 
view of the low client outreach by the MFis) for loan officers, but particularly 
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experiences in the field as 'frustrating', 'depressing', 'disappointing' and 'time 
consuming'. Newer loan officers had not yet learnt from their [older] colleagues 
about how to 'fast track' group development or had not yet established 
appropriate contacts within the local community and the markets where most 
potential clients conducted their business. The question was: why was group 
formation considered to be so problematic? Why did officers find it so 
frustrating? One manager illustrated this source of frustration: 
Maso: "These people [loan officers] have a tough job to do and do put in a lot. But they feel 
insecure and that tends to affect their performance. They have targets and are expected to 
meet these targets and no stories. But you see management does not appreciate that group 
formation takes time if one is to come up with a quality loan to a TB. If a loan officer moves 
quickly to form groups in order to meet set targets, they will have problems of delinquency 
later. On the other hand, if they take time to form a quality group of clients, they will not 
meet the set target in client numbers and therefore will be deemed lazy and have a bad 
assessment and their jobs will be on the line". 
Researcher: So what should they do? 
Maso: They need to find a balance and the painful thing is that assessment does not take 
into account the process of forming the group. It's difficult to find a balance. Those who 
make decisions don't know what is out here [the field] and at the same time don't make use 
of the valuable information that L/Os have. For example, one of the L!Os has been 'labelled' 
as unproductive, lazy, failing to meet set client targets, when in fact this LO is very hard 
working. The problem is that management does not know the environment these L/Os are 
subjected to. The concerned L/0 feels very frustrated. 
A long serving loan officer at CETZAM added: 
"Management says that the key task for loan officers is to form good groups and give quality 
loans, yet, when we try to do this, the issue of meeting our targets is raised. Therefore the 
desire to see long term positive change in clients is there but the overemphasis given to 
meeting targets frankly gets in the way." 
Loan officers found it difficult to convince others into becoming MFis' clients 
by joining groups. It would seem that microfinance services were here supply 
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rather than demand driven. But why would the poor not want to get group loans? 
Loan officers also found forming groups a challenge because microfinance in 
Zambia is heavily top-down, and has secured limited grassroots participation, 
and therefore lacks true local 'ownership'. Client outreach was therefore 
considered to be the sole responsibility of loan officers because they were 'paid 
for it'. There was limited evidence of mutual partnership when it came to group 
forming work itself. The ultimate challenge however, was crystallized in the 
dilemma of having to simultaneously satisfy different demands from clients as 
well as MFI management and manage relationships with both. 
7.5 Adaptive Strategies 
Being at the lower end of the hierarchy, loan officers were confronted with a 
variety of problems and faced real social and personal issues. Loan officers' 
entanglements with these two different social worlds often produced a body of 
local knowledge based largely upon personal experience, through which they 
devised their own strategies of interaction. To cope with pressure and competing 
demands, loan officers, like 'street level bureaucrats', carved out for themselves 
a degree of autonomy' and reprioritised their activities to make them more 
manageable. They also changed their practices, language, and behaviour to 
accommodate the different demands made on them by their branch managers, 
management and clients. Loan officers, therefore, did not necessarily pursue 
officially stated lending procedures. For instance, the formal orientation period 
of 10 weeks was not strictly adhered to, less time was spent on client screening, 
and client's businesses were not visited before disbursing loans. 
"You see group loan rules are very difficult. It is just we, the loan officers who are in contact 
with you clients that make things easier for you; otherwise not many people would be getting 
loans. For example, when books don't balance, we try to do something about it to ensure they 
balance". 
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"There are MECs that are very good and make payments on time but others are problematic 
and so as a credit officer I have to help in keeping those MECs intact by flouting a few rules 
here and there just to try and maintain them. If I strictly stick to the rules, then a lot of people 
will be frustrated and the whole process won'tjust work". 
So lending procedures and group rules were 'chiselled' out in order to meet 
pressure from clients for quick disbursement of loans and also satisfy (at least 
temporarily) their superiors' demands for higher volume throughput. Loan 
officers adapted by reducing the time spent on activities (such as counselling and 
training) that were less visible and which also invited more arbitrary judgments 
upon their individual performance. Like other 'street-level bureaucrats' they too 
sought ways to reduce the intensity and range of their work tasks, and limit the 
demands and expectations placed upon them (Goetz, 1996; Lipsky, 1980) 
through group management by selection or 'cherry-picking' as the conversation 
below illustrates: 
Client: 'We are not at the meeting place now because you [the loan officer] always come 
late for meetings. So we were expecting you around 15.30 hours.' 
Another client adds, 'In fact the other time you made us wait for hours and never turned up 
so we thought you were not coming today as well'. 
Loan officer: Oh! I am sorry. It is just that I had other pressing things to attend to at the 
office. 
Later the loan officer says: "Usually as loan officers we tend to sideline good performing 
TBs in order to give time to problematic ones, especially those in arrears. We pay more 
attention to those giving us problems and so this group here has no repayment problems, as 
such I just pass through like this to ensure I chat with them. So I didn't come when they had a 
meeting because I was following up those affecting our portfolio. That is the only way one 
can cope with work". 
These adaptive strategies had other unfortunate knock-on effects - making it 
difficult to shape rnicrofinance as originally intended. Strategically loan officers 
concentrated on those activities that had an immediate demonstrable financial 
impact. Other important areas of micro finance such as relationship building and 
·----training of-c1ienis-_were rectlicedas'a resli1Cr<)all-of'ficei81otinct-iheffi-serves ~-= 
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putting survival of the institution ahead of their clients, and spending less time 
on social intermediation. But they felt the 'burden' of carrying rnicrofinance 
work on their shoulders as if so much depended on them. As a result, some 
resigned and others began to 'invent' their own procedures to cope with the 
emerging situation. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The chapter has described the actual roles of loan officers and the nature of their 
work in the field. It has shown that the loan officer is a key figure of the lending 
process, as he/she is the link between MFis and the clients. They are the actors 
with 'grounded knowledge' of rnicrofinance. In addition, they represent the 
institution outside, so they must be well trained, responsible and motivated, but 
also able to manage relationships with clients. Loan officers had multiple roles 
but were found so engaged by the 'new role' of debt collecting that they 
sidelined their original roles as facilitators and enablers of development. In view 
of top-down pressure to meet targets, loan officers' jobs had become more 
diverse and disparate, with other responsibilities, added accountability, and 
increased span of control. In addition to pressure of work and workload, their 
work also carried certain tensions and other conflicts. Loan officers were 
mainly groomed to meet prevailing institutional targets rather than enabling 
them to work responsively in a more complex and personally demanding local 
environment. In addition they judged their work as increasingly demoralising. 
The emphasis on targets significantly altered how loan officers experienced their 
roles and relationships, and how they came to regard rnicrofinance in action. 
Based on the actors' own narratives, the practice of micro finance can be very 
ambiguous. This chapter has therefore shown that accounts of the everyday 
practices and dilemmas faced by loan officers could help to inform expectations, 
and expose uncritical admiration of rnicrofinance, and put other unrealistic 
critiques into perspective. How then do issues of loan officers' motivation for 
developm-ental work, internctionswitli: dients~arufwliaCtney actually"i:lo~ in111e 
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field affect the institution's sustainability and diffusion of microfinance? 
Chapter Eight draws the key themes together and reconsiders the initial question 
of variable take-up of microfinance from the perspectives of the actors who 
deliver it. 
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Chapter Eight 
Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
This research has sought to illustrate and explain the variable take-up of 
microfinance from the particular standpoint of the actors who actually produce 
and deliver microfinance. It has drawn attention to issues of relationships, 
action, tensions, and compromises in the real work of loan officers, which 
ultimately define how microfinance works. It now identifies key emergent 
themes based on the empirical evidence itself. It sets these against existing 
knowledge about the microfinance strategy for poverty reduction and the role of 
loan officers. Such computer facilitated thematic discussion arises because 
microfinance is not easily categorised and produces rich field data accordingly. 
8.2 An Overview of Approach 
The study called for an in-depth study on loan officers because evaluation -
driven studies were largely concerned to determine whether programme inputs 
subsequently produced the predicted results (impact) without demonstrating 
much concern for the intervening process. It argued that this approach was 
essentially deductive and did not fully explain the means whereby particular 
outcomes had actually been achieved. The result had been an all too 
deterministic approach to explaining the variable international take -up of 
microfinance across different world regions. This alternative approach 
incorporated the study of micro finance in action (Figure 8.1) would thus account 
for other factors which might further explain how variably microfinance 
diffuses. 
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It involved a qualitative, anthropologically grounded methodology based upon a 
constructionist epistemology to explain why this is so. Other approaches deal 
with microfinance at a 'design' level without exposing actual implementation 
issues themselves. In seeking to advance knowledge of microfinance in action, a 
more bottom - up perspective was employed compared with previous research. 
This study has not evaluated the 'impact' or relative 'success' or 'failure' of 
microfinance as such, but instead has analysed the processes and practices that 
account for the variable take up of micro finance in the case of Zambia. 
ORIGINAL 
DESIGN 
A 
Input 
Figure 8. 1 An alternative approach to microfinance 
Previous literature concentrated on design and 'development' (i.e. A to C-figure 
8.1 ), resulting in numerous studies about the lending techniques and impacts of 
microcredit/finance, specifically directed 'upwards' to donors to justify the 
allocation of resources. However, the 'Design- Development' mode (A to C) in 
effect bypassed B (figure 8.1) and overlooked the intervening feedback from the 
grassroots themselves. Research has almost proceeded as though the 
imple_mt:nJati9!! Qff11~J'_Qfi_[laJlC~, dig_nQJ~r_e'!JJY,~Jl1JlJt~r,"_~ith~~UCC~~1),fl_&Sum~<:J-tO~~' _ ~~ c=c .o _ .~ 
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depend upon having a good design for the right institutions, followed by 
efficient resource allocation. The Design-Development mode may generalize 
outward across microfinance institutions and places, but is limited 'downward' 
to practice (Mosse, 2006). The approach disclosed little about the means of 
development (C). MFis and lending technologies might be similar but how they 
work varies greatly. The study argues that expected development (i.e. C) should 
be informed by both the design and subsequent implementation of microfinance. 
Therefore, how microfinance actually works cannot be fully comprehended by 
deterministic economic analysis alone, but should take into account its wider 
social context (B). As a result a different set of issues that focus on trust, 
tensions, emotions, conflict and ambiguity emerge which demonstrably affect 
any outcomes (C) actually achieves. 
Subsequent discussion is now thematically structured to reflect original research 
questions. Loan officers' judgments of microfinance were initially framed 
according to the orientation that resulted from their recruitment and later 
experiences in the field. Therefore the key themes about their judgments, 
relationships, and practice of group-based methodology, demonstrate what was 
found in relation to this wider literature. 
8.3 Loan officer Work 
This research found that there was a wide gap between the work that loan 
officers actually do and the organizational image of a loan officer, which is 
associated with facilitation. Their work was found to be stressful, fragmented 
and characterised by particular difficulties. Their reported experiences revealed 
the informality and unstructuredness of microfinance at the point of interaction 
with clients. These findings support Lipsky's (1980) model of 'street-level 
bureaucrats'. This model has been employed by other researchers (Brodkin, 
2000; Hasenfeld, 1992; Hillhorst and Schmiemann, 2002; Fineman, 1998; 
Keiser, 1999; Riccucci, 2002) to explain how frontline workers obtain and 
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exercise discretion regarding public policy implementation. The model directs 
attention to how policy deliverers (in this case loan officers) actually work and 
attempt to resolve and/or manage different objectives and demands. Drawing 
from the 'street-level bureaucracy' model, this evidence here revealed how the 
practice of microfinance was effectively reconstituted by the actions of loan 
officers, albeit in somewhat unintended and also unacknowledged ways. By 
focusing on the informal, lower-level routines that actualize policy at the point 
of delivery, the study has therefore afforded greater transparency to those 
microfinance processes, which have otherwise been opaque. Loan officers at the 
"bottom" of the MFI organisational ladder are the other "policy makers" and 
"shapers" of micro finance in practice. Similar results were found in Bangladesh 
(Goetz, 2001). A particularly interesting finding was the relational nature of the 
work - there has to be a social construct between two parties; especially that 
between clients and loan officers, and also management with loan officers. This 
perspective could now be further enriched by incorporating the concept of 
emotional labour as developed by Hochschild, (1979) and Ashforth and 
Humphrey (1993). 
8.3.1 Emotional Labour 
This concept has not been used like this before despite being inherent in the 
nature of the work itself (see section 2.9). Ahmad (2000) and Goetz (1996, 
2001) make reference to 'bitter' relationship experiences of field workers, in 
particular those related to non-repayment of credit. Ahmad (2000) reported that 
field workers abused clients over non-repayment of loans and felt embarrassed 
when women clients cried in meetings due to inability to repay. Field workers 
felt such pressure to show compassion but at the same time obtain the money 
borrowed that some believed they were compromised as a result. Rahman (1999) 
reported similar findings. 
Moreover, economic surveys do not disclose the emotive dimension of 
- ITiicrofirianceo-experlencecr1Jrthose-mteractlng closely with il1e-poor. -This-study~ 
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finds that microfinance is about 'compassion management' (Frost et al., 2006) 
and can be emotion laden. Loan officers' work often entails focusing on tasks 
that are difficult to measure (like having to visit clients when sick or bereaved). 
Therefore an ability to manage or express appropriate emotions is central to loan 
officer-client relationships. First, loan officers, like other front-line service 
actors, are situated at the organization - client interface and thus represent and 
'personify' microfinance institutions to clients themselves (see chapter 7). 
Second, their work involves face-to-face interactions with clients and their 
encounters have a changeable and emergent quality. Based on these factors, the 
behaviour of the service agents (the loan officers) strongly affects clients' 
perceptions of microfinance. Emotional labour therefore has potential to 
interpret more of what was expressed as negative about their experiences by the 
CETZAM and PRIDE Zambia loan officers who found it a challenge to manage 
emotions, especially regarding repayment targets. The loan officers who were 
not fully prepared for 'sensitive' frontline work often struggled to manage the 
stress of "wearing two hats" - that of' debt collector' and 'facilitator'. 
Applying emotional labour also reveals the gender dimensions of nature of 
work. Women were often described here as compassionate, charitable, agreeable 
and kind (representing the 'toe'). They were not expected to be aggressive or 
forceful (the 'heel') as when dealing with defaulting clients, while for male loan 
officers it was expected as 'normal' for them if they displayed emotions that 
revolved around anger and implied threats in order to induce fear and 
compliance in clients. From this perspective, this study offers insight into why 
female loan officers came to be regarded as unsuitable, or had to be more 'like 
men' to perform or even 'twice as good' as them. This meant that female loan 
officers had to become 'sociological males' (Goetz, 2001, p.265) by learning to 
be more aggressive, competitive and dominating. The problem of this strategy 
was that both male and female clients often found such aggressive behaviour an 
unacceptable gender role violation. This dilemma for female loan officers 
remained unresolved. This study has shown that rnicrofinance work is laden with 
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emotions and that loan officers have to learn to manage own emotions under 
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pressure to construct relationships with clients and possibly gain social 
'acceptability' without which group forming and performance could become 
problematic. 
Because their work presented many challenges, loan officers did not follow the 
formal procedures and policy as part of 'own' formulated strategy to cope with 
different expectations and demands. From their perspective, it was the most 
'practical' way of making sense of the 'informality' of micro finance at the point 
of interface with clients (a majority being illiterate or semi-illiterate). 
Alternatively, the way in which loan officers undermined and subverted aspects 
of formal lending procedures reflected different "realities". This does not 
suggest either that loan officers did not know, or could not carry out, what was 
required. It could instead simply mean that they found most of group-lending 
requirements to be inappropriate in their specific environment at the time. It also 
helped them deal with other dilemmas of microfinance at the interface with 
clients. Loan officers were never passive in the face of such changes and 
challenges; many struggled to make sense of their experience, and to find new 
ways of articulating their role within the changes that affected their work and 
personal lives. 
8.3.2 Role Conflict and Ambiguity 
The role of local-level development workers (loan officers) has been neglected. 
Previous studies have represented loan officers' role to be that of simultaneous 
village counsellors, money managers, conflict mediators, facilitators and debt 
collectors (Ahmad, 2000; Goetz, 2001; Ito, 2003; Montgomery, 1996). Others 
have observed contradictory demands on loan officers (Jackson, 1997) and 
rising tensions in the face of competing demands. These findings generally 
support the view of loan officers' roles as facilitators. The loan officers here 
however lacked a clear prior understanding of what would be their intended role, 
-and-csubsequently~'took-up'"other ambiguous"and~potentiaUy-conflicting"roles:- · ·· •c--=·c-
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Previous studies are less explicit on role conflict. For instance, less is known 
about loan officers' priorities in the context of change of mission, and pressures 
for sustainability. How do loan officers adapt to these potentially conflicting 
roles, and what impact does this have on how they interact with clients? This 
study has addressed these questions and produced evidence to show that 
organizational self interest, rather than clients', may determine loan officers' 
priorities. In this case 'debt' collecting rather than the facilitative role took 
priority in response to immediate pressures for economic survival. Loan 
officers' role was therefore not given but situationally determined where the 
situation enabled the 'appropriate' role to emerge. 
Whilst the microfinance literature has not dealt with role Issues, other 
organisational studies have long been concerned about what occurs when 
individuals have multiple and mutually incompatible roles (Conley and 
Woosley, 2000; Katz and Kahn, 1978). In this case the roles of 'facilitator' and 
that of 'debt collector' were found to be particularly incompatible. Loan officers 
never seemed to be only facilitators or only 'debt collectors'; they always 
seemed to be both, and according to many of loan officers, they reported feeling 
split between "what to do when" as a "facilitator and [as] a debt collector". In 
addition, the 'strategies' loan officers developed to manage these contradictions 
blurred their judgment of microfinance itself. They made micro finance appear to 
be largely about disbursing loans and repayment, with wider issues eclipsed by 
concern for survival and job security. 
The delivery and practice of microfinance itself has changed with increased 
private participation and now moves towards its commercialization (Prahalad, 
2005; Rhyne, 2005; Fernando, 2003). Microfinance is presented less as a 
charitable endeavour and more as part of building an 'inclusive' financial sector. 
Similarly, CETZAM and PRIDE Zambia like other MFis in the SSA region and 
elsewhere are required to 'transform' themselves into sustainable for-profit 
institutions~guided~by-orthodox'bankingrprinciples '(see"cliaptet 2=an-o"'3fi\C::t~=--c;~~ -
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policy level therefore, there is a changing discourse from 'charity' towards 
'commercialization'. But, this shift (still in its elementary stage) may not 
dovetail with actualities at the grassroots. Consequently, loan officers were 
caught in the middle of two different working 'contexts,' as Zambian MFis (and 
indeed many of MFis in SSA) are in an intermediate stage of transformation. 
How loan officers then judged their work could be viewed as depending upon 
loan officers being both 'facilitators' and 'debt collectors' and, at another level, 
on MFis still considered 'social NGOs' as against their 'new' identity of 
'commercial profit oriented' institutions. Which role MFI's management, and 
ultimately loan officers, actually prioritise can thus affect how rnicrofinance 
subsequently evolves. 
By shadowing loan officers in order to capture what they actually did (see 
chapter 4), this study has shown that loan officers are not empowered to do 
'proper' rnicrofinance as a result of growing emphasis on institutional 
sustainability. They can become 'loan repayment agents' as opposed to 
'development workers' (Goetz, 2001) or 'enablers' of growth. Loan officers 
were preoccupied with negative interactions with clients, instead of those roles 
which foster the idea that MFis are institutions that support and facilitate 
'empowerment' of poor clients. This change in priority has undermined existing 
client loyalty, trust and slowed down new client solicitation as well. 
So far, the literature has not yet viewed loan officers' role conflict and ambiguity 
from an accountability perspective. This study found that loan officers' position 
gave them a central role in integrating both the upward (to management) and 
downward (to clients) accountabilities, but many found it difficult to strike the 
right balance between them. Their role in facilitating accountability at the 
grassroots, within the broader NGO accountability debate alone calls for further 
research. 
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8.4. Working Relationships 
Literature has emphasized that borrowing group members have strong, 
embedded ties, and likely to know one another prior to group membership 
(Anthony, 2005; Hermes eta!. 2005; Johnson, 2004; Morduch, 1999; Woolcock, 
1998). As a result previous literature has focused on group dynamics and in 
particular, horizontal relationships among members (Figure 8.2 A below). These 
studies are based on the assumption that the poor are inherently predisposed to 
working collectively in groups (Sherraden et a!., 2004), which also have the 
potential to empower clients (especially women). Consequently, they have 
focused on the role of social capital (especially amongst members) and networks 
in group forming and subsequent performance (Bastelear, 2000; Woolcock, 
2001 ). The loan officer-client relationship itself is presented as tangential. In 
particular, the factors that enable or constrain their interactions with clients are 
only inferred in most studies-especially in impact studies (Copestake, 2002). 
A B 
Strong social capital & networks Weak connections within group 
Figure 8. 2 Configuration of social networks and relationships 
Close observation of client groups at CETZAM and PRIDE Zambia revealed a 
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greater diversity, and while a few groups were coherent, most were problematic. 
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Thus, this study argues that the assumption that social capital is the 'glue' that 
makes the group members stick together and enforce loan repayment is difficult 
to reconcile with the actual evidence of increased direct loan officers' 
involvement (chapter 6 and 7). The findings give little support for the role of 
social capital and instead argue that the arrangement as seen in figure 8 (A), 
mostly observed in rural based microfinance programmes in Bangladesh may 
not hold. Microfinance in Zambia (like in many other countries in the SSA 
region) is much more urban based (and so is poverty). However, the 
"modernised" urban are currently characterised with weak social ties 
(Copestake, 2001; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998). The evidence here resonates 
with Ferguson's (1999) ethnographic accounts regarding changes in urban 
cultural forms, social interactions, and configurations of identity and solidarity 
on the Zambian Copperbelt. Solomon (2003) also noted that more 'urban' 
groups in Ghana were not as close-knit and their relations not as intimate. 
Relationships in member groups were increasingly shaped not by solidarity 
principles, but by vertical relationships of control and dependence on loan 
officers (see figure 8 (B) above). As a result, group dynamics, cohesion and 
performance were greatly influenced by loan officers' personality and intensive 
involvement99. Horizontal relationships among members were becoming less 
important than previously thought, signifying limited participation. But 
participation can help build ownership and enhance transparency and 
accountability, and in doing so enhances effectiveness of development 
programme. The limited intra-group participation observed in meetings and 
change in relationships could point to a recreation of traditional patron-client 
(i.e., vertical social capital) between loan officers and borrowers (McGregory, 
1997; Fisher, 1997; Hoque and Siddiquee, 1998; Ito, 1998), where group 
members are loosely united with a sense of serving a common "patron" who has 
discretionary power over their individual loan applications. The case shows 
99 In their study of fanner groups in Southern Zambia, Bastelaer and Leathers (2006: 1797), 
found that repayment of seed loans was strongly affected by the number of visits by an extension 
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involvement. 
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more external control and participation (from the top through loan officers) in 
groups, but only because institutional self-interest was threatened. Instead of 
working through group leaders (assumed to have been 'elected'), loan officers 
were developing 'personal' relationships with individual members, and needed 
more time and resources to do so. It was a question of how well connected to the 
group [and community] a loan officer was, rather than member connectedness, 
which here determined acknowledged "success". Personal characteristics and 
'charisma' became overriding factors for loan officers themselves, making their 
relationships sensitive to local cultural expectations. Moreover, client 
relationships were becoming more driven by the need to keep repayment rates 
high and secure jobs, rather than grooming clients to collectively manage their 
way out of poverty. Central to these relationships, however, were trust and 
reciprocity. 
8.4.1. Trust 
Theories of trust and reciprocity offer further insights to the nature of 
relationships within group-based lending methodologies. Microfinance IS 
intensively social and ideally thrives on high levels of mutual trust. For 
sustainable relationships to develop, clients need to trust their loan officers, and 
also trust each other. In other words, trust seems to arise from accepted cultural 
norms that specific people will cooperate, keep verbal agreements, and act 
reciprocally (Lyon, 2000). This trust is integral to group stability, controlling of 
transaction costs, smoothing conduct and thus programme performance 
(Bebbington and Goomez, 2006). In addition, mutual trust between loan officers 
and clients, and also amongst clients themselves, reduces mutual suspicion and 
creates other opportunities for improved group's performance (Bastelaer and 
Leathers, 2006; Woolcock, 1998). However, if trust breaks down between loan 
officers and clients (and among the members of the group) then other problems 
emerge and eventually groups can become dysfunctional. Loan officers and 
:70 _ ,~-----~ __ slie!lJ~ i£J~~~liJt~;qY,jJ_otp_~IJgg£~1~~Lt!latJhi.sJ.l~CLair~aqy.:_o~c:urr~ed. ~et;~(li!}ogrQJJP~~c- c-=-~,--~=c.;o-c=-c ~" 
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leaders and loan officers were not trusted with money. In fact, it was often 
difficult to trust anyone with money, implying a 'culture' of mistrust100. 
Bebbington and Gomez (2006) observe that groups which find trust problematic 
tend to experience higher rates of default, drop-out and even embezzlement101 . 
Research in Bangladesh and India likewise shows that group-based microfinance 
services build trust between members, improve relationships within the wider 
community and increase self-confidence (Goetz, 2001; Kabeer and Mosley, 
2004). Unlike these findings about trusting relationships, this case showed a 
general lack of trust. Smets and Bahre (2004) argue that, the success of group-
based lending depends largely on trust in the actors who participate in them, and 
less on trust in institutions themselves. Because loan officers here represented 
MFis to clients, a lack of trust in them meant that most clients lacked trust in the 
MFis concerned, making it difficult to orally market services through clients' 
positive 'word of mouth'. Trust amongst group members was also problematic 
not only because they lacked close ties, but also because of weak group 
accountability and limited transparency in dealing with each other. Weak mutual 
trust may have more restrictive, longer term implications than envisaged. These 
findings might help explain the slow down in the diffusion of microfinance in 
Zambia and other less trusting cultures. As Fisher (2002) noted, '"credit' after 
all means 'trust"'. 
100 Based on personal communication with AMIZ Director (Lusaka, 29/5/04) and with Head of 
Credit - CETZAM (Kitwe, July 2004). This view was reinforced by two women clients who 
unashamedly revealed that they (the poor) would rather trust 'umusungu' (white person) than 
MFis' staff because the white person keeps his/her promises. Trust amongst MFI' staff was 
equally problematic. 
101 During the course of field study, certain members of staff at branch level were being 
investigated while others were dismissed (two of which had earlier been interviewed). The 
researcher heard numerous stories of embezzlement. Most client groups' on the other hand were 
inactive due to similar incidents -group leaders or treasurers-disappearing with collected money. 
However, the extent of these issues was not investigated as this was outside the focus of the 
-research~-- ------ ------ - ~~- --- -.7 __ -o~~--- -------- ~------~=------.-=--~--~---
221 
8.4.2. Reciprocity 
The study supports Cropanzano and Mitchell's (2005) observation that 
microfinance literature concerning group dynamics has not sufficiently focused 
on expectations of reciprocity in loan officer-client relationships. Here loan 
officers believed that most clients developed a good credit record and 
encouraged others to do so based on the loan officers' own individual 
'goodness' to them. From a client perspective, duty to reciprocate loan officers' 
'helpfulness' and 'understanding' came first, and obligation to repay the loan as 
an agreed contract could be secondary. 'Good' group performance (i.e. loan 
repayment and group forming) was not only driven by the possible economic 
value of accessing future loans but also by the strength of the developing social 
relationships between them and loan officers. The extent of reciprocity could 
alter the nature of relationships. One CETZAM loan officer, for instance, had 
problems with repayments from a group because he did not visit a client (who 
later died) in hospital. Unlike formal banking, social exchange relationships (see 
chapter six) matter in microfinance (Schreiner, 1999). Interestingly, comments 
from these loan officers (especially from CETZAM) indicate that when they 
made extra effort to reciprocate (by giving 'favours' to clients) it was also to 
protect their jobs and not just for the clients' own long-term benefit. Overall the 
research found that the critical element of success in group lending was the 
existence of enabling social relationships between loan officers and MFI clients 
(and not amongst clients)- an element neglected in the literature and overlooked 
within other empirical surveys. Loan officers, in this study, faced a dilemma: 
having 'good' relationships meant that loan officers had to be 'culture-fit' 
(Beugre and Offodile, 2001) in their approach, for respect for elders still shapes 
interpersonal relationships in Zambia and other African countries. However, 
loan delinquency and pressure to achieve high repayments made it difficult for 
loan officers to observe such expectations. As a result many of them felt morally 
conflicted (see chapter 6). 
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8.5. Group-based Methodology Practice 
Previous research has explained the success and/or failure of the group 
methodology in terms of levels of social capital and enforcement of social 
sanctions where members default (Anthony, 2005; Morduch, 1999; Woolcock, 
1998). Client groups are portrayed as self-managing with major roles of 'peer 
monitoring' being taken by members themselves. Others claim that the success 
of rnicrofinance programs and client groups depends more on the activities of 
loan officers (Diagne et al. 2002; Isaia, 2005; Jain and Moore, 2003; MkNelly 
and Kevane, 2002). Evidence here supports the latter view, where loan officers 
were not only central to group formation but, more importantly, to clients' group 
recorded 'successes', especially loan repayment (see chapter 6 and 7). The case 
showed that social capital (especially among poor women) and active 
participation amongst clients were not necessarily key factors in explaining 
group success or failure. It has shown that groups had effectively 'delegated' 
monitoring duties and collection of money to the de facto group leaders - the 
loan officers - instead. This could mean that, while pressure from the group did 
certainly play some part in repayment, loan officers were in effect the 'human' 
glue or 'linking pin' who would create a 'better' group through their 'pastoral 
care' and 'debt collecting'. In view of this, loan officers' sense of having 
"boundless roles" should be seen partly as a consequence of client orientation 
and also a breakdown of mutual responsibility for joint-liability loans. Because 
lenders (through loan officers) could not rely on the clients themselves to help 
with screening, monitoring and collection of money, loan officers took up those 
tasks and thereby increased their workload. 
Notwithstanding loan officers' contribution to the stability of client groups, the 
unintended consequences of intensive involvement have not always been fully 
acknowledged. Loan officers (under pressure to account for group performance 
and meet measurable targets) faced a paradox in their work and began 'adopting' 
_group~ members' -responsibilities ~ and-,roles,- thereby ~making- -them- ~more, -~ 
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vulnerable to 'temptations' of fraud. Group accountability amongst members 
also became more problematic. Instead of jointly accounting for the loans, 
members sought individual accountability directly to loan officers in contrast to 
group solidarity and mutual accounting, which are the founding principles of 
group lending methodology. This result negates the idea of local or group 
participation and the intended principle of self-group management and can 
potentially lead to a more disempowering "dependency" instead. Some clients 
claimed that, besides the issues of fraud, loan officers tended to introduce their 
relatives and friends in groups (contrary to laid down rules) who then 'failed' to 
pay off the full loan, thereby affecting that group's sustainability. 
With regard to group meetings, clients' understandings were largely framed by 
their initial orientation and subsequently by the predominance of money 
collection relative to other activities. Clients clearly did not regard these 
meetings as social occasions but simply as the time for making repayments, 
which contrasted to the assumptions that groups (especially for women) 
provided an opportunity for mutually supportive socialising102• While this may 
be the case for certain contexts in South Asia, especially for women who are 
socially isolated (Goetz, 2001; Isaia, 2005; Rankin, 2006), women's social 
circumstances in the Copperbelt were different. They preferred socialising in 
informal places such as the markets and, for the less poor, kitchen parties 
(Raising, 1999), here exclusively organised for women. This could imply that 
clients (especially women) rely more on informal social interactions, traditions, 
and customs than on established formal associations to build trust and common 
values that underlie group dynamics. Generalising from a specific context like 
Bangladesh to Zambia and the rest of SSA region reflects an implicit assumption 
that all developing country contexts are the same. 
102 Researcher noticed that in some Trust Banks, children aged about 14, atte_!l~d<';~_me~j_ngL;g> 
~ ~ ~~-,--~ -~---~~----~--~,,..- ~--~--~~-~--~-,.,--------~·""'- ~-~------~-~ =· ~----- ~- -~ ~··- -~-~- ·-----~ . -.---proxies. for t 1eif parents on·~ilardians: Other gro-up-memoers togetner with concerned loan 
officers seemed comfortable with it 
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Development efforts focus on building institutional capacity through the 
encouragement of local self-reliance, based on sustainable groups of clients. 
These are aimed at empowering the hitherto excluded. The assumption is that if 
progress is to be achieved it cannot be imposed from the outside and has to be 
built on small locally based initiatives (Marsden, 1994). The findings on group 
dynamics and management support the general assumption in organization 
studies that actors will be more responsive if they are a part of the design and 
implementation of programmes (groups in this case) which affect them and if 
they have made some investment or commitment to them. Such an approach 
may foster more 'ownership' and active participation. 
Unlike the Zambian experience, the bottom-up approach underpins the self-help 
groups (SHGs) approach in Bangladesh. But like most developmental activities 
elsewhere (Pereda and Chrisman, 2006, p.311 ), micro finance in Africa (and in 
particular Zambia) has been conceived externally (see chapter 3), which has 
often led to less significant sense of ownership on the part of clients (even 
amongst loan officers as well as their managers). Even though SSA might have a 
rich heritage of indigenous associations, such as the ROSCAs, there is ample 
evidence of failure of past group/community projects across Africa (Nissanke, 
2001; Porter, 2003). A review of group-based activities in Ghana (Lyon, 2000) 
and elsewhere suggests that the successful groups are typically those established 
by their own initiative, which have evolved slowly, and allowed individual 
members to identify their own objectives and manage their own income. These 
groups share norms of trust and cooperation which are embedded in social 
relations at large. This was not the case with client groups at CETZAM and 
PRIDE Zambia. As Goetz and Jenkins (2005) have observed, this research finds 
that where client groups are set up and controlled by MFI field staff (external 
influence exerted), they are not readily sustained and might not adapt themselves 
for other collective purposes. The direct involvement of loan officers may 
increase group performance but may inevitably diminish group cohesion and 
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input (as self-selection principle is not enforced in the first place) and later 
weaken group accountability, especially in time of default. 
These findings raise an important issue: even where there had been potential for 
success, it can be inhibited by loan officers' domination of groups themselves. 
Client groups are not to be managed just for purposes of facilitating institutional 
survival where this weakens their claim to 'empower' the poor. These 
observations are significant when placed in the context of the current literature 
on NGO accountability relationships (Ebrahim, 2005; Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; 
Kaldor, 2003; Najam, 1996) and, in particular, accountability at the grassroots 
(Dixon, et al., 2006). 
8.6. Accountability 
Hitherto accountability has not been sufficiently incorporated into the study of 
group dynamics in microfinance (especially in 'low' trusting cultures). 
Accountability is itself argued to be a relational concept (Ebrahim, 2005; 
Roberts, 1996). From an accountability perspective, therefore, the lack of active 
participation and mutual accountability exhibited in client groups of CETZAM 
and PRIDE Zambia restricted the goal of tackling exclusion and the 
marginalisation aspects of poverty. The recent World Development Report 
(2006) and several others (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; Malena et al., 2004) have 
made similar links, although directed more at state and citizen relationships 
rather than grassroots. However, accountability may only really make a 
difference if it helps overcome problems in groups and also fits the essential 
'informality' and 'oral' character of rnicrofmance. This case shows that the 
challenge is to ensure the appropriate accountability takes place within groups 
and also between the groups and their loan officers. The question is: 
accountability for whose benefit? In this case, it was accountability to monitor 
outcomes based on reporting systems that were typically aligned hierarchically 
-------- - -··- --:_·· ----......:;_-.,----:: --.:~=::--=-=·-~~-._-:-_--;:---------,--...=--=..-:::~---=.:::--------=-..:--~-:--:;;-::-·~..;--_ --- -~ .... ---=-=-~-:-.-:·.-:·.-----=-- --· 
and entailed a "surveillance" frame of control (Munro and Hatherly, 1993, p 
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369). As a result, loan officers were imposing a vertical type of accountability 
that served their organizational interests, and less for the purposes of promoting 
intra-group participation and self- management. A comparative accountability 
framework for explaining rnicrofinance in action should offer a new dimension 
to the problems faced by loan officers in client groups. Loan officers' attempt to 
take the informal into account here presented a considerable challenge to 
hierarchical accountability and relationships. This perspective fits Goetz and 
Jenkins arguments regarding 'Reinventing Accountability' (2005). While they 
take a macro level perspective to NGO accountability, this research extends their 
argument by linking it to the grassroots' groups, and also argues that appropriate 
accountability at the grassroots is an integral component to 'empowerment' and 
hence poverty reduction. But, the CETZAM case (in particular) has shown that 
more calls for accountability do not necessarily lead to better development 
outcomes. The vertical/hierarchical accountabilities particular to MFis in 
Zambia effectively gave more power to loan officers to hold clients accountable 
to them (and not vice-versa), while weakening horizontal accountability 
(amongst group members). An important general caution is that a standardized 
approach to accountability may require a careful consideration of significant 
differences that exist amongst rnicrofinance NGOs and MFis. 
8.7. Loan Officer Capabilities 
Several studies (Andaleeb, 1996; Ahmad, 2000; Baumann, 2004; Churhill, 1999; 
Olive, 1996; Paxton, 1999) have already found that field workers rarely receive 
proper socialization on the grounds that they are needed immediately in the 
'field' or are constrained by tight budgets. The findings here support these 
concerns and additionally, loan officers here did not possess both business 
development and human relations skills, and in particular, "streetwise" skills 
(Gambetta and Hamill, 2005; Mukama, et al., 2005) specifically related to 
microfinance (Andaleeb, 1996; Sherraden, et al., 2004). Griffith (1987) also 
found that many field workers were not trained to identify the poorest and how 
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to deal with different social relationships. Baumann (2004) in particular noted 
that South African loan officers lacked 'life skills' and a 'mature work ethic'. 
Mosse (2005) has emphasized the importance of social relations to development 
(especially community-driven development). So why it is that this is so 
overlooked in developmental work? Practitioners and donors have concentrated 
on technology transfer and staff capacity building at management and 
supervisory levels (Basu et al., 2004). Yet even where loan officers have been 
the focus of training it has sometimes been inappropriate and/or inadequate for 
promoting and managing group dynamics. Loan officers here claimed that their 
training favoured technical and accounting skills and not other aspects of 
'development' work (see appendix 3 for a proposed loan officers' course 
organised by AMIZ, 2004, and in-house training by MFis). The experiences of 
loan officers suggested that, though variously regarded as the 'agents' (Jackson, 
1997), the 'heart ofmicrofinance' (Chua, 1998), the 'linking pins' (Likert, 1967) 
and 'implementers' (Ahmad, 2000), they were nevertheless marginalised, and 
lacked a thorough understanding of what their work entailed as well as what 
others expected of them. Accordingly, Sherraden et al., (2004) have identified 
the need for staff in microenterprise programs to possess an unusual mix of 
skills because facilitating development in individuals or groups can call for some 
commitment to one's own development as well. The existing knowledge gap and 
skill needs to be addressed for microfinance to gain critical mass among 
communities. 
Although previous studies have highlighted loan officers' limited training and 
other capabilities, they have not explored how microfinance is conducted. How 
can loan officers be change 'agents' of processes they are not able to 
understand? How can they 'empower' the poor when they themselves lack the 
necessary knowledge and skill? Consequently clients did not appreciate the 
basics of the methodology either. Managers' own accounts demonstrated that 
they also underestimated the significance of staff training, citing 'pressure' to 
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attend to other 'urgent' problems in the field. Loan officers here claimed that as 
result, they entered microfinance work with the 'wrong' perceptions. 
8.7.1. Positioning Loan Officers 
The positionality of a loan officer was a significant factor in policy 
implementation and, consequently, microfinance outcomes and development. 
While the literature has located loan officers as members of the microfinance 
institution, this research has demonstrated ambiguities in their position, between 
both their MFI and client group. This has implications not only for the training 
needs of loan officers, but the need for more responsive management itself. As 
Solomon (2003) found, the educational background and socio-cultural context of 
frontline staff (loan officers) needs to be understood in order to appreciate how 
they approach the lending methodology. This should be augmented by training 
that is sensitive to the nature of their work but can also challenge and ultimately 
change their knowledge. 
Responsiveness also means creating spaces to enable them to work through 
operational problems. For example, at CETZAM, while loan officers were 
expected to attend all weekly Trust Bank meetings, as well as provide training, 
loan officers privately curtailed their daily activities and programmes, citing the 
short time frame they were given to meet targets and in particular repayment 
targets. They claimed that this did not allow them to train clients and attend to 
every group (their 'cherry-picking' approach) (chapter 7). A more responsive 
environment would allow for a reflection on and for these difficulties to be 
addressed rather than concealed and, perhaps, contribute to the evolving process 
and practice of micro finance. 
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8.8. Conclusion 
This discussion brings together key themes that 'tell a story' about how 
microfinance works from the actors' own perspectives at the grassroots. The 
research aimed at explaining the variable take-up of microfinance, the role of 
loan officers and to develop an alternative theoretical view that incorporate 
interaction variables and better explains its variable development. The research 
specifically set itself to explore the experiences and actual role of loan officers -
the 'link-pins'. It reveals that diffusion of microfinance cannot be enhanced by 
loan officers prioritizing their 'debt collecting' rather than the facilitative role. 
As a result relationships between clients and loan officers were problematic and 
less trusting. In particular, the emerging hierarchical relationships limited the 
participation of the poor and further development of microfinance at the 
grassroots. Furthermore, the nature of work itself was found to be relational but 
stressful, fragmented and characterised by challenging difficulties. Loan officers 
were particularly found to be ill-equipped for 'field' challenges and generally 
felt marginalised and compromised. Their judgments and experience of 
micro finance were critical in shaping clients' perceptions and performance of 
microfinance institutions as well. 
This research therefore explains the variable take up of microfinance by an 
approach that incorporates feedback from the grassroots in order to inform 
development strategies. Other approaches neglect the role of loan officers at the 
point of interaction with clients, and concentrate on economic outcomes of 
microfinance, without connecting these to implementation. Knowledge of 
economic outcomes may not fully explain how microfinance occurs because this 
is also shaped by other factors, not least loan officers themselves. Loan officers 
are de facto 'policy makers' and implementers who effectively shape 
microfinance practice. Therefore microfinance might not succeed without 
appropriate loan officers/client collaboration and mutual accountability IS 
integral to both 'empowerment' and poverty-reduction. -
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The next chapter, which forms the conclusion for this research, sununarizes the 
major research findings, based on the initial research questions. It also provides 
key learning points for microfinance in emerging areas and makes suggestions 
for further implication for microfinance development policy and practice. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This research has attempted to disclose the role played by loan officers in a 
group-based lending methodology and diffusion of micro finance in Zambia. In 
addressing this issue it has first examined the loan officers' motives for doing 
development work, and their interface with clients. It was originally argued that 
in order to understand the international transferability of microfinance, it was 
necessary to take a more bottom~up perspective from the grassroots, where loan 
officers were 'link-pins'. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first summarizes and reviews the 
main findings to highlight specific results and develop understanding of 
microfinance with particular reference to Zambia. The subsequent section 
highlights three central issues and presents the implications of this research for 
further microfinance development and practice. Finally, it discusses areas for 
further research. 
9.2 Review of Key Findings 
The process of diffusion of microfinance is a central theme. It was found that 
loan officers had multiple, ambiguous and fast-changing roles at this time. Work 
was characterised by the particular problems of seeking to satisfy mixed 
expectations of clients and MFI management. Their ambiguous position 
between management and client groups generated some cognitive dissonance 
and competing expectations, which inevitably affected how they then acted. 
Loan _officers' regard for_their_work_was found7to beinfluenced by their- pre-
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entry socialization, initial orientation and subsequent experiences. Additional 
pressure for institutional sustainability and commercialisation was changing 
relationships and the original character of rnicrofinance itself. The general 
conclusion is that it is not only the prior policy and administrative design of 
rnicrofinance programmes which primarily defined and shaped its actual take-
up, but also local particularities, and the role played by loan officers as well. 
9.2.1 Competing Judgments 
Institutional rnicrofinance started not as if it was 'business', but as a means of 
alleviating poverty and helping poor people to create sustainable livelihoods for 
themselves. Judgments about rnicrofinance in Zambia have been influenced by 
political and historical factors and the strong role which non-governmental 
social development organisations (NGOs) have played in promoting it. As 
social development organisations, they have been judged to be donor driven 
organisations with essentially charitable goals (see chapter 3). This initially 
created an 'us' versus 'them' attitude among MFI clients and also loan officers 
as well, as if to justify taking from 'them', the donors (represented by MFis or 
NGOs ), for the material betterment of 'us', the poor. Poverty alleviation or 
'helping' the poor was/is not necessarily synonymous with regarding this as a 
'business' transaction. This problem was exacerbated because early knowledge 
of rnicrofinance within SSA was primarily imported from South Asia and was 
not locally 'owned' here. This impacted on the development of rnicrofinance in 
the sense that actors' knowledge was variable from the outset. Consequently, 
microfinance institutions had not hitherto been marketed or managed as if they 
were 'commercial' organizations. As service deliverers loan officers had been 
sympathetic in approach, while poor clients assumed that MFis had an 
'obligation' to help them. This has meant slower client take-up, as client groups 
have disintegrated due to non-repayment of loans, and consequently turned loan 
officers more into 'debt collectors' than facilitators. A key finding was that this 
incr~asing_con_y~sciQn_of lo~q Q_fficersjl1tQ d~bt_c()ll_es;1qrs nqt_oplyr~duceg_th~ir __ 
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social status (see chapter 5) but also stigmatized them in a society with declared 
"Christian" ethics. 
9.2.2. Practice Development 
It was found that loan officers were absorbing members' and leaders' roles as if 
those groups were not as self managing as they expected. Money collection had 
become the loan officer's key role (in line with MFI sustainability demands) 
and increasingly displaced other roles such as group capacity building and 
marketing of MFI's services. The group methodology stipulated that group 
members and leaders were responsible for collecting repayments, but it was 
found that loan officers were not just facilitators, but active debt collectors. In 
effect, some role displacement was taking place, and this could threaten the 
further development of micro finance in future. It was not expected to find loan 
officers performing the 'debt' role with such intensity, since previous research 
had presented them as facilitators, in line with formal policy. 
As diffusion of microfinance is its overarching theme, this research has found 
that loan officers were not necessarily empowered to do other 'proper' 
microfinance work because of growing emphasis on institutional sustainability, 
which in effect marginalised other activities that could contribute towards client 
group sustainability. The current practice of microfinance in Zambia may thus 
risk transforming loan officers into 'loan repayment agents' as opposed to 
'development workers' (Goetz, 2001) or 'enablers' of growth. This raises the 
question: can microfinance institutions in SSA achieve long term sustainability 
given such restricted client interaction, where loan officers may increasingly 
become 'loan collection' agents above all? Debt collection was not synonymous 
with 'development from below' and cannot be as 'empowering' as microfinance 
was originally intended to be. If not addressed, it could undermine the base of 
customer loyalty, trust and also slow down new client solicitation as well. 
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Also the practice of microfinance has demonstrated a limited trust and 
forbearance among actors which could be taken as one of the major limitations 
upon the development of micro finance in Zambia. In particular, where relations 
amongst clients and with MFis (represented by loan officers), were 
characterised by mutual distrust, this could discourage potential clients planning 
to access financial services from MFis. Along similar lines, Green et al., (2006) 
and Takyi-Asiedu (1993) found that most entrepreneurs in sub-Saharan Africa 
eschewed networks and sought autonomy because of the distrust they had for 
other cooperative members. However without trust, true reflection and further 
learning amongst MFI staff cannot take place. This hindered improvements to 
practice, especially where loan officers' tacit knowledge became devalued, or 
was treated with suspicion. 
9.3. Relationships and Unintended Consequences 
The research found a strong inclination to building ties with loan officers 
(similar to what Woolcock (1998) labels as "bridging" social capital, or 
"linkage") instead of intra-group ties ("bonding" social capital or "integration"). 
But group-based microfinance is intended to thrive upon integration at a group 
or community level than the linkage 103 • Rankin (2006) observes that 
'"solidarity" groups are expected to mobilize existing networks, trust and norms 
of reciprocity in order to perform' (p.l 03), with loan officers as facilitators of 
the process. However, as the research has clearly shown, group organization and 
loan officers' practice militated against this. Clients expected relationships in 
which they had more social closeness to, and also familiarity with, the loan 
officer rather than their fellow group members (see chapter 8). This finding 
challenges how the organization and management of client groups is usually 
103 Individual lending methodology as used by some MFis may not require high levels of 
"bonding" social capital because individual borrowers' ability to access future loans is not 
dependent on the performance of other group members. In this case, there will be need to work 
ontlie -"onilgiii!f' socialcapitar \vith-loan-oTficers. ~Fort lie "aownside" of soCial capitalsee ·. 
Portes and Landolt, 1996; Mayoux, 2001. This study focused on group methodology. 
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presented in the self-management literature. In effect, it means that the actual 
practice of micro finance as found here could undermine the very basis of group-
lending: social collateral and strong horizontal relations amongst members and 
shifting emphasis towards vertical hierarchical relations with loan officers. If, as 
was claimed by the World Bank (2001), that social capital is a key ingredient 
for development, and that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper 
economically and development to be sustainable, then the group-based 
methodology (outside South Asia) in urban SSA and Zambia needs re-thinking. 
In light of the existing hierarchical relationships and weak bonding, one might 
question whether solidarity groups could be sustainable configurations for 
future urban microfmance, given that urbanisation is a growing phenomenon in 
Africa, along with urban poverty (Mukama, et al., 2005; Solomon, 2003). This 
is where this research contributes to a well acknowledged criticism concerning 
global development institutions like the World Bank, IMF and others which 
have long sought to address poverty issues in developing countries with a 
standardized "one size fits all" approach (Bond, 2006; Kirkpatrick, 2005) which 
fails to take into account the importance of context-specificity for development. 
The current global promotion of microfinance and insistence on applying 
standardized lending techniques attest to this. 
9.4. Mission Drift or Hybrid Form? 
There was evidence to suggest that the practice of microfinance in Zambia and 
elsewhere is still evolving. Globally, the more orthodox banking practices now 
being introduced in microfinance would claim to make it more sustainable and 
profitable. Loan officers and some senior managers were in this case concerned 
that such 'commercialization' could have negative social impact or else result in 
progressive "mission drift" 104. In actuality, loan officers indicated that their 
104 
"Mission drift" refers to a shift in the composition of new clients, or a re-orientation from 
poorer to wealthier clients among existing clients (Cull et al., 2006, p.23). This drift is more of a 
conceril-for-socially~diiveifmictofinanceNGOs orMFKAndsoinvas=for CETZAM. 
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organizations were now targeting what they called the "working poor" 105• This 
change could be a strong pointer to the possibility that inclusive microfinance is 
now reverting back to more orthodox banking (Koveos and Randhawa, 2004; 
Montgomery and Weiss, 2006) which raises important issues of accountability 
and governance, and questions whether its initial poverty reduction objectives 
will be displaced by institutional viability requirements. This does not mean that 
accountability is not an issue, but it does suggest that the particular reporting 
demands of donors (Ebrahim, 2005; Dixon, et al., 2006; Hillhorst, 2003; Porter, 
2003) may inevitably result in loan officers spending more time away compiling 
reports rather than directly interacting with clients. Taking this path may veer 
from the original focus of microfinance, but dovetails with the 'survival' 
argument that prioritizes repayments and meeting of targets. While this may 
prioritize limited donor funds, it could also restrict microfinance to one 
particular category of clients (the most literate and less poor). Alternatively, 
from the 'development' standpoint, microfinance might then survive, but could 
produce a mix of contradictory elements, themselves vertically controlled with 
the unintended outcomes that it may not then reach all the intended poor. 
9.5. Transferring and Developing Microfinance: Is Africa Different? 
Given the argument that group-based micro finance is ideally 'participatory', 
'empowering', 'bottom-up', 'relational' and based on 'solidarity', is effective 
microfinance therefore contingent upon meeting other conditions as well? This 
raised the question: does Africa present different conditions from elsewhere, 
and how do these enable or restrict its further development. Is Africa different 
from other regions when it comes to implementing microfinance? These 
questions created a need to explain the variable take-up of micro finance in SSA 
from the perspective of the actors concerned. 
105 By the "working poor", they were referring to salaried workers such as nurses, teachers and 
other civil servants. Also salary guaranteed loans (SGLS) have been introduced and these need 
no interaction with loan officers- the employer mediates by making payments to the MFI. 
Initially, MFis concentrated on women-the marketeers. Microcredit was synonymous with being 
· a~inarReteet~-witn-connotations··ofTunnini(verys11Hill-ousifiesses in.~o~pen--ma:rket!,-aiid oy 
roadsides. 
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According to Hofstede ( 1980a, 1991 ), management is partially culture-
dependent. Theories or models developed within a given culture reflect the main 
patterns of that culture (Beugre and Offodile, 2001 ). They may therefore not be 
easily transferable to different cultures and, in this case, the African culture. As 
Granovetter (1985) argued, the values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours which 
employees and clients bring into the organization are shaped by those that 
prevail across society at large. While SSA is not a unified region its peoples are 
of diverse and differing cultures both among themselves and with outsiders. 
Even within the same nation state, differences can be substantial. Despite this 
intranational diversity, certain common cultural patterns do emerge which 
characterize (though not exhaustively) most African countries. Beugre and 
Offodile for example identify these as: respect for elders, the importance of the 
extended family, collectivism and deference to power and authority (p. 537). 
Blunt and Jones (1992) also considered these important for understanding 
management practices in sub-Saharan Africa. Of particular interest to the 
fmdings of this research is the importance of the extended family. 
Previous studies have not fully examined group dynamics in SSA in light of this 
cultural value of the extended family. It is relevant because of its potential to 
give insights into the nature of relationships (intra-group relations, loan officer-
client interaction), group formation and subsequent management thereof. The 
extended family is deeply entrenched in the Zambian culture (Ferguson, 1999) 
and much of the rest of SSA (Ackers and Khan, 2004; Nzelibe, 1986)106• As 
such, those working are required to provide the social and financial needs of 
their relatives (Takyi-Asiedu, 1993). Consequently, an obligation to relatives 
may raise questions about nepotism and /or favouritism, but helping one's 
relative for a job or (as the present case) access to financial services (even when 
they do not qualify) is also considered a moral obligation and 'normal' conduct. 
106 The present African family in the urban areas and communities cannot however be said to be 
closely knit as technological development, migration, and other social and economic factors 
liave-torn-family unifs-aparf. But stiir an average-·zamofanrernalnscommitted-tothe exfe-nded. 
family clan. 
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Alternatively, this aspect of 'helping' could also be the consequence of the 
'circumstance'. For instance, the absence of socio-economic 'safety nets' of 
Western countries and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS exacerbates the practice on 
the part of those (be it clients or loan officers) who are left to look after an 
extended family of orphans, unemployed and/or the sick. This cultural value 
(though useful) could challenge the group methodology rule: personal relatives 
are not supposed to be in any group where social sanctions are to be applied. 
Conversely loan officers bring their own relatives, friends and neighbours into 
groups (as a way of helping) even if they then find it difficult to discipline and 
manage in face of default. 
Therefore, while African culture has been collectivist in nature (Hofstede, 1991) 
and its communal orientation a potentially useful (Acker and Khan, 2004) 
aspect of helping one's relatives, tribesman, and neighbours, it can also work 
against the kind of group formation, operation and sustainability that 
microfinance was intended for. This creates dissonance between institutional 
expectations of groups and client's desire to maintain 'community' harmony 
and 'a culture of care'. What this research has explicitly shown is that while the 
collectivist nature of the African culture may initially help to boost client 
numbers for MFis, it may not subsequently sustain the group lending 
methodology unless it is better adapted to differing local specific socio-cultural 
contexts (Siu and Kirby, 1995). For instance, the assumption that social pressure 
enforces group repayments (and not loan officers) may not yield the intended 
results in times of default where it sets relatives against relatives, or neighbours 
against neighbours (and this includes loan officers as well, who may not pursue 
some defaulting clients because of the similar cultural expectations)107. 
107 The obligation to help relatives is not just restricted to clients and loan officers, but may 
extend to recruitment of loan officers and other staff, career progression and discipline. Ackers 
and Khan (2004; 1332) find this to be a general tendency in HRM in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Bastelaer and Leathers (2006) in Southern Zambia, found that membership in the same church 
for instance, was-itWersely-correlated-withrepaymefif pe-r'formafice aue io sfrorig bonos-among 
members of the same church -therefore restricting mutual enforcement discipline. 
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9.6. Contribution of the Research 
This research had the task of increasing knowledge and understanding of how 
microfinance works, transfers and translates elsewhere with particular reference 
to Zambia and sub-Saharan Africa. By exploring microfinance in action at the 
grassroots, it has resituated the discussion about the variable take up of 
microfinance in Zambia, and similar places, outside the original domain of 
South Asia, and also beyond the dominant economic evaluation paradigm. 
The case study is among the first in SSA that reveals the actual working of 
microfinance at the grassroots. It was based on an understanding that takes into 
account different interaction variables in explaining observed actions. It argued 
that the design - development model, which represents the conventional 
approach, does not explicitly recognize the socially constructed nature of 
microfinance work and the diverse interpretations of it. Microfinance 1s 
necessarily relational, and loan officers mediate these relationships, working 
with own peers, superiors, clients and communities. The actors involved 
however, see the process from varying perspectives (as in chapter 5, 6 and 7), 
which are not necessarily complementary or unambiguous. The lack of previous 
research in SSA, and in particular, Zambia, makes this a pathfinding study, both 
with respect to increasing knowledge and for wider comparative purposes. 
Furthermore, while others have focused on lending technologies, institutional 
types and impacts on clients, this research has focused specifically on loan 
officers. This is important for two reasons. First, they facilitate the process of 
microfinance; and second it permits access to the actual work of microfinance. 
However, this is not to say that diffusion of microfinance and its sustainability 
is wholly dependent on loan officers' intensive involvement. Clients' active 
participation, team work and organisation's systems all make a difference as 
well. 
This research also seeks to advance knowledge by linking the concept of 
emotional labour to the work of field workers at the grassroots. Emotional 
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labour is a large part of what loan officers do at the point of interaction with the 
poor. They are expected to be 'enablers' of growth and facilitate the process of 
'empowerment' of the poor. To do that calls for daily exposure to the realities of 
the poor and poverty (which their managers may not often directly see), which 
at times create acute moral dilemmas for loan officers who may at times be 
'victims' of the poverty they are otherwise seeking to address. How can loan 
officers be expected to interact with clients in a detached, emotionless manner 
in despairing environments like the SSA, which are also confronted with the 
HIV I AIDS pandemic? How do loan officers manage emerging emotions, 
tensions and conflicts as they prioritize MFis' sustainability rather than clients'? 
Unless microfinance can revert to the formal banking orthodoxy that eschews 
close and direct interactions with clients, loan officers will continue to 
informally adapt MFis policies to fit the 'field' realities as they find them. 
Thirdly, by focusing on SSA region, where microfinance is still emerging and 
under researched relative to South Asia and Latin America, the research has 
emphasized other issues that account for the diffusion of rnicrofinance. For 
example, success in rnicrofinance has been presumed to rest on the global 
diffusion of concepts and measured results rather than how best to manage the 
intervening process of making it work. As such many MFis in frontier areas 
such as SSA encounter unexpected blockages in their efforts to expand client 
outreach. The importance of this research therefore needs to be seen in light of 
the growing global recognition that microfinance has the potential to be an 
effective strategy in poverty alleviation (Commission for Africa, 2005; World 
Bank, 2005). But this can only happen if rnicrofinance moves from its initial 
promising start to sustainable large scale operation across many different 
countries. Nowhere is the research into the diffusion of rnicrofinance more 
required than in SSA where general levels of financial exclusion are high and 
poverty rates the highest (as discussed in chapter 1 and Table 1.1 ). Meanwhile 
MFis struggle with implementation issues making the potential of micro finance 
more-difficult to realize.--These findings- have therefore-raised the-question: if 
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microfinance is organised thus (as in chapter 6, 7 and 8), can it really ever 
facilitate poverty reduction through active economic citizenship on the kind of 
scale envisioned by for example, the United Nations, the World Bank and the 
Commission for Africa Report, 2005? 
Fourthly, the research contributes to the limited literature on NGO 
accountability by suggesting that use of an accountability framework would 
provide further insights into the actual practice of microfinance. For instance 
sponsors of microfinance institutions and other developmental NGOs call for 
greater accountability as if it were a 'cure all' solution for its many different 
problems. Notwithstanding the importance of institutionalised accountability, 
this research has shown that certain accountabilities can become 
counterproductive, so microfinance reverts back towards orthodox banking by 
excluding precisely the very poor it was originally intended to serve. Group-
based microfinance is based on trust amongst group members and in tum with 
the lending institution. Therefore reciprocated accountability should reinforce 
trusting relationships, and increase their cohesion. Resistance to mutual 
accountability at the grassroots may signify a fundamental shift in the practice 
and orientation of microfinance. In addition, the research has suggested that 
loan officers are the 'link-pins' for any type of accountability, but have not been 
trained to facilitate it. Loan officers are central because of their "buffer" 
position. This means that where commercialisation and sustainability of 
microfinance institutions dominates so will the pressure on loan officers to 
manage client groups in such a way as to prioritize and meet hierarchical 
accountability demands. The question therefore remains: are the demands for 
greater accountability 'constraining' or 'enabling' solidarity-based 
micro finance? Will increased demands for accountability (especially towards 
donors) enable loan officers to reflect on their practice and move closer to their 
clients or is it likely to 'lock' them into 'audit' reports and detailed 
administrative 'paper work'? The World Development Report (2004)- 'making 
services work for-the poor'-and- the Africa eommission~Report-(2005) each 
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make links between poverty reduction and (social) accountability explicit, on 
the assumption that the poor are able to participate directly or indirectly in 
exacting accountability and can themselves hold bureaucrats (even 'street-level' 
bureaucrats like loan officers) accountable. In light of the CETZAM case, 
development workers at the 'sharp-end' (Jackson, 1997) are facilitators of such 
participation and accountability at the grassroots. This research would direct 
attention to how changes in accountability relationships and practices are 
considered to be part of the mobilizing configuration of factors capable of 
encouraging 'local' participation in the development ofmicrofinance. 
In spite of its limitations discussed in chapter 4, this study has the potential to 
make contributions to knowledge primarily because it traversed uncharted 
territory - sub-Saharan Africa and in particular, Zambia. This is the first study 
to focus on the role of loan officers in the diffusion of micro finance in Africa. 
By doing so, this research has contributed to knowledge about how 
microfinance translates across different regions. The strength of this study 
therefore is that it has shed light on how microfinance actually works at the 
grassroots. 
9.7 Further Implications for Microfinance Development Policy and 
Practice 
This research has argued that microfinance can either be constrained or enabled 
by what loan officers actually do in the field with clients. Equally important is 
how they prioritise their roles against the different and also competing demands 
from institutions and clients. The findings are not merely interesting from a 
theoretical vantage-point; they are also highly policy-relevant. 
First, they suggest that diffusion of micro finance cannot be achieved by simply 
transferring lending models and 'best practices' to other emerging areas such as 
Zambia. Although this-practice as Porter-(2003) suggests, -can be linked to donor -
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calls for generic findings about 'best practice', sub-Saharan Africa could be 
different in terms of its political system and culture. These cultural differences 
therefore can pose difficult problems for group-based methodologies which 
have been successful elsewhere. In Ghana, for instance, the application of Asian 
models has been identified as a factor which actually undermines local potential 
for change (Porter, 2003). Policy makers and microfinance practitioners need to 
identify, understand and plan for these significant differences. 
Second, it is critical to note the role played by loan officers or field workers in 
developmental work if efforts to 'empower' the poor are to be more effective. 
Loan officers' knowledge is often highly tacit and management may focus more 
on the tacit dimension of 'local' knowledge to accelerate client take-up and 
development. Also, because microfinance attempts to address poverty and 
works with deprived marginalised people, loan officers who directly personally 
witness "live" sufferings of the poor, face deeper, often moral, conflicts which 
they cannot easily resolve. As a matter of policy, MFis' managers need to 
appreciate and respond to the actual work of loan officers themselves. Reliance 
solely on detached input-output models and externally developed/sanctioned 
'best practices' which do not take grassroots realities into account risks 
neglecting important variables which explain how microfinance actually works. 
Like other previous poverty alleviation interventions in the developing world, 
microfmance programs in SSA could yet fail to build suitable local and durable 
self-reliance (Burkey, 1993). Loan officers are expected to play a pivotal role in 
facilitating such participation. 
Notwithstanding the importance of external resources (donors) into 
microfinance institutions or well formulated designs and policies, microfinance 
is to a great extent about what gets done and how, at the interface with clients 
and the local community. The loan officer is a key figure of the lending process 
(lsaia, 2005), as he/she is the link between MFis and the clients. He/she 
represents the institution-among the people, -so they must be empowered; trained---
244 
and motivated to manage the process. Practitioners need further reminding that 
expecting loan officers to form client groups, manage them and control their 
performance (similar to undertaking a top-down strategy for participation 
(Mohan and Stokke, 2000)), may sometimes serve institution's immediate 
survival concerns, but not offer a sustainable approach to the goal of promoting 
bottom-up participation and empowerment. Diffusion of microfinance is 
constrained if the loan officers who are the 'link-pins' continue to work in the 
"survival mode" -i.e. working to sustain institutions and own livelihoods than for 
clients'. 
Third, the study has policy transfer implications. Exactly because there are no 
two equal settings the transfer of microfmance lending models from one country 
or context to another can still be highly problematic. For instance, the cultural 
settings in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are different, which may then 
affect how relationships are constructed within groups, between loan officers 
and clients, and also whether both female or male loan officers are particularly 
suitable for grassroots developmental work. How microfinance is best practiced 
and diffused can therefore be context dependent. This being the case, the 
process of micro finance is neither fully transferable nor imposable; it also needs 
to evolve and develop its own local fitting 'best practices'. This questions any 
universally standardized 'blueprint' or a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to 
development. An important general lesson of microfinance experience is the 
need for policy and practice to be based on a careful consideration of country 
conditions and differences as well as diversity in institutional organization. 
9.8 Future Research Agenda 
With so little research about the actual organisation and diffusion of 
microfinance, there are other possibilities for future research. Microfinance in 
sub-Saharan Africa is an emerging research site. Future research may consider 
- - --- -- -- ·- - -- -- ---
using an accountability framework to investigate group dynamics and the work 
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of loan officers at the interface with clients. What type of accountability 
facilitates or disables self-management and collective action within client 
groups? Do current calls for accountability take into account the diversity of 
microfinance institutions and its distinct character? This could provide 
alternative but useful insights in enriching our understanding of micro finance in 
action. This is important if microfinance is to make further advances into 
making the socially marginalised become more active economic citizens and 
give them a 'voice' in making their way out of poverty. Moreover, 
accountability has taken centre-stage in development work and in particular, 
within the NGO sector and not-for profit institutions (Dixon. et al., 2006; Goetz 
and Jenkins, 2005; Unerman and 0' Dwyer, 2005) as a way for accounting for 
better development outcomes. Accountability is an issue in Africa now and the 
future as microfinance is likely to become more significant as an inclusive tool 
for reducing poverty levels. Further research on this issue will add depth to 
knowledge. 
From a more methodological perspective, the limitations of time and financial 
resources led to the exclusion of detailed study of CETZAM and PRIDE 
Zambia branches outside Copperbelt, as well as other MFis. The excluded 
branches are not mining towns like the five explored here and it would therefore 
be valuable to see how microfinance process compares. The Copperbelt is 
known to have enjoyed the "social thick" (Ferguson, 2006) policies of the 
Zambia consolidated copper mines (now privatised as separate units) which 
originally promoted a 'culture' of dependence on the mines for livelihoods. 
ZCCM subsidized all basic services to employees and also provided credit for 
consumption purposes. It is questionable whether MFI clients in the non-mining 
towns share this same dependency characteristic or whether they manage 
themselves more independently. Similarly an examination of institutions based 
in Lusaka - the capital, and those with branches in rural provinces would also 
provide useful comparator data with Copperbelt. The case of Lusaka is of 
interest because-ofits ~economic-vitality-ando morecvaried social- structure~-There--
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are also queries about whether the level of urbanisation has significant bearing 
on microfinance development. Such a comprehensive study would shed light 
on group dynamics and the suitability of the group lending methodology to the 
local context. 
A third direction for future research emanates from the fact that the study 
employed a micro perspective approach. Other major factors that could affect 
the diffusion of micro finance were not studied in depth. For example, the study 
focused on the 'field' and on the role of loan officers, but did not follow through 
into upper management. Originally, questions about how management style, for 
instance, affected how the loan officers implemented policy and interacted with 
clients were not included. Similarly, the organizational interface between loan 
officers and their superiors needed further exploration. Other macro related 
factors (economic and legal) have not been fully explored. Future research 
could benefit from an ethnographic approach and integrating both the macro and 
micro perspectives to generating further knowledge on how microfinance 
works. 
In addition, future research could extend the study to other MFis, to establish 
whether loan officers' experiences are driven by the mission of the MFI and 
lending methodology used. For instance, are loan officers in faith-based MFis 
more likely to facilitate social intermediation, and feel more conflicted in 
performing their roles than in those MFis which are not? This research could 
compare with Bornstein's (2003) ethnographic study of faith based development 
in some NGOs of Zimbabwe. There are a number of faith- based MFis and 
NGOs providing credit and other financial services - CETZAM (covered in the 
study) and World Vision Zambia is one of them. Are they more able to conduct 
developmental work at the grassroots? Currently, there is little research in 
Zambia exploring such important issues . 
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Fourthly, a comparative study of Zambia and other regional countries (such as 
Uganda,) could provide interesting comparative data and illuminate the 
similarities and differences in microfinance practice. How for instance does the 
Zambian experience compare with other SSA countries? This would shed light 
on regional variances in client take-up and contribute to advancing our 
knowledge of what works and does not work in SSA. Such an inter-country 
research (directed at the loan officer-client interface) would be a worthwhile 
endeavour. In addition to comparative investigations, studies could be 
undertaken which give more 'voice' to clients' experiences in their own right. It 
is possible that clients might view the development of micro finance in ways that 
diverge from how loan officers and their managers would preferably view it. 
Finally, based on this exploratory study, future research could explore the 
possibilities of incorporating selected organisational variables into economic 
based surveys. In order to capture the complicated and dynamic nature of the 
process of micro finance, both quantitative and qualitative analyses are required, 
thus underlining the need for methodological heterogeneity and 
multidisciplinarity. 
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Appendix 1: Loan Officers' Questionnaire 
Durham 
Dear Respondent, 
The objective of this questionnaire is to collect data that will help us to 
understand who you are in the organisation, how you see microcredit and what 
you contribute to the delivery of your organisation's services to its clients. 
Please note that the questionnaire is not aimed at assessing you or your work and 
that all information and opinion you give is confidential and will be used for 
academic research purposes only. You are encouraged to give your views freely 
and please do not indicate your name on it. 
We fully understand your demanding work situation and therefore have ensured 
the questionnaire is short and easy to fill in. We would appreciate your voluntary 
participation in completing the questionnaire. 
Thank you for your time. 
Contact details: 
Juliana N Siwale 
School of Business 
Copperbelt University 
P.O Box 21692 
Kitwe. 
Zambia. 
Email: Siwalejn@yahoo.co.uk 
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1. Yourjobtitle _____________ _ 
2. Name of Microfinance institution 
-----------
3. Name of the branch 
-----------------
1. About Yourself 
1.1 Gender (tick box): Male D Female D 
1.2 What is your marital status? 
I. Single 
2. Married 
3. Divorced 
4. Widowed 
1.3 What is your age _______ ? 
1.4 Number of children 
-------
1.5 Educational background: 
Please tick the highest level of your educational qualification 
Grade 12 D 
College: -Certificate level D 
-Diploma level D 
(Specify type of diploma and college obtained from) 
University graduate I 
Other Educational Qualification .-I ---. 
(Please specify) __________ _ 
1.6 Are you undertaking further studies now? (Please state the course (s) you 
are studying) 
250 
1.7 How long have you been employed by your current organisation? (Please 
state the number of months or years) ______________ _ 
1.8 Indicate the years of work experience before joining your present employer: 
1. __ Year(s) and with which employer? 
2. None 
---
1.9 If you have worked in another microfinance institution, government 
department or in business why did you leave that job? 
1.10 Why did you originally decide to take up your present job? (Put a tick to as 
many as apply to you) 
Good salary and benefits ____ _ 
I like this work itself 
Interest in working with the poor __ _ 
Want to utilize my education ___ _ 
Want to provide for myself ___ _ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Convenience in working near home ___ _ 
Inspired by others 
Other (please 
1.11 Have you received any training from your present employer? 
Yes 
---
No 
---
1.12 If Yes, please specify the types of training? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
specify) 
1.13 What have you found most or least useful about the training in your present 
job? 
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1.14 What additional training do you think would be relevant? 
(Please explain its importance). 
2. About your organisation 
2.1 What specific services does your organisation provide to clients (in order of 
priority/importance as seen by you)? 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
2.2 Please specify those services your clients most need? (Please write your 
answers in order of priority/importance as experienced by you). 
}. ______________________________ __ 
2. ______________________________ __ 
3. ______________________________ __ 
4. ______________________________ ~~ 
5. ______________________________ __ 
2.3 How does your organisation identify and select people to lend money to? 
2.4 Who do you believe should be the primary target for microcredit or loans 
given by your organisation? _____________ _ 
2.5 Please explain ______________ _ 
2.6 Whom do you (as an individual) prefer as clients? 
Men D 
Women 
Both 
D 
. -·o7, -- -- . -
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,,____ __ 
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2.7 Please explain ________ _ 
2.8 In your opinion are there any difficulties you face in working with: (rank 
your opinion: For example, 1 = most difficulty faced) 
Poor Women 
-Problems in gaining their confidence and trust 
-Lack of time to attend/support meetings 
-Low literacy levels 
-Low self-esteem/involvement 
-Other difficulties (please specify) 
Poor Men 
- Problems in gaining their confidence and trust 
-Lack of time to attend group meetings 
-Mobilizing them in groups 
-Low self-esteem/involvement 
-Other difficulties (please specify) 
2.9 From the listed activities, on average which ones take up most of your time 
per week? (Put them in rank order: 1 =highest activity, 2=second highest etc.) 
Meetings with supervisors/fellow loan officers _______ _ 
Loan disbursement 
------
Paper work 
Getting to where clients are _____ _ 
Following up defaulters ______ _ 
Information collection about clients 
----
Giving advice to clients 
Attending client group meetings 
-----
Other activities (please specify) ___________ _ 
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2.10 In your view, how well is information communicated in your organisation? 
Very well D quite well D average D poor D 
2.11 What kind of support/criticism do you get from your immediate supervisor? 
(Please explain your answer) 
2.12 How often do you discuss your performance with your supervisor? (Please 
circle as appropriate) 
I. Daily 
2. Weekly 
3. Monthly 
4. Quarterly 
5. Any other- (specify) _____ _ 
2.13 Is it normal to have team meetings with other loan officers to exchange 
ideas and experiences? 
Yes ____ , how often?---------~ 
No 
----
lfNot, why? _______ _ 
2.14 Are there any changes being planned that will affect how you serve clients 
in future? 
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2.15 What do you find most/least challenging about your work? 
Most challenging. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Least challenging. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
2.16 What changes would you like to make to improve microfinance? 
2.17 How secure is the job with your organisation? (Tick your response) 
Very secure D Quite secure D Insecure D 
Please briefly explain your response 
Please feel free to make any other comments (in the space below) that you might 
have concerning your work. 
END 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION. 
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Appendix 2 Semi -structured interview questions 
Guide questions to Managers 
(Started with warm up questions. For example, asked for a brief background of 
where they had worked before the current job and how long they had been in 
that position? What was their professional background?) 
1. How far do you think Microfinance has come? (Where has it come from 
and where are we?) 
2. Briefly, what is the background to your organisation? 
3. How would you describe your organisation? 
4. How is your organisation financed? 
5. What is your definition of the target group as an organisation? 
6. What are your achievements as an institution? 
7. What is your understanding of sustainability within microfinance? 
8. In your opinion, what are the major factors affecting the sustainability of 
your institution? 
9. What challenges do you face? 
10. Are other Micro finance institutions different from what you just 
presented? 
11. Do you have best practices? (What are they? How have they evolved?) 
12. How do you see microfinance developing in future? 
13. What do you think are going to be the key management issues in future? 
256 
Guide Questions to Supervisors 
1. How would you describe your job? 
2. What is the role of loan/credit officers? 
3. What do you look for when employing loan officers? 
4. What sort of background do they come from? 
5. Are there gender issues in the selection ofloan officers? 
6. Whom do you prefer? 
7. What are the reasons for your preferences? (Ask about the trend m 
employing female Loan officers) 
8. How do you assess the work of the loan officers? 
9. What sort of training do you give to your loan officers? 
10. What opportunities are there for loan officers? 
11. What problems do they face in their work? 
12. In your opinion, what makes a loan officer effective or ineffective? 
13. If you were starting as loan officer, what would be the challenges? 
14. What do you find interesting about your work? 
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Guide Questions for the Loan officers 
How did you find yourself here? (Warm up question) 
1. What does your organisation expect from you as loan officer? 
2. What do clients expect from you? 
3. What has been your experience in meeting these expectations? 
4. What kind of activities are you occupied with on a daily basis? 
5. Do you have priorities in your job as loan officer? 
6. What guides the way you prioritize your work? 
7. How are groups formed and managed? 
8. Who are your best clients and which ones do you find hard to work with? 
9. How do you build relationships with your clients? 
10. Do you think gender of the loan officer matters to you and to your clients? 
11. Who evaluates your performance? And what is the evaluation based upon? 
12. What are the challenges of your work? 
13. What changes do you anticipate in the future? 
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Former Loan Officers 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
When did you join the organisation? 
What did you expect? 
How long was your stay at the organisation you worked for? 
How would you describe your experiences as a loan officer then? 
Who were your best clients or borrowers and which ones did you struggle 
with? 
What kind of groups did you work with and Why? 
If you were a client, what would you be looking for in a loan officer? 
Are there gender issues in Loan officers' selection? 
Looking back as a former loan officer, what changes would you suggest 
improving for service delivery? 
What are your impressions ofmicrofinance in Zambia? 
Why did you leave the organisation? 
What did you learn? 
How do you feel about your decision to leave? 
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Questions for Borrowers/Clients 
1. How did you first learn about this lending institution? 
2. What did you expect? 
3. How was the group you belong to formed? 
4. What do loan officers do? 
5. What do you look for in a loan officer? 
6. How do you describe your relationship with your loan officer? 
7. Does gender of the loan officer make a difference? How? 
8. When do loan officers help and when do they hinder the loan process? 
9. How are loans decided and paid back? 
10. How would you describe the group meetings you attend? 
11. Do members drop out of groups? 
12. Why do they drop out? 
13. Would you recommend somebody else to this institution and why? 
14. Do you think people are going to be asking for different services in future? 
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Appendix 3: The Challenges of Being a Loan Officer 
It is a big challenge working as a loan officer. Experience confirms much more 
than can be put on paper. Facing challenges begins in the morning when you 
wake up; perhaps you could also have been dreaming you were on a motorbike 
making follow-ups to defaulting trust banks. From the start of the day this keeps 
the mind of the loan officer awake. The morning delinquency reports also 
activate the loan officer who can easily seize anything from a delinquent client. 
It is not easy to manage a number of people in a trust bank. First as a loan 
officer you must be able to manage yourself well (in terms of your social 
behaviour and financially) before you can manage the group. One needs to 
know their strengths in order to make the best contribution to the organization. 
But you also need to work on your weaknesses to able to change your attitude 
and that of clients. In addition you need to be focused, determined, courageous 
and firmly committed to doing your work. A loan officer has to be a person who 
is patient, learning from experiences, and well reasoning to deal with 
mushrooming problems in the trust banks. Overall, you have to be a good public 
speaker. Your approach in terms oflanguage matters most. This is because good 
communication links up people and builds relationships. 
Even though there are a lot of things happening in the field, ensure loans are 
repaid, keep a close eye on arrears and manage your clients well. 
Enjoy your work!!!! 
Published in the internal newsletter for CETZAM-2003 
Author: Loan officer-branch 3 
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Appendix 4 (a): Proposed Course Outline 
Session Summary Contents 
I. Introductions • Profile of a loan officer and responsibilities 
2. Overview of MF Principles • Definitions 
• Types or organisations involved in microfinance 
• MF Principles 
• MF approaches 
• Viability principles 
3. MF lending Methods and • Individual and Group Lending Principles 
clients targeting Clients Targeting Tools 
4. Credit Appraisal • Preliminary features in credit appraisal 
• 5 Cs of Credit 
• Clients screening methods . 
• Business diagnosis techniques 
• Techniques for determining loan terms 
• Use of credit committees 
5. Marketing & product • Marketing Ps 
development • Market Positioning 
• Market Segmentation 
• Product Development 
6. Delinquency Management: 
6.1 Causes and Costs of • Controllable and uncontrollable causes of delinquency 
Delinquency • Costs of delinquency to an MFI 
• Calculating the costs of delinquency 
6.2 Controlling Delinquency • Delinquency Prevention Measures 
• Delinquency Management Measures 
• Developing an institutional plan to control 
delinquency 
• Controlling a delinquency crisis 
• Loan collection methods and legal implications 
6.3 Measuring Delinquency • Calculating and interpreting the various loan portfolio 
quality ratios (i.e., arrears rate, portfolio at risk, loan 
loss rate and repayment rate) through the use of a case 
study. 
7. Communication Skills & • Effective communication techniques 
Time Management • Various communication methods 
• Barriers to effective communication 
• Time management techniques 
8. Customer Care • The economics of customer loyalty 
• Enhancing customer loyalty 
• Measuring customer retention 
• Preventing customer defections 
9. Loan Officer Productivity • Measuring Loan Officer productivity 
• Enhancing loan officer productivity 
I 0. Field work & Action Plans • Participants will be divided into various groups and 
will interview clients on different topics covered in the 
workshop and make presentations 
SoUic~:_ AMIZ training ;rec_o~:ci~. ~\ill~ 10Q4 
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Appendix 4 (b): Types of training received 
CETZAM 
Client listening techniques* 
E-merge (computer loan tracking 
software) 
Group lending methodology 
Insurance scheme 
Motor bike appreciation course 
Additional relevant training 
1. Business management 
2. Public relations 
3. Marketing/business skills 
4. Risk/default management 
5. How to start a business 
PRIDE Zambia 
Marketing and customer care 
Basic business management skills 
HIV AIDS Peer Education/sensitization 
Credit officer induction 
Branch Accounting/management 
Credit Management 
Aggregate Numbers 
5 
10 
5 
6 
0 
6. HIV AIDS Awareness and Counseling 2 
1 7. Social work skills 
* Though client listening methodologies/techniques training was offered, one 
loan officer claimed the job does not provide an opportunity to practice the 
skills. In short they have no time to listen to clients. 
Source: Compiled from questionnaires and interviews with loan officers 
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